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Statement of Policy
 The Accounting Historians Journal is an international jour-
nal that addresses the development of accounting thought and 
practice. AHJ embraces all subject matter related to accounting 
history, including but not limited to research that provides an 
historical perspective on contemporary accounting issues.
 Authors may find the following guidelines helpful.
1. Authors should provide a clear specification of the research 
issue or problem addressed and the motivation for the study.
2. Authors should describe the method employed in the re-
search, indicating the extent and manner in which they intend 
to employ the methodology. Manuscripts are encouraged that 
draw on a variety of conceptual frameworks and techniques, in-
cluding those used in other social sciences.
3. Manuscripts that rely on primary sources should contain a 
statement specifying the original materials or data collected or 
analyzed and the rationale used in selection of those source ma-
terials. Authors should provide the reader information as to how 
these source materials may be accessed.
4. Authors who use a critical or new theoretical framework to 
examine prior historical interpretations of the development of 
accounting thought or practice should include a discussion of 
the rationale for use of that framework in the manuscript.
5. In performing all analyses, authors should be sensitive to 
and take adequate account of the social, political, and economic 
contexts of the time period examined and of other environ-
mental factors.
6. While historians have long debated the ability to assign cau-
sation to particular factors, we encourage authors to address 
and evaluate the probable influences related to the problem or 
issue examined.
7. Authors should clearly state all their interpretations of re-
sults, and the conclusions they draw should be consistent with 
the original objectives of and data used in the study. Interpreta-
tions and conclusions should be clearly linked to the research 
problem. Authors also should state the implications of the study 
for future research.
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IN MEMORIAM: CELEBRATING THE 
LIFE OF BILL SAMSON
WILLIAM DONALD SAMSON (1947-2005)
 Bill was a big man. Yet, even in Alabama’s football sta-
dium, you would know of his presence, hearing him without 
seeing him. He was an asset to every gathering. Richard Vanger-
meersch recollects how Bill and Joni were the lives of the party, 
from Australia to the U.K., and all points between. 
 Bill was a man of fierce loyalties – to Joni, of course, to Ala-
bama, to accounting history and the Academy he once headed, 
to the multitude of his friends. Who else would have been able 
to make accounting history a front page story of the Wall Street 
Journal? Who else could have shamed his more conservative co-
authors on the U.S. railroading project into wearing engineering 
caps at their presentations? Perhaps Bill’s reverence for his men-
tor, Paul Garner, exemplifies his loyalty and his respect for the 
past.
 Bill was one of the biggest hearted men I have ever had the 
privilege to know. Just ask the stray cats and dogs he and Joni 
rescued and welcomed into their home. Whenever I had occa-
sion to visit Tuscaloosa, they took grand care of me.
 The two articles that follow are offered as a tribute to Bill’s 
remarkable contributions to accounting history. The first is 
the latest of a lengthy stream of archival research undertaken 
10
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by Bill, Dale Flesher, and Gary Previts to extend to accounting 
 history Alfred Chandler’s belief that the U.S. transcontinental 
railroads were in many ways the first corporations of the mod-
ern type. The second paper, of a totally different genre, is the 
product of one of Bill’s most heartfelt projects – to convince 
accounting educators of the possibilities for using Theresa 
Hammond’s A White-Collar Profession for the dual purposes of 
generating awareness of accountancy’s diversity issues while, at 
the same time, creating an interest in the profession’s past.
 Bill, we will miss thee.
11
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2006, Vol. 33, no. 1
Published by eGrove, 2006
Accounting Historians Journal
Vol. 33, No. 1
June 2006
pp. 3-24
Dale L. Flesher
UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI
Gary J. Previts
CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY
and  
William D. Samson
UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA
EARLY AMERICAN CORPORATE 
REPORTING AND EUROPEAN CAPITAL 
MARKETS: THE CASE OF THE ILLINOIS 
CENTRAL RAILROAD, 1851-1861
Abstract: This study of the annual reports of the Illinois Central 
Railroad (IC) from the 1850s supports a conclusion that the state-
ments, as to form and content, were developed to serve the needs of 
two classes of investors and to inform the general community of the 
activities of the company. The need to report to the public as to the 
success of the company’s role in its “social contract” to develop the 
state required details of a demographic nature, which were provided 
by the land commissioner. Operating results provided evidence of the 
ability to service the debts held by European investors and to inform 
British venture capitalists of the extent of the company’s operations. 
This communication with the distant capital providers was a new 
development in financial reporting as the capital-intensive railroads 
 experienced management and ownership separation on a scale not 
seen before. In summary, the IC provided annual reports more de-
tailed and informative than those of other corporations of the period 
because of a need to provide European investors with evidence of 
management’s activities.
INTRODUCTION
 From as early as the 1850s, the Illinois Central Railroad 
(IC) published annual reports aimed at both the general, non-
investing, American public and the European (primarily British) 
capital markets, which represented the majority of investors. Al-
though the IC, because of the way it was founded, was a unique 
corporation that had a greater responsibility to the general pub-
lic than do most for-profit corporations, its reporting provides 
an excellent example of duality reporting at its finest since its 
annual reports addressed the needs of both audiences.
12
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 The IC, sometimes called the “Main Line of Mid-America,” 
was America’s first coast-to-coast railroad system, extending 
from Lake Michigan in the north to the Gulf of Mexico. The IC 
was also America’s first land-grant railroad, and thus an experi-
ment in social economy. The transportation that the IC provided 
was the intended product of the U.S. Congress when northern 
senator Stephen Douglas of Illinois and southern senators Jef-
ferson Davis of Mississippi (later president of the Confederate 
States) and William R. King of Alabama (later vice president of 
the U.S.) joined forces to provide an unprecedented form of fed-
eral subsidy that could link agricultural markets and shipping 
points in the emerging population centers in the Midwest and 
Mid-south. 
 The subsidy, in the form of federal land grants, was to shape 
the modernization of America’s frontier. America’s rich interior 
land was almost worthless without the access to markets that 
railroads were to provide. To opponents Senator King remarked 
[Carstensen, 1963, p. 128]: 
We are met by the objection that this is an immense 
grant – that it is a great quantity of land. Well, sir, it is 
a great quantity; but it will be there for five hundred 
years; and unless some mode of the kind proposed be 
adopted, it will never command ten cents.
 This paper, based on the IC’s corporate annual reports 
from the 1850s, analyzes the impact of the land grants (public 
investment) and more traditional private investment, primar-
ily by British investors, on the railroad and the corresponding 
development of the American frontier. These corporate reports 
provided not only financial details to benefit the British capital-
ists who invested in the road, but also a longitudinal view of the 
results of the company’s impact on the development of Illinois 
and related markets. Further, the farmers and merchants who 
were to be the principal customers and beneficiaries of the IC’s 
 services were also parties interested in the information provided 
in these increasingly detailed and complex annual reports. The 
analysis begins with the IC’s first report and ends with the onset 
of the Civil War. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The 
first section identifies the principal research questions, followed 
by a review of the origins and background of the IC. A section 
on the land-grant legislation of 1850 is provided to give the 
reader historic perspective. Next, the economic development 
and capital sourcing plan, especially as it pertains to its influ-
ence on financial statements for the period 1851 through 1861, 
13
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is examined. An assessment of the content of the shareholder re-
ports relative to the communication of operating objectives and 
economic development to the European investors follows. The 
paper concludes with observations about the research questions, 
including implications for further research.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
 The IC annual reports of the 1850s were quite detailed and 
information laden. Therefore, the principal research question 
addressed in this paper is, why did the IC management publish 
the type and amount of information found in them? In short, 
what dictated the form and content of these early corporate 
reports? Such reports were neither mandatory nor common 
among other types of entities. Other railroads, including the 
Pennsylvania, dating from 1847, and the Baltimore and Ohio, 
commencing in 1827, produced quite different reports in terms 
of style, content, and form.1 By undertaking this archival investi-
gation of an antebellum corporate enterprise, the hope is to add 
to the knowledge of the role of information provided to British 
capital markets during a period that has been seldom studied. 
 Although the IC is an important company to study for 
purely historical reasons, it is also important for contemporary 
reasons. Recently, the IC agreed to a merger with the Canadian 
National Railway Co., which creates a railway system extend-
ing from Halifax in the east, Vancouver and Seattle in the west, 
to New Orleans in the south, with Chicago as the geographic 
center. A further 15-year alliance with the Kansas City Southern 
Railway, which operates Mexico’s Transportation Ferroviaria 
Mexicana, will produce a 25,000 mile rail network to capture 
fast-growing cargo traffic stimulated by the North American 
Free Trade Agreement. Again in the 21st century, the “Mainline 
of Mid-America” is being positioned to become the “Mainline of 
North America.” More importantly, examining the financial dis-
closures of the early railroads gives insight into how new tech-
nology impacts accounting and corporate reporting. A parallel 
between the railroad revolution and the Internet revolution can 
be drawn.
1Noteworthy is the fact that railroads, even in their earliest years of devel-
opment, presented lengthy annual reports with many tables and exhibits laden 
with data. Thus, the IC was not unique among railroads in this regard. By con-
trast, the annual reports of industrial companies fifty years later were “postcard” 
size with very little detailed information since such data were considered “pro-
prietary.”
14
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BACKGROUND 
 The federal land-grant legislation of September 1850 
marked the first time that public lands from the U.S. fed-
eral government were to be used to aid in the construction of 
a private rail line [Stover, 1975, p. 15].2 Senator Stephen A. 
 Douglas was the main supporter of the bill in Congress, with 
help in the House from Abraham Lincoln. An original bill in 
1848, limited to public lands in Illinois, was narrowly defeated. 
In 1850, Senators King and Davis amended the bill to extend the 
grants to the southern states. With this new source of support, 
the bill passed the Senate in May and the House in September. 
Initially, there was concern that President Taylor would veto the 
bill because of his possible sympathies for New Orleans. Taylor 
was a plantation owner from Louisiana, and the bill appeared 
to favor Mobile over New Orleans. However, Taylor died in July 
1850, shortly before the bill was approved by Congress. Fillmore 
became president and signed the bill on September 20, 1850, 
within three days after it had passed the House [Stover, 1975, 
pp. 19-21].
 As noted in Senator King’s statement in the introduction, 
the main argument in support of the legislation was the opinion 
that the federal land was worthless without a railroad in the vi-
cinity, and no railroad would build where there was no popula-
tion. However, if a portion of the land were given to the railroad, 
in checkerboard fashion, the remaining land still owned by the 
government would become far more valuable. Thus, the sale 
of the land could be used to finance the railroad, which in turn 
made both the railroad’s land and the government’s land more 
valuable. In reality, Congress viewed the land grants not as sub-
sidies, but as investments to make federal land marketable.
 As the Illinois legislature began meeting in 1851, there were 
three rival groups vying for the right to build the railroad in Il-
linois and receive the federal grant of over 2.5 million acres. 
The winning group, composed of Eastern capitalists, was led by 
Robert Schuyler (“America’s Railroad King”) and Robert Ran-
toul [Stover, 1975, p. 26]. This group’s earlier successful develop-
ment of the New York and New Haven Railroad seemed to be 
an important ingredient, given the need for the involvement of 
credible and experienced management. In return for the rights 
to the federal grant, the Schuyler/Rantoul group agreed to pay 
2State governments had previously used land grants to support canal build-
ing [Baskin and Miranti, 1997, p. 133].
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the state a tax consisting of a percentage of gross receipts. This 
tax, set by the legislature at seven percent, exempted the corpo-
ration from paying Illinois state and local taxes.3 Eventually, the 
revenue from this tax enabled the state to pay off its debts from 
an ill-fated internal improvements program of 1837. The IC was 
officially chartered on February 10, 1851, when the Illinois gov-
ernor signed the charter bill after passage by both houses of the 
legislature. 
 The IC is the only major rail carrier in the U.S. that oper-
ated under its charter name for more than 150 years. Chartered 
on February 10, 1851, parts of the IC system date back even 
further. For example, the West Feliciana Railroad in Mississippi, 
chartered in 1831 as the first railroad west of the Appalachians, 
became a part of the IC in 1892 [Stover, 1975, p. 228]. As noted 
previously, the IC was the first land-grant railroad in America. 
The land-grant details specified that the states of Illinois, Mis-
sissippi, and Alabama were granted a right of way through the 
public lands for the construction of a railroad to extend from 
the western end of the Illinois and Michigan Canal to Mobile, 
Alabama, by way of Cairo, with a branch to Dubuque, Iowa, by 
way of Galena and another to Chicago [Gates, 1934]. The Mobile 
and Ohio Railroad would be the southern land grant railroad to 
complete the link of the Great Lakes and Gulf Coast when the 
lines met on the Ohio River at Cairo. 
 Notable political and popular figures were associated with 
the IC. Its corporate attorney in the 1850s was Abraham Lin-
coln. Some of Lincoln’s most famous cases were on behalf of 
the IC, and his son later became a director of the company. The 
promoters and senior managers of the early IC included many 
linked to important names in American financial circles. Jona-
than Sturges (1782-1863), a founding director who participated 
in the syndicate to incorporate the IC, had learned business in 
the counting houses of Boston, and eventually formed his own 
investment concern [Johnson and Supple, 1967, p. 22]. Sturges’ 
youngest daughter Amelia married J. Pierpont Morgan in 1861. 
Tragically, she suffered from tuberculosis and died on their hon-
3 This exemption had far-reaching implications. When McLean County tried 
to assess the IC’s property, corporate attorney Abraham Lincoln took the case to 
the State Supreme Court where the local exemption for both land and operating 
property was validated. The result was that buyers of railroad lands were content 
to delay payment on land notes for as long as possible so the land would stay 
under IC ownership and be exempt from taxes. As long as the landholders were 
willing to pay interest, the IC management was willing to be lenient with respect 
to payment terms [Decker, 1964, p. 13].
16
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 33 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 23
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss1/23
Accounting Historians Journal, June 20068  
eymoon abroad [Baughman, 1966]. Another daughter of Sturges 
married William H. Osborn, who was to become a dominant fig-
ure in the IC from 1853 to 1882 [Cochran, 1953, p. 422]. Osborn, 
who became involved in 1853 when President Robert Schuyler 
“retired,” is identified as the president of the IC as early as 1855 
[Brownson, 1915, p. 41]. Popular and folk heroes identified 
with the IC abound. Samuel Clemens (Mark Twain) piloted IC 
steamboats on the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers from 1859 to 
1861.4 Train engineer “Casey” Jones died on the IC’s “Cannonball 
Express” train wreck at Vaughn, Mississippi, in 1900. George 
B. McClellan and at least 19 other Civil War generals served as 
corporate officers of the IC either before or following the war. In 
fact, the 1857 annual report identifies McClellan (later Lincoln’s 
opponent in the 1864 presidential election) as the only vice pres-
ident [Stover, 1975]. Another future general, Ambrose Burnside 
(the inventor of sideburns), was the treasurer in 1860. 
 Within four years of being chartered, the IC had more than 
600 miles of track, making it by the mid-1850s the longest rail-
road in the world, bisecting Illinois from Chicago to Cairo and 
veering westward at Galena into Iowa.
FINANCING THE IC
 The incorporators’ plan for financing the IC was simple 
and, to insiders, most attractive. They anticipated using the land 
grant as security for a bond issue, primarily to European inves-
tors, the proceeds of which would pay for construction. There-
after the bonds could be paid off with proceeds from the sale 
of the land, whose value was enhanced by the passenger and 
freight transportation provided by the railroad. This plan would 
permit the incorporators to own the railroad and to operate it 
with minimal investment.5 It was outlined in a letter in 1851 
from one of the incorporators to a Boston business associate as 
follows [Johnson and Supple, 1967, pp. 134-135]: 
The fact is that it is expected to pay for the whole Road 
by the sale of lands – It would be rather a singular thing 
if it should turn out that this company should own a 
Road . . . and cost the stockholders [the present ones] 
4Before a bridge could be built across the Ohio River, the IC exchanged 
freight shipments with the M&O via steamboat. Thus, coast-to-coast rail ser-
vice was available even before the two lines were connected via the Ohio River 
Bridge.
5The leveraged buy-out artists of the 1980s merely were mimicking the busi-
ness model of the “Railroad King” who won the bid to build and operate the IC.
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nothing. . . . Come . . . see for yourself – all depends on 
the selling of the Bonds. Please keep this to yourself.
 In March 1851, the IC board of directors held its first meet-
ing, elected Schuyler as president, and authorized a deposit 
of $200,000 with the State of Illinois to guarantee good faith 
on behalf of the incorporators. The $200,000 came from the 
sale of stock to the 13 incorporators6 [Stover, 1975, pp. 28-30]. 
The incorporators wanted to keep their cash investments at a 
 minimum, and they would later respond to assessments of their 
stock that would far exceed their original plan or intention. 
Bond sales were slow, particularly in Europe where investors, 
especially in Great Britain, were wary of the State of Illinois 
because it had missed interest payments on several loan agree-
ments related to the financing of earlier public works projects. 
However, by adding options to buy stock, large quantities of 
bonds were eventually sold in mid-1852 in both the U.S. and in 
Europe [Stover, 1975, p. 35].
 In the fall of 1851, IC president Schuyler had dispatched 
Robert J. Walker, a former secretary of the treasury during the 
Polk administration, to England to sell IC mortgage construc-
tion bonds. Walker had many wealthy friends in Great Britain. 
He was to receive a one percent commission per dollar of debt 
placed. David Neal, an IC vice president, sailed with Walker on 
the Atlantic, the finest and fastest Cunard line ship. Upon reach-
ing Liverpool, Neal continued to Holland to try to place the IC 
bonds with Amsterdam and Rotterdam investors. It was initially 
felt that the bonds would be easily placed because of the 2.5 
million acres of land serving as collateral for the debt. Unfortu-
nately for the IC, the missions of Walker and Neal failed miser-
ably. No bonds were sold. Europeans wanted nothing to do with 
any security with “Illinois” on it, given the investors’ experience 
with their 1837 Illinois bonds, $15 million of which were still 
outstanding and in default [Stover, 1975, pp. 32-35]. 
 Another reason that the IC bonds could not be placed was 
that the IC was headed by Robert Schuyler, a “gambler, not 
a railroad man” in the eyes of the Europeans who had prior in-
vestment experiences with Schuyler railroads. Second, William 
H. Swift, a West Pointer and former army officer, was advising 
the British investment house of Barings Brothers that the IC 
land, which backed the bonds, was being appraised at too high a 
6Actually, the incorporators subscribed to $1,000,000 of stock, but the initial 
assessment was for only 20% of the stock subscribed [Stover, 1975, p. 32].
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value by company officials [Stover, 1975, p. 33]. In actuality, the 
2.5 million acres were probably not worth more than $3 million 
in 1851, but company estimates placed their future value (1856) 
at a hundred times greater, an appraisal that seemed extremely 
far-fetched at the time but was to prove accurate. In addition to 
Barings, the House of Rothschild also turned down the offer to 
buy IC bonds. Walker and Neal returned to America in Decem-
ber 1851 without a single bond sold.
 Spring 1852 brought new hope to the IC. First, $4 million 
of bonds were sold to U.S. investors. These bonds carried a 
seven percent interest rate with an option to buy ten shares of 
stock for each $1,000 bond. This latter feature made the bond 
sale successful. The IC directors realized that the equity had to 
be increased since the ownership interest could not be limited 
to only 13 investors. During the same time that the bonds were 
sold, the Michigan Central Railroad subscribed to $2 million of 
IC notes in exchange for the right to use the IC rail line into Chi-
cago after it was built. The Michigan Central had no access into 
Chicago and was desperate. Consequently, despite the disdain 
that its management had for the over-leveraged IC, the Michigan 
Central helped the IC start its construction.
 With this start-up capital raised, David Neal and George W. 
Billings sailed to England in March 1852 to try again to sell IC 
bonds. This time the English investment syndicate headed by 
Charles Devaux & Company bought $5 million of IC bonds. The 
interest rate was six percent and the owner of each $1,000 bond 
was given the option to acquire five shares of IC stock. Again, 
it was that option that made the loan attractive to the Devaux 
syndicate. In addition, extant copies of the bonds (see Exhibit 
1) indicate that the investors were allowed to pay in the loaned 
amount in ten quarterly installments starting in August 1852 
and ending on October 1, 1854. This payment schedule coin-
cided with the IC’s need for financing its construction progress. 
With the bond issue fully subscribed by August 16, 1852, Neal 
and Billings set sail for America knowing that the IC had the 
financing that would guarantee the construction of the railroad 
[Stover, 1975, p. 35].
 The IC’s construction began, but scandal soon overtook the 
organization. Schuyler, the IC’s absentee, part-time president, 
was its first wreck even before the trains began running. Be-
tween the fall of 1853 and the summer of 1854, Schuyler found 
that holding the dual roles of both the president and the transfer 
agent for the New York and New Haven Railroad, in addition to 
his presidency of the IC, was too tempting, and he succumbed 
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to selling unauthorized shares of the New York and New Ha-
ven stock and pocketing the proceeds. When Schuyler became 
ill in early July 1854, Morris Ketchum, the locomotive builder 
and one of the IC’s founders, took over Schuyler’s duties and 
uncovered his misdeeds. Schuyler resigned from all of his posts 
and fled to Canada. Even though the IC was not involved in the 
fraud, European investors were shaken. By late August 1854, 
IC bond prices had fallen to 62% of their face amount with the 
stock plummeting as well [Stover, 1975, pp. 35-36].
 The commencement of operations, however, soon led inves-
tors to forget the Schuyler matter. During the next two years, 
European ownership of IC securities increased. The price of the 
IC securities rebounded as the farmland sales in Illinois were 
being promoted throughout the European continent. By 1856, 
80,000 shares of IC stock ($100 par value) and $12 million of 
EXHIBIT 1
Illinois Central 1852 Installment Bond
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bonds were held by European investors, primarily British. The 
bonds, because of the right to subscribe to stock, were an attrac-
tive but speculative investment. In particular, the subscription 
price of $20 controlled the $100 par stock. This was a highly lev-
eraged way of speculating in the completion of the railroad. The 
British ownership of IC securities amounted to over 50% of the 
outstanding subscribed shares; Dutch and American investors 
each owned 15%. Thus, within the U.S., the IC was viewed as a 
foreign-owned corporation. Among the largest IC shareholders 
were noteworthy Englishmen such as Richard Cobden, William 
Gladstone, John Bright, and Samuel Cunard (the shipping mag-
nate).7 
 Investors were caught off guard on August 10, 1854, when 
the IC demanded a $5 per share call against the common stock 
subscribers. This call was followed by another $5 per share call 
on December 10, 1854. These calls for additional capital con-
tributions were a surprise because the shareholders had sub-
scribed to the IC stock believing that their $20 down payment 
for each $100 share would be the extent of their investment. 
This understanding had been based on the early leverage strat-
egy employed by the initial directors. Actually, the 1854 assess-
ments were due to cost overruns on construction
 By 1857, IC stock was selling for $120 per share, and bonds 
were selling at par or higher. According to the American Railroad 
Journal, “no other Company enjoyed the unlimited confidence of 
money lenders of England and America to the same extent,” as 
the IC [Corliss, 1951, p. 92]. This rapture was quick to change. 
The Panic of 1857 affected all companies in America. Illinois 
land speculators who had borrowed to buy federal land on the 
expectation of rising land prices were hard hit. This, in turn, led 
to bank foreclosures and land sales at distressed prices. The Eu-
ropean investors became concerned about the value of their col-
lateral, the two million unsold acres that the IC held. The value 
of the land from the federal grant again became an important 
issue to European investors. By September 1857, there had been 
more calls on equity investors for capital. At the same time, 
7Gladstone, Cobden, and Bright were all members of the British Parliament 
at various times in their careers. Gladstone, a former Chancellor of the Exche-
quer, became prime minister in 1868. In his early career, he had been junior 
lord of the Treasury and under-secretary for the colonies. In 1844, he had been 
responsible for the passage of a railway bill. Cobden and Bright were defeated 
in the 1857 election, and Gladstone was put out of office that year because of 
the change in prime ministers. As a result, all three seemed to have leisure time 
available to deal with IC issues.
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both stock and bond prices had dropped about 50% during the 
year. This led to British investors forming the London Protec-
tive Committee. William Gladstone, a former Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, was elected the head of the group. The IC’s 1858 an-
nual report to shareholders noted, with respect to these London 
meetings [IC, March 16, 1859, p. 2]: 
. . . no direct representative of the company, intimate 
with its affairs and fully cognizant of the various ramifi-
cations of its interests, is present to take part in the dis-
cussions, can hardly fail to be injurious to the general 
interests, and the Directors respectfully suggest to the 
English Shareholders that at least sixty day’s notice of 
any such meeting and its objects, be given, that, if pos-
sible, one of their number may be present. 
 From the time the first bonds had been issued in 1852, the 
British shareholders had exerted a powerful influence on the af-
fairs of the IC, but the Panic of 1857 caused the overseas inves-
tors to seek even more control over the company’s operations. 
The 1858 annual report stated that two gentlemen from the 
London Protective Committee had visited Chicago to examine 
the company’s books. It is likely that they also inspected the rail-
road’s assets, including the constructed line and the unsold acres 
of land. Apparently, this visit was positive for both sides, and the 
result was an attempt to arrange a line of communication be-
tween management and the English investors [IC, 1857, p. 2].
 In 1859, Gladstone appointed Richard Cobden to come to 
America to evaluate the true condition of the IC. Cobden was 
reportedly impressed with what he saw. After seeing the quality 
of the company’s lands, Cobden wrote back to England of his 
support for President Osborn and his endorsement of the fiscal 
policies of the company [Stover, 1975, p. 37]. In return for his 
support, Cobden had a town named for him in southern Illinois 
as did other British shareholders Lawrence Heyworth and Sir 
Joseph Paxton [Corliss, 1951, p. 92]. The 1859 annual report [IC, 
1859, p. 1] noted:
At the urgent request of the London Committee, the 
Directors deferred calls [assessments] in 1858 and 1859, 
although they believed then, as they do at the present 
moment, that the fact of this Company situated as it is, 
with unassessed capital, presenting itself as a borrower 
for short periods, at high rates of interest, has been 
the chief reason for the depreciation of its securities in 
 public estimation.
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The “interference” with the London Protective Committee was 
then discussed [IC, 1859, p. 2]:
London Committee: The experience of the past year has 
confirmed the Board in the opinion expressed in the 
last annual report, that it is not practicable to act with 
sufficient promptness and efficiency in concert with a 
Committee of Shareholders in London, inasmuch as a 
decision upon the Company’s affairs cannot be speedily 
arrived at by correspondence: therefore the Board will 
consider their relations with the Committee as termi-
nated, unless otherwise directed at the next meeting of 
the Shareholders. We are informed that a majority of 
the present Committee concur in this opinion.
EARLY CORPORATE REPORTING, 1851-18618
 At a time when the patterns and expectations about the con-
tent of published annual reports were not well established, the 
IC was thorough in its reporting. In retrospect, the European 
investors should have been able to get a reasonable understand-
ing of the company’s operations from the published reports. The 
stockholder report series began with a three-page report dated 
November 20, 1852. That report covered the activities from the 
founding of the company on February 10, 1851 through Novem-
ber 1, 1852. A rudimentary receipts and expenditures statement 
and a budget (ways and means) statement are all that accom-
pany the single-page letter of President Schuyler. 
 This first report provides few clues about the capital forma-
tion and construction issues that would develop in the years to 
follow. This is not unexpected given the fact that most of the 
issues had not yet been worked out and probably no real plans 
had yet been developed. The next report (from approximately 
November 1852 to December 31, 1853) has not been located 
although it is listed in the catalog at the Newberry Library. The 
next available report, which contains financial statements for 
1854, although dated January 1, 1855, is addressed to the Di-
rectors of the Road. There were 441 shareholders identified as 
subscribing to 127,690 shares as of that date. The statements 
provided in the 1854 report are identified with the capital letters 
A, B, C, and D. The four are (A) a type of balance sheet, (B) a 
form of expenditures statement, (C) a unique interest fund state-
8The IC annual reports are available at the Newberry Library in Chicago [see 
Mohr, 1951, for holdings], the Williams Library at the University of Mississippi, 
and the Bruno Library at the University of Alabama.
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ment, and (D) a budget (ways and means) reporting the status 
of bonded indebtedness.9 The latter two appear to respond to 
the terms of the mortgage bond indenture agreement of June 
23, 1852, between the IC and the bond trustees. The terms of 
the agreement, as detailed in sections six, seven, and eight of the 
indenture, appear to establish a special account for the funding 
of interest payments. Steps were taken to prioritize interest pay-
ments, including assigning operating revenues for that purpose 
as needed and earmarking 250,000 acres of land as security for 
the payment of interest.
 By the end of 1855, the first full year of operations, the re-
port had expanded to over 50 pages of fine print. The financial 
statements are provided on four pages (pp. 13-16) and follow the 
pattern of the previous year but without the alphabetic designa-
tors. Although there was no external auditor, the statements for 
years after 1854 were examined and approved by a three-man 
audit committee of the board of directors. 
 The need to produce such summary statements from de-
tailed records, as found in these early years, versus using the 
records themselves seems clear. There was no “income state-
ment” because operations did not begin until late 1854. Also, the 
company did not begin public land sales until October 1, 1854, 
although, as indicated earlier, land had been pledged as security 
on various bond issues and to secure the interest fund. 
 A full balance sheet appears for the first time for the year 
ended 1856. Each line of the balance sheet is keyed to abstracts, 
identified as A through H and printed immediately below the 
balance sheet, that provide details on the capital stock, the con-
struction bonds, the free land bonds, and the other keyed lines 
on the balance sheet; e.g., short-term debt (scrip) and floating 
(working capital) liabilities. The statement set concludes with 
a novel determination of net earnings, which is then reconciled 
with the interest fund to assure adequacy of that account. The 
next year’s statements follow this pattern of reporting, and a 
9 Alphabetic designation of reports, it should be observed, was found to be 
a common practice in the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad statements beginning 
shortly after it was established in 1827 [Previts and Samson, 2000]. However, the 
B&O statements are different in content. So it does not appear that the IC was 
simply following the pattern of other established roads, but more likely was re-
sponding to the information needs of the British creditors who were concerned 
about the integrity of their interest payments and the related principal. Lardner 
[1850, p. 424] referred to detailed reports with numbered statements in his 1850 
book on railway economics. He stated that such practices were not typical in 
Britain, but were used by Belgian railroads.
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resume of cash transactions (a cash-flow statement with full 
particulars) is added. With minor exceptions, through the year 
ended 1861, the form and content of the IC financial statements 
seem to follow what was established by 1856, with a balance 
sheet detailing the assets committed to the interest fund as the 
principal statement. The IC’s income statement, designated as 
the “Interest Fund Account” (see Exhibit 2), was not carried to 
stockholders’ equity, but to an account essentially equivalent to 
“Bondholders’ Equity.” Again, this was an indirect capitulation 
to the British venture capitalists and their claims to the earnings 
streams of the company. The concept is in sharp contrast to pro-
prietary theory, which would call for the residual to be credited 
to owners’ equity. 
 Comparative columns are added in some instances in the 
annual reports, such as for expenditures, so that trends between 
years, starting in 1852, can be studied. In fact, the reports are 
useful benchmarking documents with many examples of five-
year trends.
 The 1857 report contains an opening statement that asserts 
that the annual report is indeed a report to provide information 
useful for investment decision making [IC, 1857, p. 1]:
The Directors submit herewith the Reports and State-
ments of the Officers of the Company in charge of the 
several Departments of its business, to which the care-
ful examination of the Shareholders is invited, as af-
fording sufficient data to enable each proprietor to form 
his own judgment as to the value of his investment and 
the details of its administration. 
 Many examples can be found of analyses of managerial de-
cisions; for instance, the 1859 report [IC, 1859, p. 6] includes a 
study of the advantage of burning coal over wood. Finally, the 
economic development of the region is highlighted.
REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT REPORTING
 Beginning with 1854, the tenor of the annual reports began 
to change with respect to the information content about the 
railroad’s impact on economic development. The 1854 report 
referred to the growth of new towns along the line and the fi-
nancing by bankers of coal fields in the vicinity of the railroad. 
Economic development was occurring and following the path of 
the railroad. The report [IC, 1854, p. 1] states that:
The Prairie lands of Illinois are the garden of North 
America, and when peopled will become the granary of 
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the Mississippi. The Illinois Central R.R. passes through 
the best of them, bringing them within easy reach of a 
market. Its lands also include large and valuable Coal 
fields.
 When rail operations began, management presented finan-
cial information in great detail, including monthly revenues 
and costs at each depot along the line. Revenues by depot were 
also listed by the nature of the item shipped. The 1855 report 
included a spreadsheet with 32 columns for the transportation 
of different types of commodities, including wheat, rye, hogs, 
whiskey, apples, butter, cheese, and coal. Such detail, in ever-
declining print size, continued throughout the pre-Civil War 
era. By 1860, the spreadsheet had 42 columns, all prepared 
without benefit of computer. The IC management also provided 
extensive commentary on the economic environment within 
which the company operated. For instance, in the 1855 report, 
a table listed every station along the line, with columns for the 
population, the number of houses, and the number of churches, 
schools, stores, hotels, mills, factories, and physicians in 1850 
and 1855 [IC, 1855, p. 3]. The 1855 report went on to mention 
the growth in the importance of coal traffic on the railroad: “We 
are fully persuaded that the coal traffic will become one of the 
most important elements of profit to this road” [IC, 1855, p. 4]. 
The report also included a forecast of $2.5 million of income for 
1856 and a prediction that the road could be operated for fifty 
percent of its gross revenues. 
 Given that the IC owned a great deal of land, it was only 
appropriate that the annual report discuss the sale of land to 
settlers, which amounted to $5,598,577.83 for 528,863 acres, or 
over $10 per acre in 1855. The 1855 report also mentioned that 
since the 1851 grant, the federal government had disposed of 
nearly three million acres of land within 15 miles of the com-
pany’s tracks, and that the counties adjacent to the railroad had 
experienced a population increase of over 250,000 between 1850 
and 1855 [IC, 1855, p. 5]. At the time the report was issued in 
March 1856, the IC had 515 stockholders, mostly British, hold-
ing 129,256 shares, each share having thus far been assessed for 
an average of $20 [IC, 1856, p. 9]. 
 Management identified itself with the economic develop-
ment in the region in the 1855 report with the following para-
graph [IC, 1855, pp. 10-11]: 
. . . an examination of the statistics of the progress of 
the country since it has been opened by railroad com-
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munication, evidences the great value of the Company’s 
lands, from which, in the opinion of the Board, the en-
tire cost of the road will be realized, leaving free of cost 
to the Stockholders, the revenues of this great highway, 
which unites the waters of the Northern Lakes, with 
those of the Ohio and Mississippi, soon to be joined 
at Cairo by the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, . . . and will, 
when completed, form the great avenue of communica-
tion from the Northern States, to the important cities of 
the Gulf of Mexico.
The above comment was after the 1854 assessment call on stock 
subscribers, yet management still was maintaining that the en-
tire cost of the road would be paid for from land sales, leaving 
the revenues “free of cost to the Stockholders.”
 In the annual report section entitled the “Report of the Land 
Commissioner,” there were indications that the report might 
have some public relations or marketing objectives, a factor not 
atypical from modern annual reports.10 It was noted that some 
of the company’s land “is rolling, undulating like the waves of 
the ocean under the influence of a gentle breeze” [IC, 1854, p. 
42]. Other pages celebrated the fertility of the soil, the massive 
deposits of coal and other minerals, and the fact that the lands 
were well watered. This line of argument concluded with the im-
pact on economic development [IC, 1854, pp. 43-44]:
 In no other instance, probably, have such abundant 
benefits flowed from like causes. To the Government, 
the lands were comparatively valueless; to the State, 
they were in no way profitable; to the farmers, their pro-
ductiveness was of no avail, while the quarries of stone 
and marble, and mines of coal with which the lands 
abound, were wholly undeveloped. . . . This Company 
took these lands thus comparatively valueless . . . , and 
by the expenditure of about twenty millions of  dollars, 
imparted vitality to the whole matter by the construc-
tion and equipment of this road.
 In the event that stockholders, many of whom were in far 
off England, failed to understand the underlying meaning of the 
preceding statements, a concluding paragraph attributed to the 
company president bragged [IC, 1854, p. 46]:
The gain to the State has been a largely increased popu-
10 For a study of the public relations and marketing aspects of annual re-
ports, see Graves et al., 1996.
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lation of industrious, intelligent, and enterprising citi-
zens, chiefly producers, a very heavy increase of taxable 
property, an immense acquisition of trade and capital, 
and seven per cent of the gross receipts of this road, 
which will soon go far towards relieving the people 
from all taxation for State purposes.
President Osborn was publicizing the economic progress of the 
state being served by the company, thereby promoting the IC’s 
cause. Whether this was for the purposes of encouraging further 
land sales or merely an attempt to appeal to the penurious inter-
ests of European investors cannot be known.11 Nevertheless, it 
should have accomplished both purposes.
 The 1856 annual report continued the story of economic 
development, with analyses by the directors of changes that had 
occurred in virtually every town along the line. For Kankakee, 
it was noted that the population had swelled to 3,000 and that 
“this will become a smart inland town, being beautifully situat-
ed; eligible lots are worth $750 to $1,200. It is difficult to realize 
that 3 years since the tract of timber, about 900 acres, on which 
the town is located, was sold at $15 per acre.” For most towns 
and villages, the report was glowing with respect to develop-
ment. For Cairo, it was noted that land prices had doubled from 
the preceding year [IC, 1856, p. 2].
 Much of the 1857 annual report was devoted to the prob-
lems the company had faced due to the Panic of 1857, a major 
snowfall in January and February, and record floods late in the 
year. All of these dislocations slowed railway operations. Still, 
there was room for continued discussion of economic develop-
ment. For example, it was noted that on the west side of the 
tracks from Calumet to Mattoon, a distance of 150 miles, there 
had been erected 639 dwellings, 400 out-buildings, 114 orchards, 
and 56,352 plowed acres, none of which existed a few years ear-
lier [IC, 1857, p. 9]. 
 The question remains as to why IC management elected to 
publish such detailed annual reports, given that they were not 
11The European investors, noting the extensive and “lavish” IC advertise-
ments for land in their newspapers and magazines had been concerned about 
the “waste” of money. However, the ads did seem to support the outcome of 
drawing large numbers of European immigrants as the availability of rich, cheap 
farm land was appealing in a place where land was held by the nobility and the 
landless worked for this gentry. Victims of the Irish potato famine were also tar-
gets of the ads. The IC reports were intended to soothe the European investors’ 
concern that the ads were a waste of money.
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mandated to do so by the corporate charter. It appears that both 
subsequent contracts, (1) the bond indenture with British inves-
tors and the corresponding need to establish organizational le-
gitimacy, and (2) the need to promote land sales, were addressed 
by the form and content of the annual reports. Such detail also 
might have been a way of signaling directors and distant inves-
tors that management had control over operations. To this end, 
writing to J. Newton Perkins, the treasurer, in July 1856, Osborn 
observed [Cochran, 1953, p. 423]:
I do not think any of them [directors] are aware of what 
an immense machine this is to handle and I do wish 
them to understand more fully the details of this enter-
prise. I am left alone to this business and have no time 
for my family and for those hours of leisure which the 
other gentlemen enjoy.
If Osborn thought the directors did not understand the extent of 
operations, he surely had even stronger feelings about the dis-
tant European venture capitalists. 
 Management was desirous of reporting more than finan-
cial numbers. In the broadest sense of corporate reporting and 
communication, the accounting that occurred went “beyond 
the numbers” to include evidence relating to economic develop-
ment. Management indeed believed that the IC was the core of 
economic development in the Midwest, and that development 
was a virtue for which the IC should be recognized. Ultimately, 
the IC was the source of many precedents. Later land-grant rail-
roads adopted the IC’s classification and appraisal system as well 
as its contract and credit systems. In addition, the IC’s coloniza-
tion and advertising techniques were later used by other land-
grant railroads [Decker, 1964, p. 101].
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
 This study of the earliest annual reports to shareholders 
of the IC supports a conclusion that the statements, as to form 
and content, were developed to serve the needs of two classes 
of statement users, European investors and politicians, on the 
one hand, and the general community on the other. The bal-
ance sheet orientation and the interest fund emphasis indicate 
the need to provide the European bondholders with the data 
required by the bond indenture. A preliminary and supportable 
premise of this work is that the bond indenture was the legal 
agreement and document that drove the development of the 
IC’s financial report content. At the same time, the European 
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stockholders demanded more information than would an inves-
tor who could see the trains passing by on a daily basis, or who 
could see land being sold and farms and towns being developed. 
Further, the need to report to the public as to the success of 
the company’s role in its “social contract” to develop the state 
required the details of transactions of a demographic nature, 
which were provided by the land commissioner. Operating de-
tails, on a station-by-station basis, also served as evidence of the 
impact of the railroad’s service in areas that had heretofore been 
wilderness. In modern parlance, the details of the reports might 
be rationalized by the need to establish organizational legitima-
cy [see Deegan, 2002; Milne and Patten, 2002]. 
 Alternatively, a critic might suggest that instead of trying to 
impress readers with the quality of reporting, management was 
merely trying to defend itself against investor criticisms with a 
quantitative response in the form of detailed analyses of routine 
items. The large quantity of data helped to hide recognition of 
conceptual issues for which management either had no answers 
or for which publication would cast the company in an unfavor-
able light, such as the deduction of depreciation expense. 
 During the 1850s, the IC was more than a railroad; it was 
the change agent in a major social experiment, an attempt by 
government to foster economic development by using raw, fer-
tile land to motivate not only corporate investors, but to attract 
a productive population as well. The glue that held this experi-
ment together was the financial capital provided by European 
investors. This experiment, as detailed in the narrative of the 
annual reports to shareholders, proved successful, at least that 
is the conclusion based on the information provided by IC man-
agement. Population and agricultural productivity swelled, de-
spite major disturbances, including the Panic of 1857.
 This project has assisted in identifying several reporting 
practices that had not heretofore been acknowledged. Examples 
are the early use of cash-flow statements, the identification of 
“net earnings,” and extensive social economic reporting. Per-
haps a more important example is the British investors’ practice 
of sending representatives to America to examine (audit?) the 
IC during the late1850s. To what extent this can be compared to 
the external audit of today is conjecture at this point, as well as 
whether this was the start of British auditors coming to America 
on behalf of English investors as occurred extensively several 
decades later. In any event, the dispatch of representatives of 
British investors was reassuring for those providers of capital 
as to the soundness of the IC assets, the progress made by the 
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railroad’s development program, and the reality of its financial 
numbers. Given Schuyler’s scandalous departure and the volatile 
and speculative economic condition of the “Wild West,” the use 
of an inspector/auditor representative seems most prudent given 
that the investors’ agency problem was magnified by distance. 
Finally, while not original with the IC, additional assurance of 
proper control over funds was ensured by the use of the audit 
committee of the board of directors.12 
 The examples in the preceding paragraph are not necessar-
ily to be construed as “firsts.” However, these early uses support 
an a priori belief that the corporate form of business, and the 
need to please distant European investors, served to justify and 
instigate such reporting practices. Further study, employing a 
larger set of antebellum railroad reports, is needed to support 
this assertion. For example, the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, the 
IC’s southern sister, first issued British notes in 1854 through 
George Peabody, commencing the M&O’s relationship with the 
London capital market [Samson et al., 2003, p. 338]. The M&O 
annual reports seem to be equally informative as those of the IC. 
 Finally, this study represents an initial inquiry into the an-
nual shareholder reports of the IC. This major corporation, 
which began as an economic development project to some and 
a leveraged land speculation to others, appears to have enjoyed 
success by the end of the period under study. Sharing in this 
 success were European investors who made up the majority of 
the IC’s owners and creditors. More than just sharing in the suc-
cess, the European investors were seemingly responsible for the 
detailed financial reporting of the IC. The need to satisfy inves-
tors in another hemisphere led to detailed financial reporting at 
the IC and at future railroads that emulated it. This narrative 
ends with 1861, as by then the nation was engaged in a violent 
Civil War whose outcome would change the character and role 
of the IC and other railroads. That is another story. 
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Abstract: Accounting educators no doubt agree that diversity is an 
important and much neglected part of accounting education. They 
further recognize that it is difficult to incorporate this important topic 
into the accounting curriculum. This paper describes the efforts of 
various professors to expose business and accounting students to the 
evolution of diversity issues related to the accounting profession by 
using the book A White-Collar Profession [Hammond, 2002]. A White-
Collar Profession: African-American CPAs Since 1921 is a seminal work 
which presents a history of the profession as it relates to African-
American CPAs and documents the individual struggles of many of 
the first one hundred blacks to become certified. This paper describes 
efforts of faculty at four different colleges to utilize this book in their 
teaching of accounting. Instructors found that students not only de-
veloped an enhanced awareness about the history of the accounting 
profession, but that other educational objectives were advanced, such 
as improved communication and critical thinking skills, increased 
social awareness, and empathy for others. African-American students, 
in particular, embraced the people in the book as role models, while 
most every student saw the characters as heroic in a day when the ac-
counting profession is badly in need of role models and heroes. This 
is encouraging given the profession’s concern with diversity and the 
attention and resources directed at increasing the number of minori-
ties entering the profession.
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INTRODUCTION 
 Throughout its history, America has struggled with the is-
sues of discrimination despite its renown as a cultural melting 
pot. A number of groups have received treatment ranging from 
less than fair to extraordinarily harsh with regard to justice, eco-
nomic opportunity, social acceptance, and equality based on 
race, religion, sexual preference, and gender. The accounting 
profession has contributed to this shameful history as minori-
ties have encountered obstacles blocking their way to licensure 
as CPAs [Hammond, 2002]. A White-Collar Profession documents 
the struggles of many of the first one hundred African-Ameri-
can CPAs to enter the accounting profession by recounting their 
 efforts to achieve licensure. It comes at a time when the pro-
fession is at a low-point, in desperate need of attracting quali-
fied minorities. The nation is re-examining issues of race and op-
portunity in areas such as college admission criteria and the role 
of affirmative action and preference [Euben, 2001; Gudeman, 
2001; Downing et al., 2002].
 This paper describes the experience of the authors in us-
ing A White-Collar Profession at various colleges and in various 
ways. The objective of this paper is to share these experiences 
with instructors who might be reluctant to incorporate such an 
assignment into their accounting courses. A range of institu-
tions of higher education is represented in this article: 1) a pre-
dominately white, large, public university in the deep south; 2) 
an historically black, public college; 3) an historically black, pri-
vate college; and 4) a small, private, urban, Catholic, northern 
 university. The instructors’ approaches differed at each institu-
tion as did the courses and the level of students. While the im-
pact the book has had upon students varied somewhat, the au-
thors have all found A White-Collar Profession valuable as a 
supplementary text for their courses and its overall impact as 
consciousness raising.
 In the next section of the paper, the objectives of incorpo-
rating the book into an accounting course are described. This is 
followed by a discussion of alternatives for using A White-Col-
lar Profession in accounting courses. In the succeeding sections, 
the four instructors describe their experiences: what took place, 
the approaches used, and the student reactions observed. The fi-
nal section of the paper considers the concerns reluctant readers 
may still have in adopting this book.
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SUMMARY OF THE BOOK
 A White-Collar Profession has as its focal point the under-
representation of African Americans in the public accounting 
profession. Currently, fewer than one percent of certified pub-
lic accountants are African American, a marked contrast to oth-
er large professions in the U.S., including those with more rigor-
ous educational requirements (see Table 1).
TABLE 1
African-American Representation in Three Professions
 Year Lawyers Doctors CPAs Total Population
 1930 0.8% 2.5% 0.03% 9.7%
 1960 1.0 2.0 0.1 10.5
 1997 2.7 4.2 0.75-0.99 12.3*
 * as per the 2000 Census
 Source: Hammond, 2002, p. 2 
 The book chronicles how the history of the profession was 
one of the major determinants of today’s shortage of African-
American CPAs. Until the late 1960s, very few white-owned CPA 
firms, including the “Big Eight,” had hired any African-Ameri-
can staff. Most states required experience working for a CPA as 
a prerequisite for licensure, thereby posing a difficult challenge 
for those who wanted to enter the profession. Drawing on oral 
histories of one-third of the first one hundred African-American 
CPAs, Hammond narrates the stories of the persistence, talent, 
and determination that eventuated in their success.
 A key characteristic of the book is its focus on the stories of 
individual CPAs rather than on the details of accounting work 
or statistics about exclusion. The book also covers the changes 
in the profession resulting from the civil rights movement and 
the consequent passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 
forbade employment discrimination on the basis of race. The 
major, white-owned CPA firms began to hire African-American 
employees, and accounting departments at historically black 
colleges mushroomed as students availed themselves of the new 
opportunities. While progress continued through the 1970s, the 
representation of African Americans in the major firms declined 
through the 1980s and stagnated in the 1990s. According to the 
latest AICPA data, African Americans today average only one per 
thousand partners in major CPA firms.
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OBJECTIVES IN ASSIGNING THE BOOK
 The authors posit that incorporating A White-Collar Pro-
fession will help move an accounting course beyond the more 
mundane functions of covering text materials, reviewing home-
work problems, and lecturing on mind-numbing FASB stan-
dards. The book offers instructors the opportunity to inject the 
history of the profession which both the Bedford Committee Re-
port [1986, p. 183] and the Accounting Education Change Com-
mission (AECC) [1990, pp. 310-311] urged should be part of ac-
counting graduates’ understanding of the discipline. One theme 
of the book relates the efforts on the part of the first one hun-
dred black accountants to achieve licensure as CPAs. While the 
episodes of discrimination are harsh, the success stories are up-
lifting. Considering the image problem the CPA profession is 
currently facing, this struggle is an inspiring story about persis-
tence, hard work, determination, ambition, focus, and sacrifice 
to reach a goal. Indeed, “ambition and persistence” are person-
al qualities which the Bedford Committee [1986, p. 183] speci-
fied for accounting education to develop in students. Unsolicited 
comments from student participants indicate that this message 
has inspired some students who were struggling in account-
ing. The implication is, the book tells the stories of heroes with 
whom students of all races can identify as models of accom-
plishment. 
 The book allows students to see diversity developments in 
the profession, making them aware of the human side of ac-
counting and “the evolutionary nature of society” [Bedford Re-
port, 1986, p. 181]. As will be described subsequently, assign-
ments can contribute to the development of written and oral 
communication skills [Bedford Report, 1986, p. 182; AECC, 
1990, pp. 305, 311] and teamwork [AECC, 1990, p. 311]. Critical 
thinking skills can be engaged and ethical/moral issues raised 
through assignments related to the book [AECC, 1990, p. 311]. 
Student comments, oral and written, reflect the degree to which 
the attitudes of a significant number of students were changed 
by reading the book. This observed phenomenon fits the objec-
tives of both the Bedford Committee and the AECC. The Bed-
ford Committee [1986, p. 183] cited “empathy” and “sensitivi-
ty to social responsibilities” as two explicit “personal capacities” 
that it recommended be “fostered” in teaching. Similarly, the 
AECC [1990, p. 311] sought “an awareness of personal and so-
cial values” and “sensitivity to social responsibilities” be devel-
oped in accounting graduates. The use of this book meets these 
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educational goals heretofore infrequently addressed in account-
ing courses.
 The authors found another strength of the book is to make 
readers more sensitive to issues of race and problems of dis-
crimination. Thus, A White-Collar Profession is an excellent 
means to meet the AACSB International’s criterion for intro-
ducing diversity into the curriculum [AACSB, 2003]. This AAC-
SB accreditation standard dovetails with the goals of the Bed-
ford Committee and the AECC to raise the social consciousness 
of students. The authors believe that the book helps fill a void 
that current pedagogy is not addressing. In the follow section, 
the authors who have incorporated A White-Collar Profession in 
their teaching of traditional accounting classes describe their 
experiences. A variety of methods were used as were the types 
of institutions, students, and classes. From this discussion, the 
reader should gain insights (and confidence perhaps) as to how 
the book might be utilized in an accounting course. Noteworthy 
are the opportunities to accomplish additional objectives such 
as enhancing oral or written communication skills, developing 
team-working skills, engaging students in critical thinking, and 
dealing with the subject of discrimination in the CPA profession 
from an ethical perspective.
THE MOREHOUSE CONNECTION
 You do not have to turn a page to find the Morehouse con-
nection to A White-Collar Profession! The picture on the front 
cover of the book is that of Mr. J.B. Blayton, the first African-
American CPA in the State of Georgia and the founding father 
of Morehouse’s Department of Economics and Business Admin-
istration. When Professor Hammond spoke about her book at 
Morehouse College, she was accompanied by Mrs. Willie Boyd 
(Saddler), assistant to Mr. Blayton during his tenure at Clark-At-
lanta University, where he became known as the “Dean of Ne-
gro Accountants.” The audience was very interested in the sto-
ries Mrs. Boyd shared with them about Mr. Blayton. Much of 
the two-hour program was spent talking about him and his role 
in encouraging students to become CPAs.
 At the presentation, I got the idea to use the book in my ac-
counting class as a means of exposing students to the extent of 
Morehouse’s influence. J.B. Blayton personified that impact. He 
had audited the books of the famous civil rights organization, 
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. He had been 
highly involved in defending Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. against 
false tax evasion charges which might have derailed the civil-
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rights movement. In the 1930s, he had met with Secretary of La-
bor Francis Perkins to discuss President Roosevelt’s New Deal 
programs from an African-American perspective. In addition to 
Blayton, Charles Beckett, also a Morehouse graduate, is among 
the first one hundred African-American CPAs.
 Morehouse College, the nation’s only private, historical-
ly black, four-year, liberal-arts college for men, is located three 
miles southwest of downtown Atlanta. Approximately one thou-
sand students are enrolled in a business major, with about 250 
students taking accounting principles yearly. Accordingly, this 
class provides the opportunity to introduce all business stu-
dents to Blayton’s contribution and the Morehouse legacy. I also 
thought that exposing them to the history of blacks in the ac-
counting profession might help recruiting efforts directed at mi-
nority students. Learning about the struggles of these first Af-
rican-American CPAs might ignite a sense of pride and inspire 
students to become a part of the profession that many pioneers 
had spent many years trying to enter. On the other hand, I wor-
ried that assigning the book had the potential to hurt recruit-
ing efforts. Would sophomores be deterred from becoming ac-
counting majors because of the struggles depicted in the book? 
I contemplated making the assignment only to my auditing class 
since the career paths of senior accounting majors were already 
determined. Ultimately, I decided to assign the book to my prin-
ciples class during the subsequent spring semester.
The Assignment: Students enrolled in my two managerial prin-
ciples of accounting classes were assigned to read the book dur-
ing their spring break. At that time, they had completed one of 
four major examinations. The students were aware that ten per-
cent of their grade would be based on a special assignment. 
About two weeks prior to spring break, I instructed the students 
to bring money to pay for the cost of their special assignment. 
On the last day of class before spring break, the students com-
pleted a pre-test questionnaire (see Appendix 1). Upon comple-
tion of the survey questionnaire, each student who had paid for 
a copy of the book received it, along with the assignment requir-
ing them to read the book and to submit a three-to-five page pa-
per describing their reactions. The paper was due ten days later 
on the first day of class following spring break. The rationale for 
limiting the reading time was to help mitigate potential threats 
to the internal and external validity for measuring the book’s im-
pact on each student.
 During the first class meeting following spring break, I col-
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lected the students’ reaction papers. We did not discuss the book 
during this session. During the very next class meeting, I admin-
istered the post-test questionnaire which was identical to the 
pre-test survey. I was able to match the two surveys because the 
students included their names on each. Given the low level of 
sensitive information contained in the questionnaire, I did not 
view this as a material threat to the internal validity of the re-
sponses. Students who did not purchase a book or did not com-
plete both questionnaires were excluded from the sample. Four-
teen students were excluded based on the criteria, leaving a 
sample size of 29.
TABLE 2
Sample: Morehouse College
Total enrolled 43
Less:  Did not complete before 3
 Did not complete after 5
 Did not complete either 2
 Did not purchase book 4
  ––
Total Sample 29 
Results of the Survey: The Questionnaire: Appendix 1 contains the 
entire questionnaire. The questions varied over a range of areas. 
Some questions required the students to rank on a ten-point Lik-
ert scale their (a) knowledge of accounting history, (b) attitude 
toward diversity, and (c) appreciation of the importance of the 
accounting profession. Other questions required the students to 
rank their agreement with statements assessing their determi-
nation to achieve goals. A ten-point Likert scale was used for all 
questions.
 Panel A of Table 3 reports some descriptive statistics for 
the sample. The 29 African-American males had a mean age 
of 20. The majority (19) of the participants were sophomores 
with a major other than accounting. Most of the students knew 
what CPA stood for (26) and reportedly knew an African-Amer-
ican CPA (22) before reading the book. However, after reading 
the book, more students reported knowing an African-Ameri-
can CPA (27), resulting in a significant increase, p < .05. Pan-
el B of Table 3 reports frequencies for the two perception ques-
tions. Students’ perception of the number of African-American 
CPAs did not change significantly after reading the book. Many 
thought that the number ranged from less than 1,000 to 5,000 
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(23 and 21 respectively); several more felt the number to be 
greater than 5,000 but less than 10,000. Only two students be-
lieved that there are more than 10,000 African-American CPAs. 
Before the reading, a majority (19) of the students thought that 
1% to 5% of CPAs in the country were African American. More 
(25) subscribed to this perception after reading the book.
TABLE 3
Results: Morehouse College
Panel A: Mean
Descriptive Statistics Before After
Mean Age 20 20
Know definition of CPA 26 29
Know a CPA 22 27
Know African-American CPA 22 27
Panel B: 
Frequency Responses – 
Non-Scaled Questions Before After
12. Perception of number of African-American
 CPAs in the country? 
 a. 10,000 or more  3 2
 b. < 1,000  7 9
 c. < 10,000 but >5,000  3 6
 d. 1,000 - 5,000 16 12
13. Perception of % of African-American 
 CPAs in the country 
 a. 1% to 5%  19 25
 b. >5% but < 10%  7 3
 c. > 10% < 25%  2 1
 d. more than 25% 1 0
 Table 4 reports the mean responses of the participants to the 
scaled questions contained in the questionnaire. The mean dif-
ference reported is based on the students’ pre- and post-test re-
sponses to each question. The difference is used to evaluate the 
impact of the book on the students’ perceptions and attitudes. 
The results show that the book had significance across sever-
al parameters. Without question, the book greatly enhanced the 
students’ knowledge of the history of accounting, particularly 
the history of African Americans in the accounting profession. 
Their knowledge of the history of accounting moved from the 
one-to-five to the four-to-ten range. The mean difference is com-
puted by subtracting the response after reading the book from 
the response before reading the book. Thus, the non-positive 
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mean difference of -3.28 indicates that the students’ respons-
es after reading the book were greater than the response before 
the reading. In this case, students reported that they were more 
knowledgeable about the history of accounting after reading the 
book. The mean difference is significant (p < .001). Similarly, 
students’ knowledge of the history of African Americans in the 
accounting profession increased significantly (mean difference 
= -5.01; p < .001) after reading the book. The mode response be-
fore reading the book was 1 and 3; the post-reading mode re-
sponse was 8. The mode response regarding tolerance of diversi-
ty was 10 in both the pre- and post-survey responses, suggesting 
that the book did not impact this factor. Perhaps the high pretest 
score forestalled any revealed improvement from the book; per-
haps a flaw in the survey’s structure masked a real influence. A 
similar problem occurred at the University of Alabama with the 
pretest survey question related to working with others who were 
different from themselves (age, gender, and race).
TABLE 4
Mean Responses: Morehouse College
   (p-value) of
Questionnaire  Before After Mean Difference
Rank yourself (scale 1-10):
14. knowledge of the history of the 
accounting profession
15. knowledge of the history of 
blacks in the accounting pro-
fession
16. willingness to work as group 
members on teams with mem-
bers who are different from 
yourself as to gender, religion, 
race, and culture.
17. determination to complete this 
course
18. appreciation for the impor-
tance of this course
19. appreciation for the impor-
tance of the accounting profes-
sion
3.5172
2.4138
8.9310
9.7931
8.6552
8.8621
6.7931
7.4828
8.8276
9.5862
9.1034
9.2414
 -3.2759 (.000)
 -5.0690 (.000)
 .1034 (.742)
 .2069 (.206)
 -.4483 (.030)
 -.3793 (.094)
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20. make up mind easily
21. make decisions slowly
22. denied something really wanted
23. will probably drop a class be-
fore graduation
24. would consider dropping a class
25. would consider dropping ac-
counting
26. usually get what I ask for the 
first time I ask
27. would drop a class if: the pro-
fessor said I lacked the required 
skills and background
28. pursue my goal no matter how 
long it took to achieve it.
29. would drop a class if: required 
workload for the class was too 
time consuming
30. would register for a class even 
if: professor is known for being 
difficult
31. would become discouraged 
from pursuing goal if: I did not 
have any money
32. would become discouraged 
from pursuing my goal if: It 
took more than 5 years to 
achieve
33. discouraged from pursuing goal 
if: required school workload 
was too difficult
34. discouraged from pursuing goal 
if: If it took longer than 20 years 
to achieve
TABLE 4 (continued)
   (p-value) of
Agree (scale 1 to 10): Before After Mean Difference
6.9310
5.1379
8.6071
5.2759
5/3103
2.3103
4.6897
2.7241
8.9655
3.2069
7.4828
3.0690
2.4483
2.7931
4.3448
7.3103
5.8621
8.7500
5.8966
5.8276
2.4138
4.4828
2.4138
8.0345
3.0345
7.8276
2.8966
2.8966
2.6552
4.0690
 -.3793 (.459)
 -.7241 (.017)
 -.1429 (.708)
 -.6207 (.350)
 -.5172 (.390)
 -1.034 (.794)
 .2069 (.586)
 .3103 (.272)
 .9310 (.010)
 .1724 (.655)
 -.3448 (.414)
 .1724 (.627)
 -.4483 (.256)
 .1379 (.743)
 .2758 (.499)
43
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2006, Vol. 33, no. 1
Published by eGrove, 2006
35Samson et al.: A White-Collar Profession
 Students had a heightened appreciation for the managerial 
principles course after reading the book (p < .05). Although not 
at the conventional level, they also reported having a greater ap-
preciation for the accounting profession after reading the book 
(p < .10). They agreed strongly with the statement related to pur-
suing a goal (mean response = 8.96); however, their conviction 
diminished somewhat after reading the book (mean response = 
8.03). The mean difference of .93 is significant, p = .01. Finally, 
the book seemingly had an impact on the students’ assessment 
of their decision-making ability. Before reading the book, stu-
dents felt that they made decisions more hastily. Subsequently, 
they revised this assessment and reported that they make deci-
sions more slowly (p = .017).
Student Reactions: Most students openly expressed verbal and 
nonverbal disappointment and disbelief that I assigned this 
reading during their spring break. However, after class resumed, 
at least two students stopped by my office to thank me for mak-
ing the assignment. I could feel their excitement and sinceri-
ty. Students were disappointed that I did not allow them to con-
tinue discussing the book during the first class back. However, I 
did commit to allowing them to discuss their reactions at a later 
time. That evening at a company-sponsored reception, a recruit-
er informed me that several of the students in attendance used 
the book as an “ice-breaker.” The company representatives were 
impressed.
 I reviewed the students’ written reactions to the book. The 
papers were graded primarily on content and completeness. 
About 25% of the participants merely prepared book reports 
rather than describing their own reactions. The remaining stu-
dents gave candid reactions to the book. “Uplifting,” “enlight-
ening,” and “inspiring” were words commonly used by the stu-
dents. Some expressed that they were angered, amazed, and 
saddened by the events chronicled in the book. Most described 
early African-American CPAs as persistent, intelligent, strong, 
and focused, and believed that these qualities should be instilled 
in all. Understandably, almost all of the students indicated that 
prior to reading the book, they were unaware of the racism to 
which African Americans had been subjected in the accounting 
field. A resounding message was an increased appreciation for 
the importance of accounting and respect for those choosing to 
pursue a career in accounting. 
 Many comments were insightful, indicating that the strug-
gles in the book mirrored the struggles of the general popula-
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tion of African Americans. Two students included reference to 
a line from a poem written by Langston Hughes – “life for me 
ain’t been no crystal staircase.” A number of students expressed 
admiration of the African-American CPAs for sticking together, 
noting the importance of mentoring. While a few students per-
ceived that the book will help attract African-Americans to the 
accounting profession, many expressed that they were reluctant 
to pursue a career in accounting given the historic struggles. 
One student wrote: “It is wiser to pursue a career that has been 
thoroughly explored.” Another comment suggested that the ear-
ly discrimination of blacks in the field has resulted in the lack of 
mentors, and, thus, the lack of awareness in the African-Amer-
ican community of the accounting profession. The “oppression 
of blacks in the past may have led to African-Americans’ disin-
terest in accounting.” Many acknowledged progress, but not-
ed that the profession has a long way to go. In an introspective 
comment, one student wrote, “although against our nature, we 
(students) have been pacified to a point such that we tend to shy 
away from that which requires practice and work.” Others tried 
to imagine being in the shoes of the “firsters,” and wondered if 
they could have persevered.
 Most striking to me were the somewhat naïve comments 
expressed by the students. In general, the students did not un-
derstand why the exceptionally intelligent persons highlight-
ed in the book were not hired given the fact that they possessed 
the appropriate credentials. They were genuinely surprised that 
being at the “top of your game” was not enough! They were 
amazed that certification (i.e., passing the exam) did not guaran-
tee a job. Some students thought of racism as only an informal 
system. However, after reading the book, they viewed racism in 
accounting as more deeply ingrained since firms and key organ-
izations were the primary culprits. They were appalled at the 
open insensitivity of the firms and organizations; particular ref-
erence was made to the use of jokes and racial slurs recorded in 
the minutes of the national organization. One student could not 
fathom professional societies holding meetings in “all white” ho-
tels; it seems he was surprised that segregated hotels existed. I 
got the impression that my students had been sheltered from 
the discrimination that many of my era had either experienced, 
lived first-hand, or had been told about.
 The book, A White-Collar Profession, proved to be an ex-
tremely meaningful assignment. The students’ awareness of Af-
rican Americans in the profession seemingly softened their at-
titude toward accounting. When reviewing the students’ written 
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comments, I found overall that the written reactions were con-
sistent with the responses noted in the pre-test, post-test ques-
tionnaires. Further, I observed that many were curious about 
why these facts were not well known, especially among blacks. 
The most common reaction among the students was that the 
book should be assigned in future classes. I concur.
THE JOHN CARROLL EXPERIENCE
 John Carroll University, a Catholic and Jesuit University lo-
cated in the fashionable eastern suburbs of Cleveland, Ohio, has 
a very small minority population. The university reports a mi-
nority percentage of 9.2%1 for undergraduates of whom 4.3% 
are African Americans. The situation in the Department of Ac-
countancy is significantly lower as illustrated by the fact that 
of the 53 Intermediate Accounting students who participated in 
this assignment, only one was an African American.
 It was within this context of a predominately Caucasian en-
vironment that Professor Hammond’s book, A White-Collar Pro-
fession, was assigned as collateral reading. The student’s knowl-
edge of and reactions to the book were tested through the 
mechanism of a take-home essay that constituted 20% of the fi-
nal examination in my Intermediate Accounting I course. The 
specific question upon which the essay was based follows:
Write an essay of two-three pages in which you discuss 
why you think A White-Collar Profession was assigned to 
you as collateral reading. Support your position(s) with 
specific references (quotes and page numbers) from 
the book. Do you feel that the book provided you with 
an appreciation of how diversity issues have plagued 
the accounting profession historically? Do you feel that 
it is fair to condemn the accounting professionals of 
the past for prejudicial attitudes that seemingly have a 
greater relevance in the present?
 I expected that the students’ resentment over a rather time-
consuming assignment at the end of a difficult class that already 
had required more than its fair share of effort would result in 
a negative response to the book. On the other hand, I consid-
ered that this dire expectation would be tempered by the natural 
propensity on the part of our students to attempt to please their 
professors and, thus, to write what they thought I might want to 
hear. To mitigate these threats to the validity of the responses, I 
1 This figure is inclusive of Asian students.
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urged the students to provide an honest reaction and informed 
them that the department had designated an independent read-
er (a graduate student, who teaches English composition) for 
this particular course since it is deemed writing intensive. Thus, 
I would not see the papers until after the grades had been as-
signed. 
 I completed an informal and unscientific word-content anal-
ysis of the 53 essays submitted by the above-mentioned account-
ing students. Immediately evident and personally gratifying was 
a total absence of complaints about the assignment. In point of 
fact, several students confessed that they had had serious doubts 
about the relevance of this exercise in the context of a methodol-
ogy-oriented course such as Intermediate I, but that these reser-
vations were quickly dispelled as they had gotten into the read-
ing. Some saw the value of learning about the history of the 
profession that they were aspiring to enter.
 The message that came across loudest and clearest in the 
essays was an appreciation for having been made aware of the 
struggles African Americans endured in gaining some measure 
of acceptance into accountancy. From my perspective as reader, 
I tried to distinguish between those students who simply averred 
they were made aware of the African-American plight from 
those who seemed to express gratitude for having been made 
aware. The revelation that no knowledge had become some 
knowledge is not particularly powerful. Why should 20-year-old 
students, or even their 60-something professor for that matter, 
know of such things? The more poignant demonstration from 
my perspective lies in the fact that the information is taken to 
heart, either through an overt revulsion to accounting’s past on 
racial issues or through an indication that the profession needs 
to move forward proactively to right past wrongs. My sense was 
that 40 of the 53 students took a stronger stance than merely re-
counting the more powerful episodes of prejudice and claiming 
that they had not been aware of such happenings in the past.
 I specifically asked the question in the essay assignment 
whether it was “fair to condemn” past accountants for prejudi-
cial actions that were more antithetical to present mores than 
to those that existed back then. This question has been one that 
has impacted contemporary accounting historiography, partic-
ularly in separating “critical” historians from the more “tradi-
tional.” Critical historians aspire to using their narratives of the 
events of the past as a catalyst for changing the present. Tradi-
tional historians see themselves more as non-partisan purveyors 
of information. I anticipated that my students would universally 
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think it unfair to ascribe blame, but the results indicated a more 
equal division of opinion. Twenty-three concluded that condem-
nation was unfair, while sixteen took a harder line. However, a 
lack of knowledge of U.S. history may have aversely affected an 
informed evaluation of this question. For example, a number of 
papers actually commented that the timing of the early African-
American struggle for licensure militated against a prejudice-
free thinking since the country had just emerged from slavery.
 One final point I looked for in reading these essays was 
whether the students indicated any degree of satisfaction that 
the racial issues in the accounting profession had dissipated as 
a result of the improvements of recent years compared to the 
struggles of the protagonists in Professor Hammond’s book. 
Again, I found the results surprising. Thirty-three students made 
statements to the effect that the profession had not yet done 
nearly enough and that there was a long way to go before Afri-
can Americans were dealt with fairly as accounting profession-
als. Only ten students felt comfortable that the situation was 
much improved, and that the evils of the past had been handled 
satisfactorily. In summation, I am of the opinion that assign-
ing A White-Collar Profession was an extraordinary experience 
for both my students and for me. A substantial group of wealthy, 
Caucasian students showed me an immense and unexpected em-
pathy for a suppressed minority. 
AN EXPERIENCE IN HISTORY AT  
NORTH CAROLINA A&T UNIVERSITY
 North Carolina A&T State University, a public, historically 
black university has approximately 11,000 students and is locat-
ed in the small, metropolitan city of Greensboro, North Caroli-
na. Given that the university’s School of Business and Account-
ing Department are AACSB-accredited, an assignment using A 
White-Collar Profession was a means by which the AACSB’s di-
versity requirement could be satisfied. 
 The semester-long project was assigned to 37 cost account-
ing students, who were all African American. Additionally, arti-
cles that profiled minorities in the accounting profession [Ben-
son, 1981; Hayes, 1986; Ostrowski, 1986] were also assigned; 
these articles provided background, support, and further em-
phasis on topics described in A White-Collar Profession.
 The students formed groups by self-selection, and each 
group was assigned at least two chapters of Hammond’s book. 
The group was then responsible for summarizing and present-
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ing these assigned chapters to the class. These presentations be-
came the highlight of the semester. Groups presented in the clos-
ing minutes of each class meeting; the discussion/debate became 
lively and stimulating. Because each chapter focuses on a differ-
ent theme (or time period), the student presentation comments 
were generally unique to each session. Communication skills 
were developed and “thinking on the feet” was practiced during 
these sessions as students were not shy in their exchanges.
 In addition to the group work, each student was also re-
quired to submit an essay describing how the book affected his/
her perception of the accounting profession. Questions were 
provided to guide the development of the essay. These questions 
centered around the book’s impact on the student and includ-
ed the following: (1) did the book make students uncomfortable 
with their pursuit of accounting careers? (2) did the book in-
fluence the role that the student saw himself or herself playing 
to change the profession? (3) did the book impact the student’s 
present or future endeavors? (4) what aspect of the book did the 
student dislike or disagree with? The essay, the article summary, 
and the group presentation constituted 15% of the course grade.
 The following summary represents the impact of the Ham-
mond book on students’ perceptions of the accounting profes-
sion, discrimination, and their responsibility/role as account-
ants.
• Students felt overwhelmed (and a few were aggravated) 
by the struggles that the trailblazers endured.
• A few students perceived that the system (earlier discrim-
inatory policies and practices) was insurmountable and 
stated that, “I would have just given up” and “selected an-
other career.” Others felt that they would have become 
extremely radical and aggressive in their pursuits.
• All students agreed that this is a history that was relevant 
to them. Many felt that the knowledge prepared them for 
discrimination that they could encounter as an account-
ing professional.
• Many of the students had worked as interns and had re-
lated their experiences to those events in the book. Most 
felt that there genuinely had been diversity improvements 
in the profession. However, the scarcity in the number of 
minority partners and senior managers observed during 
their internship made them conclude that “the profession 
still has a long-way to go, to reach a truly diverse profes-
sion.”
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• The students were especially pleased in finding people 
of the same race becoming CPAs with whom they could 
identify. For the students, being able to relate to black 
CPAs was important. Other than the few instructors 
and recruiters, students did not know many black CPAs. 
Learning about the first one hundred African-American 
CPAs made the book experience enjoyable. Students rec-
ognized these individuals as role models; the book be-
came a means for the students to live vicariously the lives 
of these heroic pioneers and brave leaders who became 
the first black CPAs. 
• The accomplishments of these CPAs seemed to inspire 
students to be more motivated academically to succeed. 
• Several of the students wanted to become “good role 
models” and “recruit more African Americans into the 
profession.” Most voiced that the black pioneers paved 
the way for them and “now they must continue the path 
for tomorrow’s students.”
 To conclude the project, at the end of the semester, Dr. Ham-
mond spoke to the class and other accounting majors. The stu-
dents asked why she decided to write about African Americans, 
and what advice she would give to aspiring young “accountants.” 
The background she gave regarding her motivation and the writ-
ing process of the book, such as scheduling interviews with the 
book’s characters, augmented the students’ interest in pursuing 
not only accounting, but also their dreams.
THE EXPERIENCE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA
 Alabama has a long history of slavery and segregation to 
overcome. Forty years ago, Governor George Wallace stood in 
the university doorway attempting to block the first African-
American student from registering at the University of Alabama. 
The civil rights marches, the Ku Klux Klan, and black church 
bombings are all part of that history. Much progress has been 
made in ending discrimination and improving race relations 
from the terrible decades of the 1950s and 1960s. Yet, at the 
University of Alabama, the goal of complete integration remains 
illusive as illustrated by the lack of integration by social frater-
nities and sororities despite all manner of encouragement and 
pressure from the university’s administration to do so.
 CPA hiring practices in Alabama have been questionable 
with respect to recruiting minority students for entry-level staff 
positions. The problem seems particularly acute at non-“Big 
50
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 33 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 23
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss1/23
Accounting Historians Journal, June 200642  
Four” firms. The number of black students graduating in ac-
counting has been very small until recently, however, so the is-
sue of discrimination from the employment perspective remains 
unclear.
 I assigned A White-Collar Profession as a supplementary 
textbook in my three sections of tax accounting (first semester 
juniors), approximately 90 students, of whom 15% were African 
American and 3% were other non-Caucasian. Except for an oc-
casional reminder to read the book, I did nothing else related to 
the topic. I gave the students very little guidance except to have 
the book read before Thanksgiving. There would be a 30-minute 
test, worth 10% of their course grade, given during the class be-
fore Thanksgiving. This test would consist of one general discus-
sion question. In addition, students were invited and encouraged 
to attend a presentation by the author, Theresa Hammond, who 
would speak on the Thursday evening prior to the test. I offered 
a two-point bonus (two percent of final grade) for attending, 
plus, of course, the promise of greater insight on the upcoming 
quiz. I also promised to distribute a handout at the presenta-
tion with a list of possible discussion questions to aid and guide 
their study (see Table 5). Those students missing the presenta-
tion could pick up the question sheet at my office on the follow-
ing school days.
 I selected questions #2, #7, and #8 to ask on the test, a dif-
ferent question for each of my three sections. The results of the 
test were excellent. Of 91 students, I gave 85 As, four Bs, and 
two Cs. I confess to my apparent grade inflation without embar-
rassment since the answers were so good.
TABLE 5
Sample Questions Taken From A White-Collar Profession
1) Which profession has an even worse record than accounting as far as per-
centage employment of black Americans?
2) In what ways did Arthur J. Wilson, Jesse B. Blayton, Sr., Mary T. Washing-
ton, Lincoln J. Harrison, Walter Harris, Theodora Rutherford and the others 
described in the book become CPA heroes?
3) What barriers to becoming CPAs did blacks face in the 1920s to 1960s?
4) What barriers to becoming CPAs do blacks face in the 21st Century?
5) What groups, other than African Americans, have been discriminated 
against in becoming CPAs?
6) What is the book’s conclusion about the CPA profession’s past, present, and 
future as to opening its doors to African Americans?
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7) What cracks in the barriers to becoming a CPA allowed the first blacks 
to achieve their goals? [How did these few succeed at accomplishing this 
dream?] What were the common keys in the success stories?
8) Describe the type of accounting practice that black CPA firms operated. 
What types of clients did these firms have? What type of work did the firms 
perform? Analyze and explain what drove these practices in this direction.
 The students’ reaction to the assignment was overwhelm-
ing. At the presentation, the students not only had questions but 
many, particularly the black students, brought their books for 
Professor Hammond to autograph. One very good (white) stu-
dent confessed to her that this was the first book he had ever 
read cover to cover! A (white) female student (from Georgia) 
asked me after Hammond’s presentation if next semester we 
could have one of the first one hundred black CPAs come and 
talk at one of our Beta Alpha Psi meetings. I was floored! I had 
to confess to her that I had not even given that idea a thought 
myself, nor had I a clue, for the moment, where any of the first 
one hundred was living. But I thought it was a wonderful idea.
 In addition to the quiz responses, two black students left me 
notes telling me how much the book had meant to them. One, 
who was struggling in both accounting courses she was taking, 
realized that hard work and persistence were the keys to suc-
cess as demonstrated by the CPAs in the book. The second stu-
dent told me how moved she was by the struggle of those first 
one hundred black CPAs. The book touched her deeply, and she 
thanked me for assigning it as part of the course.
 At the end of the semester, I suggested that students might 
donate A White-Collar Profession to their public or high school 
libraries back home. One student volunteered that she had giv-
en it to her father to read; he is partner in the Washington, DC 
office of one of the “Big Four” CPA firms, an Alabama graduate, 
and a loyal supporter of our program.
 In the subsequent semester, I assigned the book in my mas-
ters-level, tax-planning course.2 The book was again used as sup-
2 In the course, I ran pre- and post-test surveys of five questions each which I 
hoped would capture the impact of the book on students’ knowledge of the history 
of the profession, their willingness to work with and accept those who are differ-
ent from themselves, and their willingness to overcome obstacles. The history of 
the profession question showed the impact of the book. However, the questions 
related to the students’ acceptance of others failed to measure change since every 
student rated him/herself the maximum on the pre-test survey. Because of how 
students rated themselves on the pretest . . . (that each was very willing to work 
with people who were from different cultures, religion, race, age, or of gender 
than the student), the post-test score did not reflect any improvement. 
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plementary reading, with a three-page paper due the last week 
of the course in which the students explained why they thought 
I had assigned this book and what made this book relevant to 
the course. This paper represented ten percent of the course 
grade. In the tax-planning course, I had 15 students of whom 
eight were masters of tax students, six were masters of account-
ancy students, and one was getting her Ph.D. in economics. The 
papers, with the exception of one, were very thoughtful and in-
sightful. The answers, as I anticipated, were very different since 
there was a multitude of reasons to justify using A White-Collar 
Profession. The papers reflected that the students had genuine-
ly learned a great deal from the book, raising their awareness of 
the history of discrimination within the profession, an issue to 
which they confessed of being totally unaware. Despite the “fail-
ure” of the pre-test, post-test survey to capture the impact of the 
book (see footnote two), the papers the students submitted re-
vealed that much had been learned by reading the book and that 
their attitudes had been impacted as well.
DISCUSSION
 Accounting educators no doubt agree that diversity is an im-
portant and very neglected part of accounting education. They 
further recognize that it is difficult to incorporate this impor-
tant topic into the accounting curriculum. This paper describes 
the efforts of various professors to expose business and account-
ing students to the evolution of diversity issues related to the ac-
counting profession by using A White-Collar Profession [Ham-
mond, 2002]. 
 A White-Collar Profession presents a history of the profes-
sion and biographies of the first blacks who overcame huge ob-
stacles to become CPAs. While some find the book disheartening 
in that the profession was racist in blocking African-American 
entry into the profession, the stories about those first black CPAs 
who succeeded are inspirational and uplifting. It is also interest-
ing to see where the profession is today in terms of accepting Af-
rican Americans into the profession. One view is that the pro-
fession has not gone nearly far enough; for example, there are 
only a handful of partners in the Big Four firms who have come 
from minority groups. Another view would hold that while the 
accounting profession has a way to go to be truly open and di-
verse, it is making progress. Thus, the book is relevant and inter-
esting for presenting an important topic that transcends cover-
age in accounting textbooks.
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 This paper provides a description of the outcomes of assign-
ing the book in various accounting classes at a range of institu-
tions of higher education (see Table 6). This paper also contains 
sample questions that are a good resource for professors who 
may use the book. These questions can serve as the catalyst for 
an out-of-class essay assignment or an in-class exam or quiz. All 
of the participants had minimally completed the first principles 
course, and thus had some previous knowledge of accounting. 
Participants perceived the assignment as valuable and relevant. 
Many expressed appreciation for having had their eyes opened 
to the events depicted in the book. Many of the Caucasian stu-
dents at one institution expressed empathy for the pioneers 
highlighted in the book; however, their opinions were mixed re-
garding the fairness of ascribing blame for the discriminatory 
behavior of the past. The book seemingly provoked some soul-
searching among the African-American male students. Many Af-
rican-American participants felt a strong sense of pride and were 
motivated to work harder. Perhaps most notable is the overt will-
ingness of both the Morehouse and Alabama students to work 
with others. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that the stu-
dents’ ability to accept diversity may be correlated with their na-
ïveté about racism in general and the profession in particular. 
The Morehouse and John Carroll experiences provide evidence 
of this phenomenon. Thus, it is just as important to determine if 
their response would differ after learning of the discriminatory 
practices reported in the book. In particular, despite past history, 
toleration of differences is a way of life to which the participants 
are seemingly accustomed and plan to continue. In our view, the 
profession should view this revelation as positive, particularly in 
the case of African-American males.
 We encourage other instructors to consider using this book 
in similar ways so that more students would be exposed to the 
issues that the book raises and the inspiring stories the book 
conveys about the history of the profession. However, we realize 
that there may be some concerns about using the book in an ac-
counting course. A possible reason for not using the book could 
be a concern about the imposition upon the students’ time. Cer-
tainly, time both in and out of class is a precious commodity 
with so much material to cover and with outside interests com-
peting. Another concern is the cost of a supplementary text, par-
ticularly since the course textbook is already costing students 
$100 or more not to mention other costs such as outlines, study 
guides, or software materials. At $16.95, we believe the cost is 
well worth the price.
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 Perhaps more to the point than these concerns about time 
and cost, instructors might be reluctant to utilize the book be-
cause of an unwillingness to take chances, to do something dif-
ferent, to take on an unfamiliar topic, to tackle an “uncomfort-
able” issue, or to deal with the profession in anything but a 
glowing light. We believe that effective teaching must go beyond 
the technical aspects of the textbook. It should inject questions 
without definite answers and cover issues that produce thought 
on the part of students. Intellectual honesty requires that aca-
demics have students consider the problems of the profession, 
as well as its successes. Above all, students represent the profes-
sion’s best hope of curing its long-term deficiencies and meet-
ing its future challenges. Our students will be the ones who will 
make accounting better than what it is today.
 Other concerns about using A White-Collar Profession center 
on students’ reaction to the assignment, specifically the book’s 
relevance to the subject matter of the course. Again, our own 
experience found student reaction to be overwhelmingly favor-
able. The comments volunteered, oral and written, have been 
“thank yous” for this assignment. While not all students reacted 
this way, many did, and in such an overwhelmingly positive way, 
that we feel concerns about student reaction are unfounded. 
 A limitation of the study is that the pre-test, post-test meth-
odology was not uniformly used by all professors. As a result, 
the statistical measurements regarding the impact of the book 
may not be generalized to other groups. However, using A White-
Collar Profession as a supplementary text in accounting class-
es offers many ways of exposing students to issues that face the 
profession and raises the awareness of diversity in students’ 
thinking. We report both anecdotal and empirical evidence that 
the participants in this study proved more willing to work with 
colleagues different from themselves, perhaps so inspired by the 
book although there is no way of knowing for sure. We find this 
to be extremely encouraging since the majority of the partici-
pants are accounting majors. In addition to an increased aware-
ness of the history of the accounting profession, some students 
gained a greater appreciation for their accounting course and 
the accounting profession. 
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APPENDIX 1
Survey Questionnaire: Morehouse College
ACHIEVING YOUR GOAL
The purpose of this questionnaire is to collect information about your percep-
tion and knowledge of the accounting profession. Also, some questions relate to 
your attitude towards goal seeking achievements in the context of completing 
course requirements and overcoming barriers. Please provide thoughtful and 
candid responses to each of the questions that follow. Responses do not affect 
your grade!! Feel free to make notes in the margin and do not hesitate to ask 
questions. 
Section I
 1. Age _______ 
      
 2. Classification: a. Freshman b. Sophomore c. Junior d. Senior
 
 3. Major: a. Finance b. Accounting c. Marketing e. Management f. Other (spec-
ify)____________ 
 4. If your major is other than accounting, did you consider a major in ac-
counting? _____Yes ______ No
 5. If your major is other than accounting, would you consider a major in ac-
counting? _____Yes ______ No
 6. What school year did you enter college? 
 7. What year do you plan to graduate? ________________________
 
Section II.
 8. Do you know what CPA stands for? ________ Yes _________ No
 9. Do you know a CPA? ________ Yes _________ No
10. Do you know any African-American CPA’s? ________ Yes _________ No
11. Have you ever dropped a class? ________ Yes _________ No
     
Section III. Please circle the response that best represents your perception.
12. How many African-American CPAs do you think there are in this country?
 a. 10,000 or more
 b. < 1,000
 c. < 10,000 but greater than 5,000
 d. 1,000 - 5,000
13. What % of total CPAs in this country do you think are African-American?
 a. 1% to 5%
 b. >5% but less than 10%
 c. > 10% but less than 25%
 d. more than 25%
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Section IV. 
14. On a scale of 1 to 10 rank your knowledge of the history of the accounting 
profession.
(1 = not knowledgeable  10 = very knowledgeable)
 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10
15. On a scale of 1 to 10 rank your knowledge of the history of blacks in the ac-
counting profession.
(1 = not knowledgeable  10 = very knowledgeable)
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10
16. On a scale of 1 to 10, rank yourself as to your willingness to work as group 
members on teams with members who are different from yourself as to gen-
der, religion, race, and culture.
 (1 = not willing – seeks to avoid having members of the team that are 
diverse)
 (10 = very willing – seeks out opportunity to have diverse members of 
the team that are diverse)
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10
17. On a scale of 1 to 10, rank your determination to complete this course
 (1 = not very committed, will see if I can pass this course without put-
ting forth a lot of effort)
 (10 = very determined – willing to do whatever it takes)
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10
18. On a scale of 1 to 10, rank your appreciation for the importance of this 
course
(1 = low appreciation)  (10 = high appreciation)
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10
19. On a scale of 1 to 10, rank your appreciation for the importance of the ac-
counting profession
(1 = low appreciation)  (10 = high appreciation)
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10
Section V. 
 On a scale of 1 to 10, rank your agreement with the following state-
ments.
1 = do not agree   10 = very much agree
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20. I make up my mind easily.
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10
21. I make decisions slowly.
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10
22. I know how it feels to be denied something you really want.
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10
23. I will probably drop a class before I graduate.
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10
24. I would consider dropping a class.
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10
25. I would consider dropping accounting.
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10
26. I usually get what I ask for the first time I ask.
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10
27. I would drop a class if: The professor told me that I lacked the skills and 
background required.
  
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10
28. I would pursue my goal no matter how long it took to achieve it.
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10
29. I would drop a class if: The workload required for the class was too time 
consuming.
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10
30. I would register for a class even if: The professor was known for being dif-
ficult.
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10
31. I would become discouraged from pursuing my goal if: I did not have any 
money.
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10
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32. I would become discouraged from pursuing my goal if: It took more than 5 
years to achieve.
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10
33. I would become discouraged from pursuing my goal if: The workload re-
quired in school was too difficult.
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10
34. I would become discouraged from pursuing my goal if: If it took longer than 
20 years to achieve.
         
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10
Section VI.
35. Do barriers motivate you (increase your determination to achieve your 
goal)?
  Yes _______ No _______
36. Do barriers discourage you (decrease your determination to achieve your 
goal)?
  Yes_______ No________
37. If you wanted to achieve a goal, would it matter how long it took? 
  Yes ____ No _____
Comments:
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ACCOUNTING TECHNIQUES IN KOREA: 
18TH CENTURY ARCHIVAL SAMPLES 
FROM A NON-PROFIT ASSOCIATION IN 
THE SINITIC WORLD
Abstract: Little is known about pre-1900 East Asian accounting tech-
niques. A double-entry method of accounting may date from the 11th 
century in Korea, but extant commercial ledgers are no older than 
1854. However, extensive accounts of cooperative associations survive 
from the early 18th century. The Mun Clan Association accounts are 
examined to reveal their organizing principles and accuracy. The ac-
counts demonstrate a highly accurate system that was intermediate 
between single-entry and double-entry accounting. While they are not 
from a commercial house, the accounts display sophisticated book-
keeping techniques designed to maximize rationality within a Confu-
cian moral economy.
INTRODUCTION 
 In recent years, the Academy of Korean Studies (Han’guk 
Cho˘ngsin Munhwa Yo˘n’guwo˘n)1 has gathered and published 
many private records and documents from post-1600 Korea, but 
there has been little research on these documents from the per-
spective of accounting and economic history. This paper exam-
ines a double-entry method used in the accounts (1741-1883) of 
the (Namp’yo˘ng) Mun Clan Association (MCA),2 an organization 
that is still active in Cho˘lla Province. The MCA is representative 
Acknowledgments: We are grateful to Anthony Hopwood and Elaine Tan of 
Oxford, the Korean Accounting Institute, two anonymous referees, and the edi-
tor for comments and suggestions that helped to improve the paper significant-
ly. We also thank the Korea Research Foundation for supporting Seong Ho Jun’s 
research.
1 The Korean name was changed in February 2005 to Han’gukhak Chung’ang 
Yo˘n’guwo˘n, retaining the English name Academy of Korean Studies.
2 Please refer to the Glossary (Appendix A) for original script and characters. 
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of a major civil-society organization in pre-20th century Korea, 
the cooperative, mutual-aid society (kye).
 Although a study in accounting history, the research on 
which this paper is based had roots in economic history. Infor-
mation on commodity prices, labor costs, land and rental costs, 
and a number of other types of basic data have been collected in 
order to build models of Korean economic history. In the course 
of exploiting the data, decisions had to be made about their 
trustworthiness, leading to an analysis of the accounting princi-
ples at work. A high degree of sophistication and accuracy is ev-
ident, thus providing confidence in the quality of the extracted 
data [Jun and Lewis, 2005, 2006].
 The MCA accounts were far more elaborate than simple, 
single-entry records. They reveal a complex linkage across sev-
eral separate commodities used as currency, including unhulled 
rice, milled rice, and copper coin. Transactions in the ledgers 
were recorded in two different places. Many of the basic princi-
ples of the double-entry method are apparent – personification 
of accounts, dual entry, integration, and periodicity. All the led-
gers contain only real accounts; nominal accounts and profit-or-
loss statements are absent. A concern for controlling losses is 
evident, while a corresponding lack of emphasis on profit-mak-
ing reflects the dominant ethic, the Confucian “moral economy.” 
The paper features, in order, a literature review, a discussion of 
the moral economy concept, a description of the MCA ledgers, 
and a summary of the findings. 
LITERATURE REVIEW
 The Sinitic world of East Asia is the oldest, continuous civ-
ilization on the planet, but very little is known of its account-
ing practices or economic history. However, accounting his-
torians have attempted to address this lack of knowledge in 
recent years. Auyeung [2002, pp. 3, 5-7, 10-12; Auyeung and Ivo-
ry, 2003, pp. 9-12] offers an overview of traditional Chinese and 
Japanese accounting practices. There are a number of useful 
studies on accounting in China [Huh, 1979; Hsu, 1991; Gardel-
la, 1992; Lin, 1992, 2003; Aiken and Lu, 1993, 1998; Chen, 1998; 
Gao and Handley-Schachler, 2003] and several on Japan [Nishi-
kawa, 1956, 1977; McKinnon, 1994; Nisikawa, 1994; Someya, 
1996]. There is at least one study on Korea [Yun, 1977]. It can 
be argued that most of these efforts suffer from insufficient de-
tailed evidence to explain traditional usages before the adoption 
of western methods. An exception is Aiken and Lu [1998]. Many 
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studies ignore historical or interpretative problems, though 
again, there are welcome exceptions [Gardella, 1992; Aiken and 
Lu, 1993, 1998; Chen, 1998; Auyeung, 2002; Auyeung and Ivory, 
2003]. All previous studies are primarily concerned with govern-
mental practices or commercial establishments.
  Commercial activity in East Asia has a long history, but pre-
modern Korean mercantile records are few. In fact, there are no 
known surviving commercial accounts dated earlier than the 
mid-19th century. Nevertheless, it is often asserted that Kore-
an merchant houses in Kaeso˘ng City traded with China and Ara-
bia and developed, as early as the mid-Koryo˘ period (11th-13th 
centuries), a double-entry method known as the sagae Song-
do ch`ibubo˘p (four-sided Kaeso˘ng ledger method). Information 
on the system is available in Korean [Hyo˘n, 1916; Hong, 1962; 
Kang, 1978; Yun, 1978, 1984; Cho, 2000], Japanese [Zensho¯, 
1968; Yoshida, 1988,3 1999], and outlined in English [Yun, 
1977]. The system is “four-sided” because it recorded the receiv-
er’s name, the giver’s name, the commodity or cash received, and 
the commodity or cash disbursed. Fundamentally, the method 
required a dual entry for each transaction.
 The four-sided method may have been centuries old, but di-
rect evidence for it is more recent so that its “origins” remain 
a matter for speculation [Yoshida, 1988, pp. 147-150]. Yoshida 
[1988, pp. 137-140; 1999, p. 73] points out that all studies rely 
primarily on a few privately obtained account books, a 1916 ac-
counting primer, and early 20th century ledgers (1898-1906) 
kept by the Taehan Ch’o˘n’il Bank in Seoul.4 Yoshida [1999, p. 
68] notes that some privately obtained account books held at 
the Kobe University Library concern a Kaeso˘ng merchant dat-
ing back to 1854. None of these documents can confirm the al-
leged mid-Koryo˘ origins of the method. The 1916 primer and 
the ledgers from 1898-1906 have been analyzed in detail, but the 
older books are not well known and offer no direct evidence of a 
method in general use predating the opening of Korean ports to 
modern trade in 1876.
  The 1916 primer deserves further explanation. By the late 
19th and early 20th centuries, there was widespread disloca-
tion as Korean society lurched headlong into the international 
3 Yoshida [1988, pp. 133-134] offers an extensive review of Japanese scholar-
ship on this issue.
4The Taehan Ch’o˘n’il Bank was founded in January 1899. It has been known 
by many names; e.g., Cho¯sen Sangyo¯ Bank (1911), Han’guk Sang’o˘p Bank 
(1950), combined with Han’il Bank (1998), Han’pit Bank (1999), absorbed by 
P’yo˘nghwa Bank (2001), and Uri (Woori) Bank (2002).
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market economy. Because the double-entry methods of the West 
had not yet penetrated Korean commerce and because there 
was general disarray in the Korean accounting world, a stand-
ard method was sorely needed.5 In 1916, Hyo˘n consulted with 
two Kaeso˘ng merchants and authored a primer describing their 
four-sided ledger method. Hyo˘n’s primer outlines an indige-
nous, double-entry method in which he defines terms and of-
fers examples. There are modern elements in the primer, such 
as the use of Japanese terms [Yoshida, 1988, p. 139], the use of 
yen and zeni (Japanese monetary denominations), and the use 
of the zero as a place marker. Moreover, the question of Chinese 
influence deserves consideration. The presentation of accounts 
on the pages of the 19th century Korean commercial ledgers 
is similar to the style in the illustrations that accompany this 
paper. Because entries are not made in a similar fashion to Chi-
nese entries with a single page divided into top and bottom [Ai-
ken and Lu, 1998, pp. 228, 232], and because the terminology is 
completely different, it seems that the Korean methods were not 
derived from Chinese accounting. Nevertheless, there are strik-
ing similarities to the Chinese Lóngmén bookkeeping system, a 
prime topic for future investigation. 
 Although we have Hyo˘n’s exposition of this indigenous prac-
tice, the problem remains that there are few available speci-
mens of accounts that predate the 1850s that can confirm the 
general use of the method. Zensho¯ [1968, p. 119] reports that, 
in 1921, when he was conducting a study of Korean accounting 
for the Japanese colonial authorities, he saw account books in a 
library in Kaeso˘ng City dating from the 1770s that used a four-
sided ledger method, but he was only able to obtain books from 
the Gu¯anxù period (1875-1908) for his personal collection and 
analysis. In addition, a North Korean researcher [Hong, 1962] 
has investigated accounts from at least 1798, which are part of 
the Kaeso˘ng City Museum archives [Hong, 1962, p. 58; Yoshi-
da, 1988, p. 155, note 44]. Hong [1962, pp. 54, 59] also refers 
to accounts from the early 1820s in the Kaeso˘ng University of 
 Politics and Economics (Songdo Cho˘ngch’i Kyo˘ngje Taehak). 
These account books may still be extant in Kaeso˘ng (presently 
in North Korea), but it has not yet been possible to gain access, 
much less to verify their existence.
 The extant accounts of commercial and banking organiza-
5 The period from 1876 to 1910 or 1920 in Korea may offer a parallel case 
for the Weberian analysis of late Qing Chinese accounting by Auyeung and Ivory 
[2003] comparing “formal” and “substantive” rationalities.
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tions from the mid-to-late 19th century are reputed to be based 
on a dual-entry system, but Yoshida [1999, p. 72] merely says 
that the 1854 debit and credit ledgers in Kobe University Library 
are “sister ledgers” (shimai cho¯bo) and that they alternately re-
cord debits and credits for the same period. Yoshida does not 
supply sufficient detail to confirm the method used, and we have 
not been able to examine these books ourselves. While there are 
questions about the principles underlying the system, the cur-
rent understanding is represented by Hong [1962, pp. 57-58], 
Zensho¯ [1968, p. 119], Kang [1978, p. 89], Yun [1978, p. 99, 
1984, p. i], and Yi [2001, p. 3], who argue that the four-sided led-
ger system is comparable to the Venetian “double-entry” system, 
is possibly older, and perhaps even more elegant.
 On the other hand, Cho [2000, pp. 300-302] argues that the 
extant materials do not justify describing the system as double 
entry. He doubts that such a sophisticated system was possible 
in East Asia where Arabic numerals were not used and the Chi-
nese script lacked the zero. Yoshida withholds judgment on the 
principles at work and objects to Korean claims to the “world’s 
oldest double-entry method” when based on evidence no older 
than 1854.
 Promoters of such claims often link their assertions to de-
velopmental economic models arguing for the indigenous ap-
pearance of capitalism in Korea [Hong, 1962, pp. 50, 54-57]. 
Yoshida [1999, p. 74] correctly criticizes the conflation of a sup-
posedly medieval dual-entry method with arguments about the 
early appearance of capitalism in Korea. Linking sophisticat-
ed accounting systems in East Asia to capitalism, something 
that is ill-defined at best for these different historical and so-
cial orders, does no more than echo the host of 19th and 20th 
 century claims for European exceptionalism in developing cap-
italism based on double-entry accounting [Weber, 1927, p. 275; 
Spengler, 1928, p. 490; Braudel, 1983, p. 573; Gardella, 1992, pp. 
317-319].
 Nevertheless, the system described in Hyo˘n’s 1916 primer 
and the practices that appear in surviving ledgers certainly pres-
ent us with a number of questions about accounting method. 
In this paper, we will not discuss the method outlined in Hyo˘n’s 
primer because there is the possibility that it was influenced by 
Japanese systems and does not reflect traditional methods. In 
order to confirm the existence of an indigenous Korean system 
and to ascertain its principles, it is necessary to identify older 
examples from various organizations, both commercial institu-
tions and non-commercial establishments. This paper examines 
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a case that clearly predates direct Korean contact with the West 
or with the West as mediated by Japan from 1876.
 The ledgers of the MCA represent some of the oldest ac-
counting books available. They are the accounting records of a 
non-profit, cooperative association. The shared terminology be-
tween Hyo˘n’s 1916 text, the MCA ledgers, and other similar ma-
terial also recently made available6 is striking and suggests the 
widespread use of a traditional style of accounting. The pre-
dominance of the accounts of non-profit organizations corrob-
orates qualitative information on the general attitudes of pre-
20th century Koreans. Merchant houses were socially inferior 
and treated with suspicion. By contrast, cooperative, non-profit 
organizations were socially acceptable, commonplace, and free 
of government control. Their accounts have been carefully pre-
served for centuries.7
MORAL ECONOMY
 The dynamic between accounting methods and the po-
litical and socio-economic environment has been explored by 
Loft [1986], Hopwood [1987], Hopwood and Miller [1994], and 
 others for Britain, and by Aiken and Lu [1993, 1998], Chen 
[1998], Bloom and Solotko [2003], and others for China. The 
 notion that accounting methods are merely an inert technology 
is quite defunct. In pre-1876 Korea, the prejudice against com-
mercial activities and the social acceptance of ubiquitous co-
operative associations were aspects of a socio-economic ethic 
that we refer to as the “moral economy” of pre-modern Korea. 
Our purpose in this paper is to analyze an indigenous Korean, 
double-entry method, not to offer deterministic cultural expla-
nations for its use. However, we find that the concept of mor-
al economy is useful in explaining significant parts of the con-
tent of the accounts presented below and of the method applied. 
We cannot yet show how the method shaped organizational and 
 societal change since our sample is too narrow, but we can show 
how the method clearly responded to societal concerns.
6 There are similar data available from the Haenam Yun clan (1846-1882), 
also from Cho˘lla Province, and from the Yongsan So˘wo˘n (Yongsan Academy, 
1700-1705) in Kyo˘ngsang Province. For the Haenam Yun clan, see Han’guk 
Cho˘ngsin Munhwa Yo˘n‘guwo˘n (ed.) [no date], library microfilm no. 35-003212 
and no. 35-003213. For the Yongsan So˘wo˘n, see Han’guk Cho˘ngsin Munhwa 
Yo˘n’guwo˘n (ed.) [2000, pp. 721-809]. 
7 Clan account books in China have been mined as rich sources for the histo-
ry of prices but not yet analyzed for their accounting method. For example, rice 
prices from clan records for 1684 to 1802 have been published by Tanaka [1986].
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 Many scholars have outlined moral economies in other his-
torical settings [Polyani, 1944; Wolf, 1969; Scott, 1976; North, 
1977; Popkin, 1979; Thompson, 1993], but few have examined 
the concept’s applicability to China, much less Korea. Certainly, 
in Korea (and northeast China), the dominant moral ethic (Con-
fucianism) was an ideological construction that fit an agricul-
tural economy as practiced in a volatile ecological zone plagued 
by severe winters and devastating summer flooding. Unlike the 
north China plain, Korea is very mountainous and had no com-
prehensive state-run irrigation works, so a “hydraulic society” 
with extensive centralized powers did not arise [Wittfogel, 1957]. 
The political philosophy of Confucianism, particularly the Neo-
Confucianism that appeared from the 13th century, was the sys-
tematic exposition of a moral economy and was well suited to 
Korean environmental constraints. It preached a social contract 
of localized mutual interdependence, ultimate government re-
sponsibility for subsistence, and interpersonal relations based 
on sincerity and clarity with fair and accurate accounting in 
transactions. These are a few of the practical reasons why Con-
fucianism excoriated commerce. Gao and Handley-Schachler 
[2003, pp. 49-50] point out the overlap between Confucianism 
and Buddhism in their distrust of the profit motive. To a Con-
fucian, profit pitted individuals against the collective. To a Bud-
dhist, profit led to the illusion of material desire and the perpet-
uation of suffering. Of course, such normative principles did not 
preclude a concern with cost and profit in production [Ji, 2003]; 
yet, the pursuit of profit was a stigmatized activity.
 Indications of the concerns and practices of a Confucian 
moral economy can be glimpsed in the MCA accounts – relief 
for economically weaker members, insurance for all, and no 
apparent concern with profit. In other words, the 18th centu-
ry context for the books examined below is one in which local 
society was deeply imbued with cooperative principles, nearly 
every individual was part of a web of cooperatives, and com-
merce was a socially despised activity. However, the disparage-
ment of commercial activities did not mean the absence of ra-
tional, accurate accounting. Non-commercial, non-governmental 
institutions were commonplace, and many of these were organi-
zationally complex and concerned with maintaining, expanding, 
and bequeathing corporate assets. 
 To determine what accounting system was in general use 
in Korea or even what passed for rationality in connection with 
economic matters, it makes little sense to focus on fringe ac-
tivities practiced by commercial organizations that operated 
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from socially inferior positions. Nonetheless, Western scholar-
ship on Sinitic civilization (China, Korea, and Japan) has long 
been dominated by teleologies that assume social and histori-
cal change arises from commercial activities and is inherently 
progressive. Both Marxists and Weberians share this bias. While 
Marxists refer to the “sprouts of capitalism” in a feudal society 
[Ji, 2003. p. 73], Weberians seek out “cultural impediments to 
overseas innovations” [Aiken and Lu, 1998, p. 221].
 The Western, economic-determinist approach to account-
ing has resulted in by-passing the larger body of accounting 
practices common to non-profit cooperative societies. The very 
strengths of the traditional Confucian societies have long been 
portrayed as impediments. For example, Auyeung [2002, p. 14] 
lists the Chinese obstructions to the rapid adoption of West-
ern accounting techniques as “centralized political power, a so-
ciety resistant to change, an anti-merchant mentality and nar-
row-based learning.” “Rational” is a term reserved for Protestant 
societies [Auyeung and Ivory, 2003, p. 19]. The assumption is, 
all choices are equal; the mystery is, why did Confucian socie-
ties fail to make the rational choice and emulate Europe? The 
 irony is, Japan and even Europe in the 19th century were in the 
throes of transforming feudal chaos into functioning structures 
that would offer stability and the power to mobilize resources 
and labor. Developments such as centralized governments, socie-
ties able to manage change and produce stability, standardized 
education, and sufficient state power to control and tax mer-
chants had already taken place in China and Korea. By casting 
Sinitic tradition in a negative light for not having moved a so-
cially despised fringe ethic to center stage, the West has been 
blinded to the actual rationality at work directed to solving im-
mediate needs. Here we reference “moral economy” to introduce 
the dominant ethic as a rational response to circumstances and 
to strip away the negative images favored by Western academics 
for more than a century. In our concluding remarks, we will re-
turn to the main components of this moral economy to interpret 
the activities revealed in the MCA books and to explain why the 
profit motive was missing.
A WORKING DEFINITION OF  
DOUBLE-ENTRY ACCOUNTING
 One task of this paper is to determine whether the books 
of the MCA were kept in a double-entry fashion or something 
closely approximating it. For this, we will need to have a work-
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ing definition of double-entry accounting as a guide. The follow-
ing notes do not presume to offer an exhaustive definition, but 
do identify a few principles from more well-known historical 
studies on the development of European accounting practices.
 De Roover [1956, p. 114] specified certain minimum re-
quirements for an accounting system to qualify as double entry:
. . . there is no double-entry bookkeeping without the ob-
servance of certain strict rules. A necessary prerequisite 
is that all transactions be recorded twice, once on the 
debit and once on the credit side. If this requirement 
is not fulfilled, there is, by definition, no double entry. 
The principle also involves the existence of an integrat-
ed system of accounts, both real and nominal, so that 
the books will balance in the end, record changes in the 
owner’s equity and permit the determination of profit or 
loss.
In addition to a ledger that records entries twice, there must be 
ledgers for real and nominal accounts, a demonstration of bal-
ance, and the possibility of determining profit or loss. In striking 
a balance, there should be no surplus or loss since this would in-
dicate a simple deduction of liabilities from assets [de Roover, 
1956, p. 128]. Other evidence is also desirable – day books and 
journals that post entries to a ledger, some tracing of accounts 
for expenses (or transaction costs), a capital account, and a bal-
ance sheet [de Roover, 1956, pp. 125, 132, 141].
 To be called double-entry bookkeeping, Yamey prefers to 
see a consistent entry for each transaction in two different plac-
es, a capital account, and a profit-or-loss account [Littleton 
and Yamey, 1956, pp. 6-8; Yamey, 1975, p. 722]. More recent-
ly, Yamey seems willing to reduce his requirement to dual entry 
and now agrees with Lane, who wrote, “as a practical matter, in 
research, [the student] may regard any accounts with duality of 
entry as being an elementary form of double-entry” [Lane, 1977, 
p. 187; Yamey, 1992, p. 706]. Recording transactions in two dif-
ferent places allows balancing, and if the balances of various 
sub-accounts are fed into a general ledger, a capital account and 
a profit-or-loss account can be easily drawn up. The use of ac-
counting periods and a single monetary unit might be added to 
these requirements [Nobes, 1994. p. 246]. 
 We will demonstrate that the accounts for the MCA record-
ed every entry that crossed ledgers in two different places (al-
though not every transaction within ledgers). There was in evi-
dence an integrated system of accounts (although all accounts 
were real accounts), accounting for expenses (transaction and 
70
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 33 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 23
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss1/23
Accounting Historians Journal, June 200662  
wastage costs), defined accounting periods (the agricultural 
 cycle), and balanced books. We will discuss personification (in-
dependent accounts trading back and forth and independent-
ly recording their trades) as the principle underlying and uni-
fying the MCA accounts. The absence of nominal accounts and 
profit-or-loss statements will be explained by invoking the soci-
etal ethics of the moral economy, the context in which these ac-
counts were produced. Before examining the accounts, we will 
briefly introduce the provenance of our sources.
VILLAGE AND CLAN ASSOCIATIONS
 While commercial establishments were rare, mutual assist-
ance associations (kye) were common in late Choso˘n Korea 
(1598-1910). Individual investors pooled resources and then ap-
pointed stewards (yusa) to carry out their aims. The associations 
usually had three objectives. The first was to act in the public in-
terest, to provide funds for public works, education, and the re-
lief of the poor. The second aim was insurance and mutual aid, 
providing for marriage costs (honin-kye), funeral costs (sang-
kye), and sacrificial rites (chesa-kye). The third aim was invest-
ment financing, providing for tree planting (song-kye), irrigation 
(po-kye), and for the lease of oxen and ploughs (nong’u-kye) [Shi-
kata, 1976, p. 71].8 The MCA engaged in all these activities and 
more.
BOOKKEEPING PRACTICES OF THE MUN CLAN
 The account books or yonghagi are among the most impor-
tant archives of the MCA. Six account books covering the peri-
od from 1741 to 1927 relating to the main clan association and 
four account books from 1819 to 1881 concerning a branch clan 
association are available.9 The form of Vol. 1 (1741-1765) differs 
from all the later volumes. It began as a simple record, but by 
the 1760s, it had assumed a complex form that became the pat-
tern for all later volumes. Vols. 2-6 contain elaborate accounts 
that record receipts and expenses in a basic dual-entry form. 
8For a description of an 18th century Chinese financial cooperative scheme, 
see Reiss et al. [1996].
9Main Clan: Vol. 1 (1741-1765); Vol. 2 (1779-1805); Vol. 3 (1806-1816); Vol. 4 
(1843-1849); Vol. 5 (1850-1871); Vol. 6 (1884-1928); Collateral Clan: Vol. 1 (1819-
1826); Vol. 2 (1827-1841); Vol. 3 (1845-1863); and Vol. 4 (1864-1881). All of these 
are photolithographically reproduced in Han’guk Cho˘ngsin Munhwa Yo˘n’guwo˘n 
(ed.), 1995.
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The increasing sophistication of recording after Vol. 1 was likely 
caused by the growth in the financial scale of the MCA.
 Rural Korea in the 18th century was not highly monetized; 
thus, money was a complex matter. The first use of copper coins 
(from 1706) appears in a village association record of major lo-
cal events (1667-1984) [Han’guk Cho˘ngsin Munhwa Yo˘n’guwo˘n 
(ed.), 1955, pp. 217-227]. This record appeared 28 years after the 
central government had begun in earnest to mint metallic coins 
(1678). These coins were known as sangp’yo˘ng t’ongbo (“ever-
normal circulating treasure”). Mention of these coins indicates 
that metallic currency was quickly adopted in the countryside 
of southwest Korea in a context where pre-industrial agrarian 
change was slow. From studies of northern China, Huang [1985, 
p. 47] suggests that it took at least three generations before “sec-
ular” change (e.g., commercialization and handicrafts develop-
ment) was apparent, but in southwest Korea, it seems to have 
taken about a generation for coinage to facilitate exchange prac-
tices.
 Despite the spread of coinage, accounts were never ex-
pressed in a single currency. In fact, receipts and expenses 
were denominated in three currencies – unhulled rice, mint-
ed copper-bronze coins, and milled rice. The rice payments 
can be considered payments in kind, but they were so univer-
sal and standardized that they actually served as money. Un-
hulled and milled rice functioned as “rice money,” consumable 
and storable specie with a natural loss value. Copper cash was 
more stable. Introduced widely from 1678, its value general-
ly remained steady until 1866, at which time the government is-
sued a multi-denominational coin with a face value one hundred 
times the old coin. Chinese money was also imported to Korea 
at the end of the 19th century when, as per Gresham’s law, the 
older, higher-value coins were withdrawn from circulation. In-
flation and chaos resulted and lasted into the 1890s when for-
eign currencies (Mexican and Japanese) began to circulate with 
new Korean government issues. Financial and economic stabili-
ty did not begin to re-appear until 1904 when Japanese policies 
imposed order [Pak, 1969, pp. 30-91, 116-145; Palais, 1996, pp. 
855-876, 924-1001]. Strangely, the MCA accounts during the late 
19th and early 20th centuries do not show the introduction of 
the Japanese yen until early 1928 (at the very end of Vol. 6). Un-
til then, the accounts continue to use the old character for cop-
per cash or yang. The consistency in the unit of currency proba-
bly indicates a desire to maintain accounting consistency. Since 
Japanese currency was imposed shortly after the annexation of 
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Korea in 1910, it evidently took about a generation to adopt the 
new coinage.
 The following subsections discuss five separate bookkeeping 
concepts and methods related to the clan accounts. These top-
ics will be illustrated with exhibits and tables drawn from the 
source materials. 
Developments in the Mechanics of Bookkeeping: Writing in pre-
modern Korea was in the East Asian vertical style, top to bottom 
and right to left. Not surprisingly, the account books of the MCA 
were written in this fashion. Account books in double-entry for-
mat must have a method to distinguish verbally and visually be-
tween debits and credits. Littleton [1956, pp. 232-233] discusses 
the development of journal nomenclature and form in Europe. 
European accountants developed technical vocabulary and even-
tually a visual vocabulary of indentation at least by the middle of 
the 19th century.10 By the 18th century, the accountants for the 
MCA were deploying indentation, special terms, and word order 
as their technical apparatus.
 At first, two different types of written characters, ordi-
nary and large, were employed to facilitate classification, to-
gether with an indentation technique. The large character had 
two usages, marking years and accounts. In the 1741 accounts, 
large characters marked the year, rental income, and “remain-
ing” cash or rice on hand (see Exhibit 1). By 1744, the use of 
large characters had disappeared, and the reporting period had 
changed from an annual report in the twelfth month to biannual 
reports in spring and autumn. 
 The most important distinction was between debits and 
credits, which came to be indicated by special terms, yu (留) 
and then nae (內). In the 1741 account (Exhibit 1, indicated by 
C), we can see yu, which means “remaining [assets].” In Exhib-
it 1, upper and lower sheets, yu indicates old grain kept in stor-
age. In the following year, yu was disappearing and nae was be-
ginning to appear. Within the decade, nae became the standard 
term with the clear meaning of “total income or assets from 
10 Littleton [1956, p. 233] describes the process as follows: “Practice has 
passed from one definite stage to another: 1. a time of no journal entries, when 
the full statement of the transaction was probably entered directly in the two 
ledger accounts concerned; 2. a period (say 1430 to 1550) with a highly technical 
form of journal entry preparatory to the record in the ledger; 3. a long interval in 
which the journal entry expressed more or less fully a complete thought; and 4. 
the modern period – now quite technical in form again – when the focus is the 
accurate sorting of accounting units.” 
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which expenditures” would be deducted. Exhibit 2 shows that 
nae appears in the 1793 accounts at the end of the second col-
umn from the far right in the top of the illustration and again 
at the end of the third column from the far left (indicated with 
G). Debits were recorded to the right of nae and credits to the 
left. This use of the term nae to divide expenditures from assets 
was not unusual in East Asia. It was used extensively in Japa-
nese (Tsushima) trade ledgers from the Tokugawa period. Hyo˘n’s 
work [1916, p. 25], explaining the methods of the Kaeso˘ng mer-
chants, depicts nae playing the same role.
 From as early as the 1740s, the MCA accounts used word 
order (whether words or numbers came first) to indicate the dif-
ference between debits and credits. In Exhibit 2, words begin 
all debit entries and numbers begin all credit entries. This word 
order was consistently applied from the mid-1750s. Words fol-
lowed by numbers indicated a positive entry (income) and num-
bers followed by words signalled a negative entry (payment). 
For spring accounts, the debit entries all begin with “balance 
brought forward (from the previous year)” (cho˘nsu or cho˘n as il-
lustrated in Exhibit 2, indicated by F, first appearance 1745), but 
autumn debit entries often begin with “remaining” (yu), as in 
“remaining from the previous accounting period.”
 Also, from the mid-1750s, entries for expenditures carried 
a final character, ha. For example, in Exhibit 2 (indicated by H), 
after the columns that end in nae, all expenditure entries end in 
ha, except final entries that express “natural loss” (ch`uk, indi-
cated by E). From 1755, subtotals were marked off at the end of 
sections by the term isang (Exhibit 2, indicated by J), but the use 
is inconsistent until the records resume from 1779, following a 
gap of 14 years.11
  Although the terms nae and ha appear early to distinguish 
debits from credits, we do not find extensive indentation until 
much later. The technique of indentation was developed by the 
19th century in English accounting and indicated a separation 
between debits and credits [Littleton, 1956, p. 232]. Littleton 
points out that the custom was to indent credits below debits. In 
Exhibit 1, we can see some experimentation with indentation, 
11Other technical terms that do not appear here should be born in mind. For 
example, pong or sang meant receipt, ku˘p or ha (the ha that is mentioned above) 
meant expenditure, ip or nae2 meant incoming. This nae2 is a different character 
from the nae discussed above and is in the glossary as nae2. Finally, ch’ul or ko˘ 
meant outgoing. These terms are explained in Hyo˘n’s primer [1916, pp. 18-26]. 
They all seem to have had native Korean pronunciations (idu), but we have giv-
en them their common Sinitic pronunciation.
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EXHIBIT 1
Mun Clan Ledger (Yonghagi, two folio sheets), 1741
         
            
Source: Han’guk Cho˘ngsin Munhwa Yo˘n’guwo˘n (eds.) (1995), Komunso˘ 
chipso˘ng vol. 21 (Collection of documents, vol. 21) (So˘ngnam: Han’guk cho˘ngsin 
munhwa yo˘n’guwo˘n), pp. 576-577.
NB: A: year (1741); B: income (畓); C: remaining (留); D: ledger ([別有司]秩); 
E: natural loss (縮).
A
B
C
B
C
C
D
E
C
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EXHIBIT 2
Mun Head Clan Ledger (Yonghagi, two folio sheets) 
Unhulled rice (春租秩), Milled Rice (米秩), and the 
Beginning of Copper Cash (錢秩), Spring 1793
Source: Han’guk Cho˘ngsin Munhwa Yo˘n’guwo˘n (eds.) (1995), Komunso˘ 
chipso˘ng vol. 21 (Collection of documents, vol. 21) (So˘ngnam: Han’guk cho˘ngsin 
munhwa yo˘n’guwo˘n), p. 638.
NB: D: ledger (秩); E: natural loss (縮); F: balance brought forward (傳受); 
G: from this (total income) (內); H: expenditure (下); I: milled rice (米); J: subto-
tal (已上).
but consistency does not appear until 1785. Exhibit 2 for the 
1793 accounts shows an indentation style that remained con-
sistent for the next century or more with debit-entry columns 
 beginning higher on the page than credit-entry columns. In 
short, by the 1780s, the above techniques produced pages that 
textually and visually showed the relationships between entries.
Personal Accounts and a Division of Administration: Yamey of-
fers four possibilities for the origins of double-entry bookkeep-
ing (DEB). Perhaps it was the work of a single gifted inventor 
or a triumph of the mercantile ingenuity of the Renaissance. 
A third possibility is that DEB was an accidental technical de-
G
G
F
F
H
H
E
D
D
H
I
E
Unhulled            rice        Milled rice 
Copper 
      Milled rice 
J
76
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 33 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 23
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss1/23
Accounting Historians Journal, June 200668  
velopment from simpler forms that evolved through a process 
of accretion and adaptation. The fourth possibility is that DEB 
was a response to “new or growing business needs not satis-
fied by earlier methods of record-keeping” [Littleton and Yamey, 
1956, p. 2]. The differences between the 1741 and the 1793 ac-
counts kept by the head clan (taejong-kye) of the Mun Clan indi-
cate that, in this case, techniques grew by a gradual process of 
accretion and adaptation that employed customary techniques 
already in use. In the earliest records from 1741, items were al-
ready being grouped under appropriate headings, indicating a 
gestation of accounting methods. By the 1760s, accounts had 
been separated into their own ledgers.
 The books kept between 1819 and 1883 by a branch Mun 
Clan (sojong-kye) show no evolution and display the same so-
phisticated form perfected by 1793 in the head clan accounts. 
However, the branch clan accounts display different emphases 
from those of the head clan. The head and branch clan books 
show a division of administration. In particular, the branch 
clan’s books contain personal accounts. Personal accounts oc-
casionally appear in the head clan accounts in connection with 
memorial rites (filial piety), bad debts, and emergencies, but 
they exist routinely throughout the branch clan records for fu-
nerals and expenditures for seed and tillage. The fact that in-
dividual or household names were attached to transactions as 
well as insurance payments is a significant refinement over the 
head clan accounts. Table 1 contains an extract from the branch 
clan accounts and presents the unhulled rice ledger for 1819. 
Lines 10-19, 22-24, and 33 and 36 are all personal accounts with 
names indicated in bold. 
TABLE 1
Original Text and Translation for  
Unhulled Rice ch’unjo (春租)  
Spring Period (Branch Clan), 1819
Line Original text Translation conversion to tu
1 己卯春 1819 spring
2 傳受租七十三石十八斗八升三合 carried down [from previous fiscal year] 1478.83
3 一石十五斗松溪祭債下 Song-kye [another association] rite cost 35
4 一石十斗場巖祭債下 Chang`am [village association] rite cost 30
5
二石私乃
   
庫直 
Remuneration Warehouse
keeper
40
6 五斗庫基所耕 Annual production cost a) 5
7 五斗例給種子 Seed according to precedent 5
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8 十一斗捧上廳盖草 Thatch Posang house 11
9 七斗庫舍盖草 Thatch warehouse 7
10
五斗例給種子
再哲
Seed according to precedent
Chae Ch’o˘l 5
11 一石私乃
 
大元   
Remuneration
Tae Wo˘n
20
12 五斗例給種子 seed according to precedent 5
13
十四斗四升光大畓七斗落半所
耕
次先
Kwangdae paddy 7 turak half 
annual production cost
Ch’a So˘n
14
14
六斗大草畓二斗落半耕
冷泉宅
Taech’o paddy 2 turak half annual 
production cost
Naeng Ch’o˘n House
6
15
六斗二升甬洞畓三斗落半所
萬貴
Yongdong paddy 3 turak half annual 
production cost
Mangwi
6.2
16
四斗堂洞畓三斗落半所耕
興得
Tangdong paddy 3 turak half annual 
production cost
Hu˘ng Do˘k
4
17
四斗甬洞畓三斗落半所耕
肖伊
Yongdong paddy 3 turak half annual 
production cost
So Yi
4
18
四斗東亭畓四斗落種子
小八仙
Tongjung paddy 4 turak seed
So P’al So˘n 4
19
五斗所土畓四斗落種子推移
秋捧次
望湖宅
Sot’o paddy 4 turak seed loan to be 
repaid within autumn harvest time
Mangho House
5
20
二斗同防川役粮 Food costs for labour when building 
a dam for flood prevention 2
21
十斗山直所耕 Grave keeper’s annual production 
cost 10
22
五斗光大畓半所耕
億伊
Kwangdae paddy half annual 
production cost
O¯k Yi
5
23
十三斗八合石朴畓四斗落半所
國山宅
So˘kbak paddy 4 turak half annual 
production cost
Kuk San House
13.08
24
五斗孝悌畓堰水役粮
花方宅
Food costs for labour when 
irrigating Hyoje paddy
Hwa Pang House
5
25
一石十斗庫使推移秋捧次 Loan to warehouse manager to be 
repaid within autumn harvest time 10
26 二石作錢三兩 Traded 2 so˘k for [cash] 3 yang 40
27
七石作米五十二斗五升白七斗
五升例
Milled 7 so˘k [unhulled rice into] 52 
tu 5 su˘ng hulled rice at a rate [of 
1 so˘k unhulled rice yields hulled] 
white rice 7 tu 5 su˘ng
140
28 一石書徒求請 Students’ request 20
29
七斗一升三合作錢五錢荒 Traded 7 tu 1 su˘ng 3 hop for cash 5 
cho˘n  [grain in a year of dearth] 7.13
30
五石作米四十斗八斗例 Milled 5 so˘k 40 tu [unhulled 
rice] into 40 tu at a rate [of 1 so˘k 
unhulled rice yields hulled rice] 8 tu
100
31 一斗省墓粮下 Foodstuffs to visit ancestral graves 1
32
十石十一斗八升錢十六兩九錢
四分一兩六錢例
Traded 10 so˘k 11 tu 8 sung for cash 
16 yang 9 cho˘n 4 pun at a rate [of 1 
so˘k =] 1 yang 6 cho˘n
211.8
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33
十斗文必勳氏嚴親初喪賻 Donation for Mun P’ilhun’s 
parents’ funeral expenses 10
34 十斗永保亭求請 Request for Yongbo pavilion 10
35
三石門契別廳求請 Request for clan association’s 
auxiliary building 60
36
十斗文壽澤氏慈夫人初喪賻下 Donation for Mun Sut’aek’s 
compassionate wife’s funeral 
expenses
10
37
十三斗二升五合作米三斗三升 Milled 13 tu 2 su˘ng 5 hop [unhulled 
rice into hulled rice] 3 tu 3 su˘ng 13.25
38
三石作米二十斗一升六斗七
升例
Milled 3 so˘k [unhulled rice into] 20 
tu 1 su˘ng hulled rice at rate [of 1 
so˘k unhulled rice yields hulled rice] 
6 tu 7 su˘ng
60
39 二十一石別廳除 Deducted for auxiliary building 420
40
荒 三石作米二十一斗 七斗例 Milled [grain in a year of dearth] 3 
so˘k [unhulled rice into] 21 tu hulled 
rice at rate [of 1 so˘k unhulled rice 
yields hulled rice] 7 tu
60
41 一石六斗九升七合縮 1 so˘k 6 tu 9 su˘ng 7 hop natural loss 26.97
42
已上用七十三石一斗八升三合 Above expenditures total 73 so˘k 1 
tu 8 su˘ng 3 hop 1461.83
43 十七斗留 17 tu remainder 17
Source: Han’guk Cho˘ngsin Munhwa Yo˘n’guwo˘n (eds.) (1995), Komunso˘ 
chipso˘ng vol. 22 (Collection of documents, vol. 22) So˘ngnam: Han’guk cho˘ngsin 
munhwa yo˘n’guwo˘n), pp. 5-6.
a) Sogyo˘ng is translated here as “annual production cost.” The meaning of 
the term sogyo˘ng is not yet clear. Pak [1999, pp. 54, 313-314] argues that this 
term refers to taxation, although the usual tax indicators referred to land area 
(kyo˘l, turak, etc). The Association was not liable for taxation; the tenant was, so 
we would not expect to see notations for taxation in the Association’s accounts. 
Based on its appearance continually throughout the accounts for the Mun clan 
as a credit, the term seems to refer to expenditures for labor (oxen and plowing 
to prepare the land and lay seed), but may have included a tax subsidy. In the 
1741 accounts and in lines 6 and 7 above, we can see sogyo˘ng and seed costs as 
separate items, listed side-by-side, so sogyo˘ng was not a seeding cost. This sort 
of item was quite common in initial payments from the unhulled rice ledger. In 
lines 13-17 and 22-23, we see pan sogyo˘ng, meaning a payment of half of the usu-
al cost of sogyo˘ng. Presumably, the tenant was responsible for the remaining 
half.
 These personal accounts link communal and private 
 concerns. The associations kept such elaborate records because 
they dealt with joint common property, but the personal ac-
counts demonstrate that individual liability was the norm. In-
dividual names indicate that the village community was not a 
faceless collective, a commune; rather, its economic stability re-
lied on individual investors and individual responsibility. Goody 
[1996, p. 7] links individualism and the necessity for accurate 
accounting.
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 Individual household responsibility was at the base of pro-
duction, a fact that becomes apparent when comparing the 
structure of payments by the head clan (Table 2) with those of 
the branch clan (Table 3).
 Head clan expenditures focus on obtaining copper coins (to 
purchase specialized items), milling unhulled rice, paying out 
dividends, and extending funds for ancestral rites, all expendi-
tures that impacted the entire community. Their prominence 
indicates that the head clan’s overarching concern was for the 
greater community. Branch clan expenditures were more evenly 
spread over a variety of local, immediate concerns. There were 
significant productive payments (seeding and tillage costs with-
in personal accounts), but the largest group of expenditures was 
for unproductive activities, such as students, education, charity, 
and public buildings.
 The differences between the structure of the head clan ex-
penditures and those for the branch clan indicate that the 
branch clan formed the basic unit of production and supplied 
most social welfare. The head clan’s function was to manage 
the external relations that affected all members of the MCA. 
There was clearly a tiered aspect to the management of the vil-
lage economy highlighted by the fact that personal accounts 
were mostly to be found in the branch clan’s records. The size of 
the unproductive payments also indicates that surpluses existed 
which allowed the majority of village members to escape subsist-
ence crises during the 18th and early 19th centuries.
Transaction Costs and Natural Loss: The accounts of the MCA do 
not contain explicit transaction costs. What we see is the term 
ch`uk (Exhibits 1 and 2, indicated by E), translated as “natural 
loss.” We hypothecate that this term indicated the natural loss 
of grains to vermin and rot (wastage), as well as the transaction 
costs involved in milling unhulled rice into white rice. Ch`uk 
was always present in unhulled rice accounts and often pres-
ent in milled rice accounts, but was not seen in other accounts. 
Moreover, ch`uk entries were not cross-listed and appeared only 
as a reduction in stocks. While no cross-listing might support an 
argument against the designation “double entry,” the presence of 
these careful entries indicates great concern for the comprehen-
sive and consistent calculation of balance. For example, Exhibit 
1 (E: natural loss) records 4 su˘ng as a “natural loss.” The differ-
ence between income and outgo was 4 su˘ng, but there is no ex-
planation for the deficit, except the term ch`uk, which basical-
ly means “shrink” or “shortfall.” Because no rice was milled, we 
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believe that this “shortfall” was a natural loss due to water and 
rats. From 1765, ch`uk became a regular feature in the accounts.
 In the unhulled rice ledger for spring 1793 (Exhibit 2), both 
“natural loss” (E) and the milling cost of unhulled rice appear 
(I). Most likely, this natural loss consisted of both real loss and 
transaction costs. Transactions with rice and the cost of mill-
ing almost always went in tandem. Traditionally in rural village 
markets, there was a toejaeng-i, who measured and milled grain 
for a commission [Kim, 1977, pp. 299-300]. In the milled rice 
accounts, there is another natural loss, probably due to rats and 
water. This loss would not have reflected any further transaction 
costs after milling, so these costs are most likely due to wastage.
With our small sample, we can only catch a glimpse of what 
might have been the relative size of natural losses and trans-
action costs. Table 4 presents examples extracted from the ac-
counts for 1741 and 1793-1795.
 Natural loss from vermin and rot probably ranged from 0.4 
to 0.9%, while transaction costs may be estimated at 3.7 to 4.5%. 
The high cost for spring 1795 (4.9%) may be attributed to the 
poor crop of the previous autumn.
 An awareness of transaction costs indicates an appreciation 
for total cost accuracy. Even more minute transaction costs ap-
pear as the cost of the paper to record a land sale in the copper 
cash ledger for 1793 (not shown). Implicit transaction costs ap-
pear elsewhere in the form of travel expenses to conduct trans-
actions in distant places or to visit government offices. 
TABLE 4
Natural Loss and Transaction Ratios
Ledger ch`uk (縮) ratio Natural loss / Transaction
1741 0.9 per cent Natural loss
1793 spring
Unhulled
4.7 per cent Natural loss + Transaction
(pure Transaction: 4.3 per cent?)
1793 spring
Milled
0.4 per cent Natural loss
1794 spring
Unhulled
4.1 per cent Natural loss + Transaction
(pure Transaction: 3.7 per cent?)
1795 spring
Unhulled
3.2 per cent Natural loss + Transaction
(pure Transaction: 2.8 per cent?)
4.9 per centa) Natural loss + Transaction
(pure Transaction: 4.5 per cent?)
1795 spring
Milled
0.4 per cent Natural loss
a) Includes 9 tu as “lost”.
Source: same as Tables 1 and 2.
82
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 33 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 23
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss1/23
Accounting Historians Journal, June 200674  
 Transaction costs in Choso˘n Korea were widely recognized. 
Because rice was an important commodity, even functioning as 
money, the Choso˘n state had to be able to detect deviations from 
rules and customs in order to regulate compliance. Many trans-
action costs involved in creating and maintaining institutions to 
regulate rice transactions defy our explanation, but it should be 
noted that the central government was greatly concerned with 
eliminating non-standard and excessive exactions on the peas-
antry. To control this abuse, King Sukjong in 1715 established a 
standard shape that was not the ordinary simple box but a trap-
ezoid. An ordinary, wide-mouth box allowed the abuse of “heap-
ing measures,” whereas a trapezoid, with its narrow mouth, 
wider bottom, and taller body, helped ensure every measure’s ex-
actness and limited “heaping measures” that could be raked off 
to the official’s private benefit.12
Personification or a Simple Division of Accounts?:
The attribution of a living, independent personality to 
accounts must have had its roots in the very earliest 
forms of bookkeeping [Jackson, 1956, p. 295].
  According to Jackson, the teaching of accounting in Eng-
land from the 17th to the late 19th century developed from the 
rote application of procedural rules to a rational application of 
judgment based on the concept of personified accounts. Double-
 entry accounting necessitates the separate establishment of in-
dependent accounts (e.g., capital, goods, bills receivable, bills 
payable, cash, etc.) that swap entries back and forth depend-
ing on how one wishes to classify the entry. When a transaction 
occurs between accounts, it is recorded in both account books 
as either received (to be in debt to another account or debit) or 
paid out (to be owed by another account or to be in credit). In 
other words, by personifying each set of accounts in their sepa-
rate ledgers, complex accounts could be easily handled and er-
rors detected by comparing the entries and totals in the vari-
ous ledgers. When all amounts and ledgers are reconciled, the 
books are balanced. If not, then the accountant or auditor has 
to search for the error. After surveying pedagogical texts from 
the early 17th to the late 19th century, Jackson [1956, p. 296] 
points out that “the practice of explaining the entries to be made 
in the ledger by means of personifying the accounts is found in 
12 King Sukjong issued an order in 1715 to the Board of Taxation that trape-
zoid measures should be distributed nationally. See Kuksa P’yo˘nch’an Wiwo˘nhoe 
(ed.), 1955-1963, Sukjong sillok pogwo˘l cho˘ngo 56:1a [1715/02/08 (u˘lhae)].
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the very earliest British texts and must be closely linked with the 
very origin of the system of bookkeeping.”
 The MCA account books (yonghagi) may have been an ear-
ly example of personification. The first volume of the yonghagi 
runs from 1741 to 1765, and by the spring of 1765, the previous 
autumn’s unhulled rice remainder was carried down to begin a 
new integrated account structure with separate ledgers marked 
off by the term chil (Exhibit 2, indicated by D). Up to the 1760s, 
however, the use of chil to mark categories was irregular. For ex-
ample, the ledger for 1741 combined unhulled rice and copper 
cash accounts, but the copper cash accounts were grouped un-
der a heading (pyo˘l yusa chil) that meant “[items] specially man-
aged by the bursar” (Exhibit 1, indicated by D). Pyo˘l means spe-
cial; yusa means the bursar for the clan association, a title that 
is still used today; and chil means order, system, or regularity 
if read as a Chinese character. When read in a Korean linguis-
tic context, chil was a suffix that indicated something had taken 
on human characteristics and would act out a certain role. Chil 
became the standard suffix that marked out an entire and 
 independent ledger, which had to be reconciled with all oth-
er ledgers to achieve a balance. In 1741, the separation had not 
yet occurred. As time passed, specific commodities, particularly 
milled rice, yeast cakes, and barley, as well as copper cash, were 
given their own ledgers with debit and credit transactions as if 
they were living persons.13 Since these items came to be seen as 
agents themselves, references to the bursar (yusa) disappeared, 
leaving only the suffix chil. The ledgers, indicated by chil, be-
came stewards, acting on behalf of the owner, and traded assets 
among themselves and outsiders.
 In the spring accounts for 1756, we see the first appearance 
of the technical term chil to mark off the part of the accounts 
devoted to copper cash (cho˘n-chil). In 1762, chil is first used to 
mark off the accounts devoted to milled rice (mi-chil), and it is 
from this time that a stable personification system that contin-
ued until the late 19th or early 20th centuries was in evidence. 
By the 1793 ledgers, such transactions were extracted from day 
books and journals and put into their own ledgers, with chil at-
tached as a suffix to identify milled rice, copper cash, barley, and 
yeast cakes.
13Chil and its use to personify accounts was also described in this way by 
Hyo˘n [1916, pp. 6, 20] when he reported on the methods reputedly handed down 
from the 13th century and still in use by Kaeso˘ng merchants in the early 20th 
century.
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 The special role of the unhulled rice ledger requires clarifi-
cation because in Exhibit 2 from the MCA records for 1793 this 
ledger does not bear the suffix chil, while in other contempo-
rary books it does. Ordinarily the unhulled rice ledger was like 
any other ledger, but it had a particular status because it con-
tained the main income producing accounts. Unhulled rice was 
the money that grew from the ground and bought copper cash, 
yeast cakes, and even barley. Unhulled rice likewise bought or 
was processed into milled rice to obtain yet a different commod-
ity, an edible commodity, so it is not surprising that the MCA ac-
corded it a special ledger.
 In the 1793 example, we can see the full development of in-
dependent, personified accounts.14 By 1793, chil had been elevat-
ed to act as the title suffix for all ledgers, except unhulled rice. 
The sequence of ledgers was standardized by the 1760s. In the 
spring, the ledger sequence was unhulled rice (cho), milled rice 
(mi-chil), and copper cash (cho˘n-chil). In the autumn, the order 
was unhulled rice, milled rice, copper cash, barley (mongmaek-
chil), and yeast cakes (kokja-chil).
 The autumn accounts were closed for the year as indicated 
by the signatures of the bursar and the auditor attesting to the 
accuracy of the ledger. The auditor was always someone from 
outside the MCA, indeed from outside the village, invited to pro-
vide objectivity. Independent auditing insured accuracy and 
transparency; trust was the result.
 The foregoing discussion begs the question of whether the 
ledgers reflected personification or simply a division of accounts. 
What survives today are separate, independent ledgers, not day 
books or journals. Transaction entries usually were undated but 
were not randomly entered. Similar entries were grouped to-
gether, indicating that there must have been day books or jour-
nals. More importantly, the extant ledgers form a framework 
of bilateral transactions. Although transactions across ledgers 
were subject to exchange rates or transaction costs, transactions 
did occur. These transactions were always recorded twice, once 
in the issuing ledger (negative) and once in the receiving led-
ger (positive). Because the various ledgers traded among them-
selves, it may be concluded that they acted as personified agents 
and transcended a mere division of accounts.
Nominal Accounts: The MCA ledgers do not include a profit-
14The accounts for 1793 are used because the document is free of damage 
and clear.
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or-loss ledger (iik-chil). We can conjecture that the MCA knew 
of such a practice but seemed to have had no need to calculate 
profit. Hyo˘n’s 1916 primer, based on the traditional practices 
 explained to him by two Kaeso˘ng merchants, lists four ledgers 
necessary to reach a final balance and to determine profit or loss 
– liabilities (ku˘pch’a-chil), assets (pongch’a-chil), profit (iik-chil), 
and loss (sobi-chil). The 1916 text clearly outlines a double-entry 
style with the final calculation of profit or loss in a nominal led-
ger. The MCA ledgers also contained expenditures, receipts, and 
losses (transaction costs and natural loss), but no profit led-
ger. The reasons were probably multiple, but fundamentally de-
rived from the difference between mercantile and agricultural 
needs. The clan association, insensitive to profit, was sensitive to 
loss. The MCA was interested in expanding its land holdings, re-
pairing its buildings, entertaining its guests, and providing for 
its membership. Copper cash was but one of three commodi-
ties that could obtain or satisfy these needs. Like modern, non-
profit, cooperative societies, the only concerns of the association 
were to meet the needs of the membership and to prevent losses. 
The MCA had no need of a purely nominal, profit ledger; all the 
MCA ledgers were real accounts with no separate nominal ac-
counts.
The Bookkeeping System: Linked Single-Entry in a Double-Entry 
Framework: Until now, aspects of the bookkeeping in the clan 
accounts exhibited certain characteristics that approximated 
 double-entry accounting – certain mechanical innovations (vo-
cabulary and appearance) that separated debit and credit en-
tries, the presence of personal accounts, the recognition of 
transaction costs and natural loss, and the personification of ac-
counts. Ultimately, however, all of these features are merely as-
pects of form. It is now necessary to explain the accounting peri-
ods used and the overall integration of the accounts.
 From 1741 to 1744, the MCA’s accounting period was one 
full year. From 1744, the accounts broke the year (lunar twelfth 
month to lunar twelfth month) in half. The first half (“spring”) 
opened the fiscal year and extended to the harvest, roughly be-
tween the sixth to eighth months. The second half (“autumn”) 
stretched from the harvest to the closing of the fiscal year in the 
spring, thus creating two accounting periods. The development 
of two accounts periods in a single year necessitated the innova-
tion of a special term to indicate “balance brought forward.” Our 
example (Exhibit 2) of accounts for the spring of the year 1793 
starts with the term cho˘nsu (Exhibit 2, indicated by F), which 
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literally means the “unhulled rice balance brought forward from 
the last account to open the new account.” This term designated 
the starting balance and brought forward the closing entry ob-
tained from the previous ledger cycle.
 The ledgers possessed elaborate technical aspects as all 
cross-ledger transactions were recorded twice. All ledgers were 
records of real accounts, with expenditures from them sim-
ply deducted from their own capitalization values. Thus, the 
 accounts were not double entry; in fact, they have every appear-
ance of an elaborate set of single-entry accounts linked together 
to allow cross-referencing and balancing. However, an elaborate 
single-entry system can closely resemble a double-entry system. 
Aiken and Lu [1998, p. 230] describe the Chinese Three Feet 
bookkeeping system as “intermediate” between single and dou-
ble entry. They point out that this method used double entry for 
non-silver transactions in which commodities were first convert-
ed to silver that was subsequently spent. The silver was recorded 
twice, once as a receipt from a commodity conversion and once 
as a disbursement for an expenditure. The MCA accounts are 
filled with similar examples.
 Although the MCA accounts may have been somewhere be-
tween single entry and double entry, there was a keen concern 
with accuracy. One great advantage of double entry is the identi-
fication of error. The fact that corrections of errors can be found 
in the MCA books demonstrates that they were meticulously re-
corded. Since errors in pre-modern and modern account books 
in Western Europe are common,15 their presence here is not un-
usual, but, compared to other contemporary books, surprising-
ly few errors have been found in the MCA ledgers. The errors 
that did appear were often related to outstanding rent or grains 
borrowed; only occasionally were mistakes made in record-
ing. When a mistake was discovered, notes were added around 
the entry in the ledger to indicate that it was an error and to ex-
plain the ramifications of the error on other ledgers. Such en-
tries demonstrate that the ledgers were not just a list of pay-
ments, but rather the pinnacle of an elaborate set of integrated 
day books and journals. In short, what the records represent is 
an equity account ledger. Table 5 shows that the incidence of er-
ror between 1781 and 1808 for the conversion of rice to cop-
per cash was 2.7%. Between 1846 and 1882, the nearby Haenam 
15 “. . . medieval [European] balance sheets do not always balance, because 
the bookkeeper was either unsuccessful or neglectful in tracing and correcting 
small differences” [de Roover, 1956, pp. 114-115].
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Yun Clan books produced an error rate of 12%, indicating that 
the Mun Clan was more meticulous in its bookkeeping [Han’guk 
Cho˘ngsin Munhwa Yo˘n’guwo˘n, no publication date].
TABLE 5
Error in the Mun Head Clan Account Books for the Period 
1781-1808
line year season tu (a)/
decimal 
so˘k
total 
yang 
(b)
correctly calculated 
for 1 so˘k
(c = total yang/
decimal so˘k
actual record
(per so˘k or 
per 20 tu)
error
(e = c - d)
1 1781 spring 820.00/
41 so˘k
67.65 1.65 1.65 0.00
2 1781 autumn 63.20/
3.16 so˘k
6.00 1.90 1.90 0.00
- - - - - - - -
8 1783 spring 66.00/
3.3 so˘k
10.70 3.24 a)
- - - - - - - -
22 1786 autumn 26.00/
1.3 so˘k
4.60 3.54 b)
- - - - - - - -
50 1793 spring 319.20/
15.96 so˘k
58.10 3.64 3.70 0.06
57 1796 spring 96.00/
4.8 so˘k
11.52 2.40 b)
58 1796 spring 85.00/
4.25 so˘k
11.70 2.75 2.70 0.05
- - - - - - - -
98 1808 spring 345.00/
17.25 so˘k
29.32 1.70 1.70 0.00
99 1808 spring 180.00/
9 so˘k
15.30 1.70 1.70 0.00
100 1808 spring 320.00/
16 so˘k
28.80 1.80 1.80 0.00
101 1808 autumn 300.00/
15 so˘k
25.50 1.70 1.70 0.00
Error rate = 2.7 per cent (2/73) [1781-1808]
the number of errors = 2, the number of total records of ‘per market price’ = 73
a)  “per market price” is hard to discern due to corruption of the document
b)  no marking of per market price
Source: see text.
 The MCA accounts were linked together. Since all trans-
actions were not entered twice, the system was not perfect 
 double entry, but because all cross-ledger transactions were re-
corded twice, the fundamental principle of dual entry for the 
purpose of cross-referencing was clearly in evidence. Dual 
 entries allow the easy tracking of assets and ease the preparation 
of trial balances. The fact that errors were found, corrected, and 
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referred back to other books testifies to the complexity and accu-
racy of the system. We must keep in mind that these were the ac-
counts of an agricultural cooperative, an organization that pro-
duced and traded in commodities. If the organization had more 
complicated assets or if the volume of transactions had been 
greater, then the accounts might well have developed into a full-
blown, double-entry system with nominal accounts. Although 
we do not yet have mercantile books from before the 1850s, we 
can see a traditional, dual-entry, indigenous Korean accounting 
system at work in the books of clan associations from the mid-
18th century.
CONCLUSION: THE MAXIMIZATION OF UTILITY IN A 
MORAL ECONOMY
 Our discussion of the MCA accounts raises two points. 
First, the fact that the accounts were kept by a clan association 
acting as an agricultural cooperative demonstrates that there 
was no necessary relationship between sophisticated account-
ing techniques and commercialism. Efficient bookkeeping was 
undoubtedly conducive to commercial success, but it was also a 
useful practice within the Korean moral economy. It was a tech-
nology that was applied in both contexts precisely because it 
was rational and efficient.
 Second, the primary purpose of the MCA was mutual sup-
port, not profit. This would explain the absence of an integrated 
profit-or-loss balance. The goal was guaranteed subsistence for 
all members of the association, and the management of an as-
set pool that would function to maintain a stable community. If 
everyone had sufficient food, if there was sufficient surplus for 
communal needs, and if the surplus could stretch to the expres-
sion of social ideals (in particular, the ideal of filial piety), then 
social stability was achievable. Significant expenditures were 
made for projects best understood as “for the common good.”16 
Loans and expenditures that might be called a form of social 
welfare, even a redistribution of wealth, were extended in hopes 
16For example, expenditures for spring sacrifices (Exhibit 1, lower sheet, col-
umn 4 from right), a house for the grave keeper and irrigation repairs (Exhibit 2, 
upper sheet, columns 7-9 from right), sacrifices to the mountain god (Exhibit 2, 
lower sheet, column 16 from right); Table 1, spring 1819: unhulled rice, lines 3, 4 
and 9, 28, 31, 34, 35, 39, and the categories of “land accounts,” “dividends,” and 
“labor for irrigation repairs” in Tables 2 and 3.
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of enhancing communal survival and reciprocity.17 Confucian 
ideology in 18th century Korea rested on personal responsibili-
ty but decried personal profit and enshrined community. We find 
plentiful evidence in these ledgers of extensive economic com-
mitment to this ideal.
 In the MCA accounts, there were numerous expenditures for 
ceremonies that directly related to the dominant social ideology 
of filial piety as a key pillar of social stability.18 The performance 
of filial duties satisfied three needs. First, there was the need 
for personal emotional expression towards forebears. Second, 
the education of the young in the principle would eventually in-
still the responsibility for providing social welfare for the elderly, 
even the dead. Filial piety was the inter-generational social con-
tract. Third, a filial son would attract community approval as a 
trustworthy and upstanding member of society. Offer [1997, pp. 
450-452] reminds us that Adam Smith stated the purpose of eco-
nomic activity: “ . . . to be observed, to be attended to, to be tak-
en notice of with sympathy, complacency, and approbation.” The 
pursuit of wealth beyond survival was the “pursuit of regard.” 
“The intrinsic benefits of social and personal interaction” or “the 
satisfactions of regard” are a human propensity perhaps stron-
ger than the propensity to “truck, barter, and exchange.” Materi-
al welfare, then, was not the sum total of human desire.
 The 18th century Korean moral economy put little value on 
speculation and strove for a surplus that could be used to ben-
efit community solidarity through public displays of commu-
nal ideals.19 Lest we risk a descent into romanticism, let us re-
call that a key element of community solidarity in the southern 
rice bowl was the maintenance of irrigation facilities.20 Since 
the members of the association were consumers as well as pro-
ducers, their ethics were radically different from those of com-
mercial concerns. They were risk-averse in their pursuit of sub-
sistence and concerned with community rather than personal 
17For example, expenditures for general distribution (dividends? Exhibit 2, 
upper sheet, column 11 from left), support of needy dependents (Exhibit 2, up-
per sheet, columns 1 and 2 from left and lower sheet, columns 1 and 4 from 
right); Table 1, spring 1819: unhulled rice, lines 10-19, 22-24, and the category of 
“students, education, charity, public buildings” in Tables 2 and 3.
18For example, expenditures for ancestral memorial rites (Exhibit 2, upper 
sheet, columns 10-19 from right, and lower sheet, columns 5-15 and 17-28 from 
right).
19Speculation would appear in the wider society in the 19th century, but 
that is another story related to the collapse of the social contract [Jun and Lew-
is, 2005].
20For example, Exhibit 2, upper sheet, columns 8-9 from right.
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surplus. In the words of Scott [1976, p. 4], “the peasant house-
hold has little scope for the profit maximization calculus of tra-
ditional neoclassical economics. Typically, the peasant cultivator 
seeks to avoid the failure that will ruin him rather than attempt-
ing a big, but risky, killing.”
 To generate subsistence and then surplus required sophis-
ticated technologies to monitor community assets. Without ef-
ficient and honest oversight, accounts became corrupted, the 
social fabric frayed, and the membership, including the account-
ants, ran the risk of starvation. Therefore, incoming and out-
going goods and money were strictly and rationally audited 
according to rules determined at the general meetings of the as-
sociation. The communal value put on honest bookkeeping can 
be seen in the observance of similar customs in widely differing 
communities. Certain colleges at Oxford and Cambridge brewed 
a special “audit ale” to be consumed on the day accounts were 
audited and merchant accounts settled. Regardless of the ef-
fect on accuracy and efficiency, the purpose of the custom was 
to celebrate a shared, communal economy. A similar custom 
was practiced on auditing day in Chang`am village when wine 
was ritually served. The Chang`am Village Association and the 
MCA had an equivalent to audit ale called cho˘nyosi-chu (“audit 
wine”), known to us because it was carefully recorded as an ex-
penditure. 
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APPENDIX A
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
chesa-kye (祭祀契) association for rituals
chil (秩) ledger
cho (租) unhulled rice
Cho˘lla province (全羅)
cho˘n (錢) copper cash unit composed of ten pun
cho˘n-chil (錢秩) copper cash ledger
cho˘nsu (傳受) balance brought forward
cho˘nyo˘si-chu (傳與時酒) audit wine
ch`uk (縮) natural loss and transaction cost
ch’ul (出) outgoing
ha (下) expenditure
honin-kye (婚姻契) marriage association
hop (合) smallest dry measure
idu (吏讀) use of Chinese characters to write native Korean words
iik-chil (利益) profit ledger
isang (已上) subtotal
ip (入) incoming
ko˘ (去) outgoing
kokja-chil (曲子秩) yeast cake ledger
ku˘p (給) expenditure
ku˘pch’a-chil (給次秩) liabilities ledger
kye (契) mutual assistance association
kyo˘l (結) land measure by production output
Lóngmén bookkeeping (龍門) Chinese style from mid-17th century
mi (米) milled rice
mi-chil (米秩) milled rice ledger
mongmaek-chil (木麥秩) barley
nae (內) from this (total income or assets)
nae2 (來) incoming
Namp’yo˘ng Mun clan (南平文氏)
nong’u-kye (農牛契) oxen-leasing association
pan sogyo˘ng (半所耕) half annual production cost
po-kye (洑契) irrigation association
pong (捧) receipt
pongch’a-chil (捧次秩) assets ledger
pun (分) smallest cash unit
pyo˘l yusa-chil (別有司秩) ledger of items specially handled by a bursar
sagae Songdo ch’ibubo˘p (四介松都治簿法) term used by modern historians to re-
fer to the accounting system used by Kaeso˘ng merchants 
sang (上) receipt
sang-kye (喪契) funeral association
sangp’yo˘ng t’ongbo (常平通寶) Korean copper cash coins
shimai cho¯bo (姉妹帳簿) ‘sister ledgers’
sobi-chil (消費秩) loss ledger
sogyo˘ng (所耕) annual production cost
sojong-kye (小宗契) association of the branch or branch clan
so˘k (石=섬 so˘m) dry measure composed of 20 or 15 tu
song-kye (松契) tree-planting association
su˘ng (升=되 twe) dry measure composed of ten hop
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toejaeng-i (되쟁이:升手) village grain handler
taejong-kye (大宗契) association of the head clan
tong-kye (洞契) village association
tu (斗=말 mal) dry measure composed of ten su˘ng
turak (斗落) land measure by amount of seed required
yang (兩) copper cash unit composed of ten cho˘n
yen (円 or 圓) modern Japanese currency
Yo˘ng`am (靈巖) place name
yonghagi (用下記) account ledgers
Yongsan So˘wo˘n (龍山書院) name of a private academy
yu (留) remaining assets
yusa (有司) bursar
zeni (銭) modern Japanese currency, subunit of yen
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18th Annual Conference on
Accounting, Business & Financial History 
at Cardiff Business School 14-15 September 2006
Announcement of Conference and Call for Papers
Guest Speakers – Josephine Maltby & Janette Rutterford
Theoretical, empirical and review papers are welcomed in all areas of account-
ing, business and financial history.
The conference provides delegates with the opportunity of presenting and dis-
cussing, in an informal setting, papers ranging from early working drafts to ful-
ly developed manuscripts. The format of the conference allows approximately 
40 minutes for presentation and discussion in order to help achieve worthwhile 
feedback from those attending.
In the past, many papers presented at Cardiff have subsequently appeared in 
print in Accounting, Business and Financial History, edited by John Richard 
(Dick) Edwards and Trevor Boyns, or in another of the full range of internation-
al, refereed academic accounting, business and economic history journals.
The conference will be held at Aberdare Hall, Cathays Park, Cardiff, CF14 3UX, 
UK, from lunchtime on Thursday, 14 September 2006 to mid-afternoon on Fri-
day, 15 September 2006.
The fully inclusive conference fee (covering all meals, the conference dinner on 
Thursday and accommodation) is £130. 
Those wishing to offer papers to be considered for presentation at the con-
ference should send an abstract of their paper (not exceeding one page) by 
31 May 2006 to:
Debbie Harris, Cardiff Business School, Colum Drive, Cardiff, CF10 3EU 
Tel +44 (0)29 2087 5730 Fax +44 (0)29 2087 4419 Email. HarrisDL@cardiff.ac.uk
Following the refereeing process, applicants will be advised of the conference or-
ganisers’ decision on 30 June 2006.
Sponsored by:
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AUBURN UNIVERSITY MONTGOMERY
AMERICA’S RAILROAD DEPRECIATION 
DEBATE, 1907 TO 1913: A STUDY OF 
DIVERGENCE IN EARLY 20th CENTURY 
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
Abstract: In June 1907, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) 
released new reporting rules that would require railroads to change 
from betterment to depreciation accounting for equipment. The new 
rules set off a firestorm of protest because the railroads felt they were 
already recognizing physical depreciation through the current system. 
The ICC, however, was looking at the concept of economic deprecia-
tion to match the cost of equipment with revenue over the life of the 
asset in much the same way that industry was beginning to account 
for its fixed assets. Such economic depreciation, it was felt, would 
give the rate-setting ICC more stable reported incomes to determine 
return on assets and the investing public a better feel for the results of 
railroad operations. The debate began in a cordial fashion but deteri-
orated into bitter name-calling, civil disobedience, and litigation that 
challenged both the accounting rules and the authority of the ICC to 
issue and require them. The ICC partially won the debate, yet rail-
roads were able to keep betterment accounting for track structures 
another 70 years before the full convergence of industry and railroad 
accounting standards occurred.
 
INTRODUCTION 
 After nearly 20 years of ineffective railroad regulation by 
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), the U.S. Congress 
in 1906 passed the Hepburn Amendment to clarify several Su-
preme Court decisions and to force the railroad industry to pub-
lish its rate schedules. The new act also gave the ICC legal au-
thority to set “fair and reasonable” rail tariffs and rates. The law 
authorized the ICC to develop uniform accounting procedures 
for railroads to meet this new mandate. The ICC quickly issued 
new accounting and financial reporting rules for all railroads 
that came under its jurisdiction. Though the rules were similar 
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to the ones issued in 1894 and largely ignored by the industry, 
the railroads were now required to recognize a depreciation ex-
pense and a corresponding reserve for their “non-permanent” 
fixed assets – rail equipment. Protests quickly erupted over the 
new rules and a fiery debate ensued between the railroad’s tra-
ditional concept of “physical depreciation” and the ICC’s appli-
cation of a new theory called “economic depreciation.” Though 
the debate solidified the ICC’s authority to issue and require spe-
cific accounting rules, it eventually compromised and allowed 
betterment accounting for track and way structures, a compro-
mise that would result in divergent accounting standards be-
tween railroads and industry for the next 70 years.
 This paper tracks the debate over these depreciation issues 
from their inception in 1907 to the final disposition by the Su-
preme Court in 1913. The debate is well documented through 
the records of the ICC and related articles published in the na-
tional press like the Wall Street Journal (the Journal), the New 
York Times (the Times), and the railroad industry’s own publi-
cation, the Railway Age Gazette (the Gazette).1 Prominent pub-
lic accountants also weighed into the debate on both sides of 
the issue, indicating an unsettled debate within the profession 
over the course of the modernization of accounting principles 
in the U.S. in the early 20th century. Though each source has 
its own biases, taken together, they give a sense of the passion 
on both sides of America’s great railroad depreciation debate. 
BACKGROUND TO THE DEBATE
 In 1902, the newly constituted U.S. Steel Company de-
veloped innovative financial reporting procedures that includ-
ed recognition of depreciation charges on fixed assets. Though 
the concept of physical depreciation of fixed assets had been 
recognized for nearly three quarters of a century, according to 
Younkins and Flesher [1984, p. 257], the U.S. Steel disclosures 
were unique among contemporary firms because they reported 
depreciation as a separate expense on the income statement. 
Such an innovation helped to institutionalize the concept of 
economic depreciation and paved the way for the modern ac-
crual accounting standards currently in use a century later. Be-
cause of its mission to control rail rates through the analysis of 
accounting and other operational data, such an innovation in 
1First published in 1856, the Railroad Gazette absorbed a smaller competi-
tor called the Railway Age and changed its name to Railway Age in January 1908, 
with a further name change in July 1908 to the Railway Age Gazette. 
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 accounting could hardly have missed the attention of the coun-
try’s primary railroad regulatory agency, the ICC, and its long-
time chief statistician, Professor Henry Carter Adams.
The Desire for a Uniform Railroad Accounting Policy2: Since the 
inception of the ICC in 1887, Henry Adams had attempted to 
standardize railroad reporting in the U.S., using Section 20 of 
the Interstate Commerce Act3 as his authority. The section read, 
in part, “the Commission may . . . the purposes of the act, pre-
scribe a period of time within which all common carriers sub-
ject to the provisions of this Act shall have, a uniform system 
of  accounts and the manner in which such accounts should be 
kept.”
 His first attempt to create uniform accounting rules was in 
1894, when the ICC issued Classifications of Operating Expens-
es to guide railroads in their data-reporting requirements. The 
requirements included modern double-entry accounting practic-
es; however, its modified accrual nature left a limited articula-
tion between the balance sheet and income statement (actually 
a profit and loss account). Though the American Association of 
Railroad Accounting Officers (AARAO) was instrumental in de-
veloping the pamphlet, the reporting requirements went largely 
ignored by other regulators and the industry. First, the ICC-insti-
tuted National Association of Railroad Commissioners (NARC) 
balked at their usage because state commissioners felt that the 
new accounting rules would hinder their ability to control rail 
rates within their respective jurisdictions. This process led to 
multiple and conflicting accounting procedures across state ju-
risdictions that caused confusion among the railroads, leading 
them to resist the new national standards. Finally, legal rulings 
and legislative inaction stymied Adams’ goal of a uniform ac-
counting system for all railroads. Though Adams and the ICC 
knew that the nation’s railroad reporting practices needed mod-
ernization, they could take no action until Congress gave the 
ICC further authority.
 In the meantime, Adams continued to issue minor revi-
sions and clarifications to the ill-fated Classifications of Operat-
ing Expenses to make the reporting process more understand-
able. The nature of the accounting, however, changed very little 
2For a review of the development of ICC reporting requirements before 1900, 
see Heier [1994, pp. 101-110].
3Act to Regulate Interstate Commerce, February 4, 1887, amended June 29, 
1906, 34 Stat. 584.
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from the 1894 document. The NARC [1905, p. 30] augured a 
change when discussing the ICC’s clarification in the definition 
of additions, betterments, and improvements for the AARAO. 
The clarification read: “Operating Expenses should include all 
expenditures necessary to keep up the general standard of effi-
ciency.” The meaning was clear; the expenses currently report-
ed by the railroads regarding fixed asset usage were not suffi-
cient to give a clear picture of rail operations. The railroads, 
however, were probably not too concerned with such a course 
change because the ICC’s position (both politically and legally) 
had not changed, at least not yet. 
The Hepburn Amendment: On June 6, 1906, Congress finally act-
ed and passed the Hepburn Amendment to the Interstate Com-
merce Act. The new act also gave the ICC the legal authority 
to set fair and reasonable rail tariffs. To meet this new man-
date, regulators were authorized to “develop uniform account-
ing rules, and to prescribe the forms of all accounts, records 
and memoranda to be kept by carriers” [ICC, 1907b, p.139]. The 
law now empowered the ICC to have rate setting as its prima-
ry mission. A uniform accounting system for railroads became 
Adams’ focus. As one would imagine, the railroad industry was 
not elated over the new legislation as evidenced by an editori-
al published in the Gazette [January 11, 1907, p. 32]. In a mut-
ed and measured tone, the industry expressed the opinion that, 
“The new rate law gives the Interstate Commerce Commission 
the fullest authority over railroad statistics and accounts, with 
the power, not only to prescribe what accounts shall be kept, 
but to forbid keeping an unapproved statistic.” 
 The rail industry had resigned itself to the fact that the ICC 
had substantially more power, but it also suggested in the arti-
cle that slow and deliberate change in reporting requirements 
would better serve the traveling public and shippers. Though 
protests would soon erupt over required depreciation charg-
es, the rail industry at this point was more concerned with the 
ICC’s potential inclusion of “out-side” or non-rail income as part 
of tariff rate calculations. Such an inclusion would disrupt the 
sensitive rate-of-return formulas that the ICC would be using to 
set passenger and freight rates. Regardless of what the chang-
es were going to be, it was clear that the industry was going 
to face new accounting rules soon.
 During the transition from the amendment’s ratification 
and the issuance of new uniform accounting standards, the ICC 
again enlisted the help of the AARAO. Professor Adams acted 
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as the ICC’s liaison to a newly created Committee of Twenty-
Five. The ICC’s annual report [1907b, p. 40] indicated: “Con-
ferences [with the AARAO] developed interesting and instruc-
tive differences of opinion on many accounting questions. But 
it may be said that, with a few exceptions, the results arrived 
at were in harmony with a consensus of opinion of a majori-
ty of its members.” The annual report did not disclose the na-
ture of the discussions, but changes in accounting procedures 
at the large manufacturers, like U.S. Steel, must have been on 
the minds of the conferees. Depreciation could well have been 
at the top of this list in light of comments from Price Water-
house’s George O. May [1962, p. 190] who indicated in his mem-
oirs that “in 1906 the straight-line amortization concept of de-
preciation was in fairly general use in the industrial field.” 
 The ICC planned to issue new financial reporting rules 
for all railroads that came under its jurisdiction by June 1907. 
Though the prospective rules were very similar to the ones is-
sued in 1894, the new system would include more accruals that 
would increase balance sheet and income statement articulation 
similar to modern financial statements. To foster the moderni-
zation of railroad reporting, the ICC also focused on the fixed 
asset and capital accounts. Like U.S. Steel, the railroads would 
probably now, in all likelihood, be required to recognize depre-
ciation expense instead of their traditional manner of account-
ing for fixed assets called betterment accounting. Succinctly put, 
depreciation represented the systematic expensing of fixed as-
set costs in contrast to the periodic (or irregular) recognition 
of expense under betterment accounting.
A Short Explanation of Betterment Accounting: An early discus-
sion of fixed asset accounting and profitability for railroads 
came in the 1870s from Albert Fink, the superintendent of the 
Louisville and Nashville Railroad. Fink suggested in an adden-
dum to the 1875 L&N annual report [Fink, 1875, pp. 6-7] that 
renewal accounts that compared actual repair costs with es-
timated repair costs to determine annual “due to that year’s 
operations” … [and] … “To make the annual reports of a railroad 
company of value, the accounts of the company should be so 
kept as to show the expenses.” Fink’s methodology would be re-
fined and institutionalized over the next thirty years, and came 
to be known simply as “betterment accounting.” The name of 
the methodology would evolve into the more theoretically de-
scriptive retirement-replacement-betterment (RRB) accounting, 
and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) [1983, 
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Para. 5], at the time of RRB discontinuance in 1983, defined 
this practice as follows:
Under RRB, the initial costs of installing track are cap-
italized, not depreciated, and remain capitalized until 
the track is retired. The costs of replacing track are ex-
pensed unless a betterment (for example, replacing a 
110-lb. rail with a 132-lb. rail) occurs. In that case, the 
amount by which the cost of the new part exceeds the 
current cost of the part replaced is considered a bet-
terment and is capitalized but not depreciated, and the 
current cost of the part replaced is expensed. Railroads 
generally have used RRB for financial reporting.
 Unlike the use of modern depreciation accounting, which 
actually matched fixed asset cost to revenues over a given pe-
riod, the railroad under betterment accounting did not recoup 
the cost of the track until replaced. It could happen in some 
years that no charges to current operating expenses from track 
usage were matched against revenue if no track was replaced. 
 By 1907, the methodology described above had been in 
widespread use and acted as the basis for reporting the account 
balances of the railroad’s two primary fixed asset accounts, 
equipment and track structures. As the depreciation debate de-
veloped, the ICC would take the position that betterment ac-
counting did not reflect the true cost of a railroad’s operations 
because in lean years it would simply not do any replacements 
or upgrades, a major safety concern for the ICC. The ICC hoped 
that the upcoming depreciation requirements would provide a 
more “accurate” rendering of these fixed asset balances through 
a more systematic matching of fixed expenses with revenue. As 
the ICC moved towards the rate-of-return basis for evaluating 
rail rates, it would become clear to the rail industry that de-
preciation was at the heart of the evolution of the concept of 
“reasonable rates” and “reasonable returns” as articulated by 
the 1898 Smyth vs. Ames [169 U.S. 466] decision.
 Exhibit 1 below shows a hypothetical comparison of rail re-
turns due to the impact of the new 1907 depreciation charges 
on a railroad’s financial results compared with betterment ac-
counting. With betterment accounting intact, the pre-1907 in-
come levels per train mile were lower due to an artificially high 
expense ratio. This helped the railroads to either maintain a 
lower return ratio and, consequently, higher tariff rates or jus-
tify their request for an increase. It was also possible for the 
railroads to schedule betterment expenditures to plan or smooth 
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annual income levels.4 This expense timing was the central prob-
lem voiced by the ICC in its 1905 annual report. On the other 
hand, with the partial accounting for depreciation charges on 
equipment, the financial position of the railroad may be im-
proved, leading regulators to construe the higher income levels 
as unreasonable. The railroad could then expect a revision of the 
rail rates downward to compensate for the “excess income.”
EXHIBIT 1
Estimated Change in Railroad Financial Accounting 
Results
Accounting  
before 1907
Accounting  
After 1907
Rail Structure Costs $2,500,000 $2,500,000
Depreciable Equipment Costs $2,500,000 $2,500,000
Total Assets $3,000,000 $3,000,000
Revenues $1,000,000 $1,000,000
Operating Expenses $2,400,000 $2,400,000
Rail Structure Betterments $2,200,000 $2,200,000
Equipment Betterments $2,150,000
Depreciation Assume 7.00% X $500,000 $2,235,000
Total Expenses $2,750,000 $2,635,000
Net Income $2,250,000 $2,365,000
Train-Miles 10,000,000
Revenue Per Mile $1210.1000 $1210.1000
Costs Per Mile $1210.0750 $1210.0635
Income per mile $1210.0250 $1210.0365
Return on Assets = Income ÷ Assets 8.33% 12.16%
THE ICC ISSUES NEW REPORTING RULES
The Preliminary Debate over the New Depreciation Rules: With 
little fanfare and with even less guidance, the ICC [1907a], on 
June 3, 1907, released new accounting rules as an update to 
the ICC’s original document, Classifications of Operating Ex-
penses.5 The first look at the new rules had actually occurred 
in April 1907 when the ICC issued Circular No. 5 to detail the 
4For the effects of the ICC accounting changes on income smoothing, see Si-
vakumar and Waymire [2003].
5The newly required equipment depreciation was highlighted essentially 
through the reorganization and renumbering of an official account classification 
scheme.
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proposed accounting changes and to give the industry due proc-
ess to comment on them before final publication. The Journal 
[May 21, 1907, p. 3] reported that a large number of railroads 
had indeed commented on the new rules, especially with regard 
to depreciation accounting. The written replies to the circular 
expressed a wide range of views on the formal depreciation ac-
count. According to the article, comments regarding Circular 
No. 5 framed the coming issue by saying, “it may be said that 
current practice [betterment accounting] allows for depreciation 
by including renewals or replacements in operating expense and 
consequently railways do not need a formal depreciation ac-
count.” The article continued by making the editorial comment 
that, “It is at least our opinion [that the ICC] question wheth-
er or not this is an appropriate method of procedure.” It was 
reported that the railroads felt that “there seems to be no dis-
agreement on the proposition that operating expense should be 
charged with the full amount of wear incident to the use of the 
property, and that any excess over that amount should be sepa-
rately charged to income.” These types of comments again sig-
naled the railroad’s coming stance that depreciation was phys-
ical in nature and not economic, and reinforced the railroads’ 
fear that any depreciation account would degrade the balance 
of the asset accounts and upset the delicate balance of the re-
turn-on-asset ratios.6
 Even with the preliminary ICC circulars issued in April and 
May, it still appears that the railroads may have been caught 
off-guard by some of the new depreciation rules, as evidenced 
by the silence in the Gazette before June on the process lead-
ing up to the promulgation of the new accounting rules. In 
fact, an early article in the Gazette [April 19, 1907, p. 507] con-
tained no discussion of depreciation but instead stressed an up-
coming rule that would make the railroad’s head accountant a 
sworn agent of the government and the issue of non-rail relat-
ed income being used in the rate-of-return formulas. In an ar-
ticle published after the issuance of the rules, the Gazette [June 
21, 1907, pp. 883-884] indicated that the present rules only ap-
plied to equipment but that there was a possibility of the appli-
cation of depreciation rules to track and structures. The article 
further explained that such a move would make the account-
ing for track additions or repairs less flexible than the current 
6It appears that companion circulars were also issued during 1907 for the 
more contentious issue of classification of “additions and betterments” related to 
those costs of upgrading permanent fixed assets such as structures and rail beds. 
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American system that allowed for management decisions relat-
ed to the recognition of no capital costs in bad years, a safety 
concern to be sure.
 According to Barret [1907, p. 486], a competing publica-
tion, Railroad World, did express tacit support for the new ac-
counting rules when it wrote, “Hitherto this question has been 
thrust aside with scanty apology that due attention to repairs, 
renewals and replacements excuses the omission. At its worst, 
the omission to make allowance for depreciation leads to un-
earned payments to capital, to eventual overcapitalization, and 
finally to bankruptcy.” Railroad World then expressed concern 
that any rate-of-return calculations from the ICC must take into 
account depreciation charges or there would be a reduction in 
asset values. Although this industry publication was moderate-
ly positive about the change to depreciation, it seemed to sug-
gest that the ICC had ulterior safety motives for the change.
 Even before the official release of the new accounting rules, 
Adams and members of the ICC readied the markets, the pub-
lic, and especially the railroads for the announcement. For ex-
ample, the Journal [May 21, 1907, p. 3] reported on the pro-
spective accounting changes, indicating that they “were to be set 
up providing for the replacement of property – annual percent-
ages to be left to the carriers.” The same article reported that 
the ICC’s aim for the new system of accounts was to “simpli-
fy the now complex problem of determining what a railroad is 
earning.” Adams was quoted in an interview as saying, “it was 
the intention of the commission to draw a clear line between 
charges [that] merely made good the actual wear and due tear 
or represented depreciations and such as represented by better-
ments and additions whether the latter is chargeable directly to 
income or to capital.” Here the argument went beyond the rec-
ognition of depreciation, and moved towards a more modern 
differentiation between capital improvements that would be de-
preciated and operating expenses that would have a direct ef-
fect on the earnings of a railroad.
 Adams went on to indicate that in the present railroad ac-
counting system, the definitions of such items as repairs, bet-
terments, and additions did not convey a definite meaning, 
“hence the necessity of establishing principles of accounting as 
will enable the commission to determine whether operating ex-
penses as charged on the company’s books properly represent 
the cost of transportation.” In the eyes of the ICC, the railroads 
were now charging only “capital improvements” against current 
income, which masked the true earnings of the corporation 
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 because under betterment accounting there was never a recov-
ery of the original cost of the railroad’s equipment through the 
income statement until replacement. Adams further explained 
the depreciation provision would better allow for the replace-
ment of property before wear and tear finally forces the issue. 
Unfortunately, at this point in the interview Adams made a mod-
ern theoretical mistake by saying: “Provisions should be made 
out of earnings of property during the period of its use to re-
place it.…The purpose of depreciation is to provide a replace-
ment fund.” 
 Though it was clear that Adams was moving toward the ap-
plication of economic depreciation and away from accounting 
for the physical depreciation of the railroad equipment, he did 
seem to harbor the perspective that depreciation, though non-
cash in nature, would provide a direct funding source for the 
replacement of equipment. Such an idea may have come from 
contemporary manufacturers like U.S. Steel, which reported 
equipment depreciation with extinguishments of debt. For ex-
ample, in the 1904 U.S. Steel annual report [p. 11], the com-
pany stated: “The appropriation of these funds has been made 
with the idea that, thus aided, the Bond Sinking Funds will liq-
uidate the capital investment in the properties at the expiration 
of their life.” In addition, the report also mentioned: “These 
funds are used to improve, modernize, and strengthen proper-
ties.” In the short term, Adams’ early misunderstanding of the 
cash nature of depreciation would cause some confusion in the 
application of the new rules and overshadow the ICC’s purpose 
better to match railroad expenditures with revenue. Finally, the 
article also reported that the railroads did not object to the idea 
of taking expenditures in excess of wear and tear out of earn-
ings, but they were leery that investors would construe a for-
mal depreciation fund as cash available for dividends.
 The rationale for the new ICC accounting rules may have 
gone beyond a more uniform accounting system and may have 
focused on two other motivations. The first of these may have 
been to foster safer railroad operations by actually forcing the 
continued replacement of railroad equipment on a scheduled 
basis through a change in accounting procedures. A more per-
nicious consideration may have been the ICC’s desire eventually 
to standardize rail tariffs through railroad valuation. This possi-
bility was made evident in a Journal article [May 23, 1907, p.1] 
that reported a speech by ICC Commissioner, Charles A. Pouty, 
before the National Association of Manufacturers in which he 
discussed the ICC’s reasons for changing the regulatory rules. 
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 First, Pouty indicated that government itself was on trial, 
and that regulation must be “sufficiently strong to choke the cry 
for national operation.” The concept of federal ownership and 
operation of the railroads had become popular as anti-capitalist 
views began to spread in the U.S. in the early part of the 19th 
century. Though he did not like the idea of government con-
trol and felt the private sector the better place to control rail 
operations, he did feel that a cabinet-level department of rail-
roads should be set up to oversee rail operations and set na-
tional transportation policy.7 Pouty also explained that the gov-
ernment, and not private individuals, should have over-sight 
responsibility in rate setting. This appears to have been a crit-
icism of the federal courts and their intervention in ICC deci-
sions on behalf of private litigants. Most importantly for this 
story, Pouty indicated that, “it is probable that the interstate rail-
ways should be valued by the national government.” Pouty, the 
ICC, and the rail industry knew that valuation needed proper 
(and uniform) accounting data. The news report quoted Pouty 
as saying: “The popular impression that if the value of our rail-
roads were known it would be easy to adjust rates that a fair 
return upon that value and only a fair return would be obtained 
is entirely erroneous. The cost of reproduction is but a sin-
gle factor which enters just value.” Although Pouty never men-
tioned the subject of the new depreciation rules, he did focus 
on a set of criticisms regarding the methods railroads used to 
determine and account for the value of their long-term capital. 
According to Pouty, railroads could easily hide investments in 
the form of stocks and bonds in related and sometimes com-
peting railroads.8
 In a related Journal article [May 22, 1907, p. 5], Adams 
echoed Pouty’s comments when he said: “The valuation of rail-
roads on a scientific basis is quite feasible, but the reasonable-
ness of railroad rates is and must be a matter of human judg-
ment exercised beyond the bounds of mere valuation.” Adams 
went on to explain that the individual subjects of railroad cap-
italization, valuation, and rates are related by giving a convo-
luted example where income should not be above the amount 
needed to maintain operations if it is to be deemed reasonable 
7It would be nearly 60 years later when the Department of Transportation 
was established by an act of Congress on October 15, 1966, with its first official 
day of operations on April 1, 1967.
8This was a direct reference to the stock manipulation case where E.H. Har-
riman of the Union Pacific and Rock Island Railroads secretly bought a directly 
competing line called the Alton Railroad. 
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income by the Commission. In a more modern sense, he then 
differentiated between the valuation used to set rates and that 
of the market valuation of the railroad securities themselves. 
Market valuation he felt did not equate to regulatory valuation 
when it came to setting freight and passenger rates.
 The popular view in this era was that high railroad mar-
ket valuations were the result of high and unfair rail tariffs. 
Through his example, it appears that Adams saw this contro-
versy differently. He felt that the high market valuations and 
high rates were only tangentially related by the fact that the 
most profitable railroads also seemed to have the highest mar-
ket value. In the end, Adams and the ICC would continue to 
focus on the return on assets to determine the reasonableness 
of tariffs in keeping with legal rulings. Finally, like Pouty, Ad-
ams was laying the groundwork for acceptance of the upcom-
ing accounting rule changes. It was clear that physical valua-
tion of the railroads was on the ICC’s agenda, and that the ICC 
was going to gather the necessary data on the railroad’s capital 
assets needed to complete this task.9 When asked about prog-
ress towards completing the new accounting system, Adams 
said: “They have progressed much further than I thought they 
would by this time. Operating revenues and operating expense 
accounts are practically done and the accountants are pulling 
together and mean business.”
 After the official release of the new rules the next week, 
an article published in the Journal [June 7, 1907, p. 6] high-
lighted the major accounting changes promulgated by the ICC. 
In general, the required revenue and expense items mirrored 
those of the 1894 requirements; however, the railroads were 
now supposed to report those financial results monthly to the 
ICC, presumably so that the ICC could maintain control over 
both short-term and long-term tariffs. According to the article, 
the major change in accounting regulations for 1907 included 
the requirement for a formal provision of depreciation charges 
and reserves for all companies covered by the Interstate Com-
merce Act. This depreciation requirement also differentiated op-
erating expenses and capital improvements by indicating, “The 
purpose of these depreciation charges is to have the exact cost 
9As a side note, in a compromise to get the Hepburn Amendment passed, the 
explicit ability of the ICC to value railroad assets directly was not given; howev-
er, it was not expressly forbidden either, a point of contention for years. For a re-
view of the political environment surrounding the development of the ICC and 
the 1906 Hepburn Amendment, see Miranti [1989].
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of a particular month or a particular year, and thus enable a 
correct statement of net revenue from operations.” The article 
then explained that the new definitions of betterments and ad-
ditions will also result in keeping the cost improvements out of 
current operating expenses.
 The lack of depreciation of track and way structures had 
been noted just a week before in the Journal [May 29, 1907, 
p. 6], anticipating the new accounting rules. The article quoted 
an ICC official who said, “operating expenses must not be bur-
dened with expenditures for additional equipment, tracks, bal-
last, or additions to the railroad, the purposes of which are to 
improve the property operated.” In addition, the official further 
divulged: “The chief new feature of these primary accounts is 
that a depreciation account, set aside for renewal accounts, has 
been supplied for every item of equipment. [However] there is 
no depreciation account for way and structures.” The article 
then quoted Adams as saying, “it is impossible to arrive at any 
final conclusion as to how the rule of depreciation should be 
applied to roadbed and buildings, and that the subject will be 
specifically investigated during the coming fiscal year.” Adams’ 
trepidation over any change of betterment accounting rules for 
track and way structures would continue in ICC policy making 
for years to come due to the ICC’s indecision about just how 
to depreciate permanent structures given conflicting theories of 
wear and tear and cost matching. The issues would be a focus 
of railroad depreciation debates lasting into the early 1980s.
THE REACTION TO THE ACCOUNTING CHANGES
Reactions by Industry through the Railroad Press: As expected, 
protests over the new accounting rules were almost immedi-
ate but surprisingly cordial. One of the first was an innocuous 
attempt by L.F. Loree, president of the Delaware and Hudson 
RR, to circulate a petition asking the ICC to postpone the im-
plementation of the accounting rules for one year. He made the 
request, “on the grounds that it will make it impossible for rail-
roads to make comparisons in the results of their operations 
for the previous year” [the Gazette, 1907, p. 869]. In an era of 
pen and ink accounting systems, a better request would have 
been for a delay in the implementation of the new rules due 
to the short period, approximately four weeks, given the rail-
roads to comply with the new regulations. For the ICC, they 
felt the transition, which was scheduled for the post-June 1907 
reporting period, actually gave the railroads one year to imple-
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ment the new accounting system before the June 1908 reports. 
Any delay at this point would have pushed its implementation 
back to 1909. 
 A Times article [June 15, 1907, p.12] provided a better pre-
view of the coming opposition from the railroad industry, re-
porting that, “efforts are being made by some large railroads 
to thwart some of the plans of the [ICC] in the matter of stand-
ardizing the accounts of all railroads, and for the establishment 
of such form of accounts as will set forth clearly all financial 
operations.” Rail industry leaders had supposedly gathered to 
discuss the matter and cooperate on a response. As an inter-
esting side note, both the newspaper and the industry must 
have misunderstood the new ICC regulations due to an errone-
ous impression that tracks and roadway were included in the 
depreciation order. In a surprising revelation, the article point-
ed out that the other railroad officials put the blame for the 
ICC’s new rules on the Pennsylvania Railroad’s decision to use 
depreciation accounting, an interesting comment considering 
the Pennsy’s later protests.The rail officials felt that Pennsy’s 
move gave the ICC the final impetus to modify its stance on 
the emerging depreciation issue. Finally, the rail industry also 
saw that the new rules were probably rooted in politics, with 
President Roosevelt pushing for the changes. The writer of the 
article, however, felt the new accounting rules, “set the true [fi-
nancial] position of railroads, and enable investors … to deter-
mine more easily just what each railroad is doing in the mat-
ter of maintaining property and the extent earnings are used 
to improve it.” The writer’s last argument may have again sig-
naled the ICC’s hidden safety agenda.
 In an attempt to define the industry’s objections to the new 
accounting rules, the Gazette began publishing a series of specif-
ic articles about the rules. In an article with the combative title 
“A Defective Accounting System” [the Gazette, June 21, 1907, pp. 
883-884], the industry put forth its early arguments against the 
new system. The three-page technical article (its tone though 
was that of an editorial) began with an explanation of the proc-
ess used to develop the new rules including the participation 
by the AARAO, an issue that would spilt railroad officials lat-
er. First, the article criticized the way the ICC used the account-
ant’s recommendations, which “serves to illustrate how easy it 
is for railroad regulation to go astray and make mistakes un-
less the persons doing the regulating possess the broadest kind 
of outlook of the entire situation.” Next, the industry saw the 
ICC as a threat due in part to its politicized nature and its lack 
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of direct experience in rail operations. Finally, the editorial ex-
plained that there were only two purposes for keeping accounts. 
The first purpose was to prevent unauthorized expenditures and 
the second was to control operations. Essentially, the industry 
felt that the new rules applied quite well to the first, but failed 
in their attempt to meet the second purpose for four primary 
reasons. 
 First, the railroads rejected the new system based on the 
structure of accounts because they feared that the new account 
scheme would commingle labor and material costs for both 
track and equipment betterments. Next, they went on to point 
out that the new account system, “interrupts the continuity of 
rail statistics at a time when statistical details are most needed 
to point the way to necessary economies and to test the efficien-
cy of operating methods.” This continuity issue would continue 
for some time to come. The roads were also against a month-
ly reporting of depreciation because they felt that such costs 
could not be efficiently apportioned on a regular basis because 
of the irregular pattern of wear and tear. This issue might have 
been mitigated by a compromise to use units-of-usage (prob-
ably based on ton-miles) methodology to determine the depreci-
ation charge. This would have allowed railroads that had oper-
ational disruptions due to weather or seasonal business history 
to deal with equal apportionment problems. Finally, the article 
explained that the new rules would handicap rail operations 
and analysis because they would not be able to keep accounts 
and data not specifically approved by the ICC. This may have 
referred to operational measures (e.g., cost per ton-mile) that 
the railroads did not want the ICC to see because this may have 
lent support to their depreciation theories.
 A Journal report [August 20, 1908, p. 5] articulated a sim-
ilar continuity argument when it said that, “railroads are find-
ing a great deal of trouble in compiling their annual reports 
to conform with all the requirements. … Unless they issue two 
reports, one after the plan followed in the previous years, and 
one under the new accounting system, it will be very difficult 
for the humble stockholder to get an idea of what the compa-
ny has been doing by comparison with last year.” In this same 
article, a comptroller at a “large New York railroad” was quot-
ed as saying, “it is useless to make any comparison of figures 
under the new rules with those in the old way … you are bound 
in the end to get results that are misleading. … We spent a lot 
of money and put in a lot of night work, but when the results 
were ready, they were not worth a picayune.” 
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 The problems related to the continuity of rail statistics were 
also explained to railroad stockholders in annual reports. For 
example, the Louisville and Nashville Railroad (Exhibit 2 below) 
in its fiscal year 1908 annual report discussed these accounting 
changes in a tenor that shows its displeasure with the regula-
tions.
EXHIBIT 2
Note on ICC Accounting Change as  
Presented in the 1908 L&N Annual Report
Uniform Accounting System Prescribed by the  
Interstate Commerce Commission:
On July 1, 1907, the new system of Accounts prescribed by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission became effective. Principle changes caused by the orders of 
the Commission were:
1.  Elimination of Expenditures for Additions and Betterments from Operat-
ing Expenses, and,
2.  The inauguration of formal Replacement Accounts for Depreciation and 
Renewals of Equipment.
The changes wrought by the new system should be borne in mind when 
making comparisons of tables in this year’s reports with those in reports of pre-
vious years.
 [Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 1908, p.13]
 In a follow-up editorial to “A Defective Accounting System” 
[the Gazette, September 27, 1907, p. 86], the editor pointed out 
that the “errors in the new system are on the whole more hurt-
ful than those in the old, and we believe it to be a matter of the 
greatest regret that at the time a change is made … a change, 
moreover, which works permanent injury to the continuity of 
records.” In an historical irony, when betterment accounting 
was finally discontinued by the ICC in 1983, the FASB had to 
issue a standard (SFAS 73) to deal with continuity of reporting 
problems.
 Another problem raised by this article centered on a per-
ceived uneven application of the rules. For example, the arti-
cle noted that a northeastern railroad that is no longer growing 
would have a smaller amount of depreciation charges due to a 
lower rate of equipment additions. Intuitively this would lead 
to less expense, higher income, and a correspondingly higher 
rate of return on assets. A higher return would, of course, lead 
to a reduction in tariff rates. By comparison, the expanded de-
preciation charges of a railroad in California that continues to 
grow due to migration would have a lower rate of return and, 
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thus, get rate relief from the ICC. Such perceived inconsisten-
cies in rate setting, however, had been a regulatory problem at 
the ICC since its inception in 1887. The infamous “long haul 
vs. short haul” clauses in the original Interstate Commerce Act 
that essentially equalized, under the theory of price discrimi-
nation, all railroad operations in the country regardless of op-
erational efficiencies. The depreciation charges only exacerbat-
ed the problem. 
Theoretical Arguments: The Gazette [October 11, 1907, p. 90] 
published “Equipment Depreciation and Renewal,” written by 
the controller of the Union Pacific, William Mahl. In the arti-
cle, Mahl seemed to imply that there is no depreciation if the 
 railroad is constantly upgrading or replacing its equipment. 
Making a distinction between physical and economic depreci-
ation, he ends the article by pleading to drop the depreciation 
requirements in favor of the old “provision for ‘renewals’ to 
represent the current cost of replacing all equipment vacated.” 
Mahl point out that, “This change will furnish the Commission 
with reliable data about the depreciation which has been car-
ried into the operating expenses of the railroads will enable it 
to order adjustments suitable to each case if any such should 
be necessary.”
 Even with the protests, Adams and the ICC issued more 
accounting regulations in January 1908. These focused on the 
specific information that the ICC required from railroads ev-
ery six months, starting in March 1908. The new regulations, 
however, did not change track and way structure accounting 
nor did they provide guidance on the actual rates a railroad 
should use to depreciate its equipment. The one clarification 
to the 1907 rules noted that the equipment was to be report-
ed on the balance sheet net of depreciation and that the asset 
book value was to be “reduced periodically to the extent of the 
depreciation charge.” Under the original 1907 regulations, the 
railroads assumed that the depreciation was a current operat-
ing expense, but not necessarily a reduction of book value on 
the asset. This new regulation unsettled the railroads because 
of its impact on the return-on-assets ratio and the public’s per-
ception of railroad over-capitalization due to a depreciation of 
equipment that is faster than the payment of bonds.
 The Gazette [January 16, 1908, p. 54] reported on this 
new set of regulations and others to come. In general, the ar-
ticle discussed the process by which the ICC modified its rules 
and some related changes to income statement and balance 
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sheet rules. In an attempt to portray the ICC as an inflexible 
and bureaucratic organization, the Gazette reported that, “An 
erroneous impression has been created that the [ICC] is dis-
posed to reconsider the propriety of depreciation on equipment 
accounts. … In working out the details of such an account the 
commission is willing to consider all practical suggestions and 
is working with members.” The views of Professor Adams were 
unaltered on this subject. 
 To combat the new regulations, Frederick Delano, the pres-
ident of Wabash Railroad, wrote his “Notes on the Application 
of a Depreciation Charge in Railway Accounting,” which was 
published by the Gazette [March 1908, pp. 471-473]. In this ar-
ticle, he criticized the ICC’s depreciation rules on rolling stock 
and then warned that the regulators would soon be issuing new 
accounting rules regarding fixed structures. Delano wanted to 
make his opinion clear to the ICC that depreciation does not 
exist in an economic sense, but is solely related to wear and 
tear and obsolescence. He wrote: “There is admittedly a depre-
ciation or deterioration … but it is difficult drawing the line be-
tween the cost of making good this sort of depreciation and or-
dinary maintenance.” Further to the point, he observed that, “in 
the case of cars depreciation goes on at a rate of 5 percent or 6 
percent per year until the car is 60 per cent depreciated of its 
original value. Beyond that it is assumed there is no deprecia-
tion if maintenance is properly kept up.” This type of deterio-
ration was a concept he called “limited depreciation” because 
the property is eventually replaced through the betterment sys-
tem at which time the costs would be absorbed into current 
expenses. He relates these facts to a perceived public contro-
versy regarding the arcane problems of railroad overcapitaliza-
tion. Essentially, in a long diatribe, Delano felt that the capital-
ization of American railroads was solid, and used this fact as 
evidence of the efficacy of betterment charges. Delano also felt 
that the current system was more flexible than the new depre-
ciation system, allowing better decision making by the board of 
directors regarding the integrity of the property. This can only 
mean that railroad management wanted to retain the right to 
decide when and if betterments and replacement occurred.
 Delano then criticized the ICC requirements for depre-
ciation as fictitious by explaining: “To put expenditures into 
 operating accounts that have not been actually made has been 
regarded as ‘padding’ accounts. To make a charge of depreci-
ation every month on a purely arbitrary basis, when the mon-
ey which is charged is not actually spent in replacement is 
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 obviously charging against operating expenses something for 
which no expenditures has been made.”10
 It is clear from Delano’s objections that the railroad in-
dustry was resisting any rapid change in its accounting meth-
ods from largely cash basis to one that necessitates extensive 
accruals for matching current expenses with income. In addi-
tion, it is also clear from Delano’s comments that industry sus-
pected the ICC’s new rules did have an ulterior safety motive 
after he pointed out that the public and stockholders had the 
right to know the condition of a railroad’s property. Delano 
 ended his article by concurring with “A Defective Accounting 
System” that the change in accounting would be unevenly ap-
plied and mature railroads like Delano’s Wabash would suffer 
the most. To counteract the problem, Delano felt that any de-
preciation charge must be offset by a corresponding adjustment 
in the appreciating value of the property. This would have been 
even more onerous to the industry because the ICC rate setters 
would have probably recognized such appreciation as income 
and lowered tariffs correspondingly.
 Railway Age [May 1, 1908, p. 623] synthesized the argu-
ments of both Mahl and Delano and indicated that the ICC’s 
intentions for the new accounting rules were two-fold. The first 
was to charge depreciation over and above current repairs to 
operating expenses monthly (economic depreciation). Second, 
the ICC’s purpose was to charge this “average life of property” 
to the profit or loss or surplus account, essentially the modern 
matching principle. The article felt that these were neutral is-
sues when taken separately, but that the industry objected to 
them taken in operating expense money that was not spent. A 
monthly charge for accruals would, in the industry’s opinion, 
make the system too rigid and inflexible and deprive the rail-
road of the ability to judge when expenditures should be made. 
The argument from the editorial was simple, “since the charge 
for depreciation is not met with payment of money, it is not an 
expense, and since depreciation continues … even though opera-
tions cease, it certainly is not an operating expense.” The con-
cepts of modern accruals and matching had not yet taken hold 
in the railroad industry. Since it appeared that the ICC was 
not going to relent, the article finally suggested a compromise 
10Delano’s arguments may have come from a 30-year-old court case, United 
States vs. Kansas Pacific Railway Company [99 U.S. 455]. In this case, the court 
disallowed the railroad from using depreciation to determine the amount of net 
earnings available to pay back certain government sponsored bonds.
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where there would be a presentation of two forms of operat-
ing accounts, “operating expenses other than depreciation” and 
“depreciation.”
 H.A. Dunn, a partner at Haskins and Sells, made a similar 
argument in a letter to Railway Age [May 29, 1908, p. 726], but 
he wanted to name the account “expired outlay on productive 
plant” (the basic definition of economic depreciation). Accord-
ing to Previts and Merino [1998, p. 219], the founder of Dunn’s 
firm, Elijah Watts Sells, was critical of the ICC’s new accounting 
rules. He essentially believed that, “depreciation charges should 
be sufficient to ensure asset replacements.” Previts and Merino 
then explained that Sells and Price Waterhouse partner Arthur 
Loews Dickinson argued this based on the assumption that de-
preciation recognition was the only way that one could prevent 
the erosion of capital, an argument closely allied with railroad 
executives. 
 In an April 20, 1908 letter to Adams, Dickinson [1980, pp. 
13-14] wrote: “The object of a depreciation is, we take it, to 
make a provision for the decreases in value from year to year 
by reason of wear and tear, etc., as it accrues instead of as it 
is made good.” Dickinson continued by saying that, “It seems 
to us that to such a proposition there is an obvious corollary 
that renewal expenditures made to arrest Depreciation should 
be charged against a Fund created in the years depreciation 
accrues, and not against the operating expenses of the year in 
which the expenditures are made.” It is clear that Dickinson 
had not moved to the concept of economic depreciation, favor-
ing the 30-year-old accounting methodology articulated by Al-
bert Fink. 
 The opinions of Sells and Dickinson would soon run con-
trary to that of the accounting profession in general. For ex-
ample, Arthur Teele [1908, pp. 89-91], an early supporter of the 
ICC’s new depreciation rules, indicated, “that I do not think it 
is necessary for me to present arguments … as to the necessity 
of promptly taking depreciation of capital … for I believe anyone 
who gives careful thought will agree to the principle of provid-
ing for the loss out of revenues earned in the period the loss is 
occurring.” Teele was on the side of matching and economic de-
preciation. The next year, William Lybrand [1909, pp. 224-227] 
took much the same view of the need for depreciation except 
he stressed the balance sheet rather than the income statement 
because he felt betterment accounting would result in the as-
sets appearing at cost regardless of deteriorated value, wear and 
tear, or replacement. 
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 Later in that year, Adams used the same themes as Teele 
and Lybrand in a speech to the annual meeting of the Ameri-
can Association of Public Accountants on October 23, 1908. Ad-
ams [1908, p. 381] explained to the audience, “When carried 
to its final analysis, the question of formal depreciation charg-
es to operating expenses is simply a question of what consti-
tutes cost of operation and the time when such cost shall be 
acknowledged.” He further told the gathering that the new sys-
tem assumed “the depletion through the use of that asset in 
operations creates an item of cost of operation that should be 
reflected in the accounts when the fact of this depletion takes 
place.” He further pointed out that, “a statement of net reve-
nue made without including this element of cost in operating 
expenses, is an erroneous statement.” Adams finished this sec-
tion of the speech by saying, “an expense arising through the 
consumption of property employed in operations ought to be 
acknowledged on the accounts with the same scrupulous fidel-
ity as an expense caused by the consumption of labor or ma-
terial.” 
 Adams had obviously solidified his conclusions related to 
the matching principle and the conservative timing on the rec-
ognition of costs. He summed up his feelings on the subject: 
“[It is my] proposition, however, that depreciation is a proper 
charge to operating expenses [and] is one which is regarded as 
an established principle in the science of accounts.” Because 
railroad accountants had helped the ICC create these accounts, 
it appears that he meant these comments for the consumption 
of his opponents, the railroad executives and some of their pub-
lic auditors.
An Internal Industry Debate: In a front-page article, the Journal 
[May 2, 1908, p. 1] weighed into the depreciation argument, 
more or less on the side of the railroads. The article detailed 
the “modifications” that railroad officials wanted the ICC to 
make to the new accounting rules. Many of these changes dealt 
with a reduction in the total number of accounts required by 
the ICC. Most of these accounts dealt with equipment report-
ing detail and the corresponding depreciation for each. The ar-
gument was that 90% of all operating costs were contained in 
these accounts. 
 The report further explained that railroad officials had 
 criticized and chastised the railroad accountants (the AARAO 
committee) for insufficiently studying the effect that deprecia-
tion would have on the bottom line. The railroad officers also 
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complained that net operating revenues were down due to the 
new rules, although they omitted to explain that there was a 
general economic downturn of the American economy at this 
time. In the end, the rail executives seemed to want the account-
ants to help them in two contradictory ways. First, the account-
ants were to report high net income for stock market purposes, 
while at the same time reporting low net income for rate-setting 
purposes, an error already pointed out by Adams in his valua-
tion example. Even after a year, the railroad officials were still 
having problems with ICC definitions of what economic depre-
ciation actually represented, the matching of cost to revenues. 
It became clear that debate over depreciation had moved from 
an industry/ICC conflict to an internal rail industry debate.
 The controller of the Erie Railroad, M.P. Blauvelt, was 
one of those executives who criticized the AARAO in an April 
29, 1908 speech. Blauvelt said that the AARAO’s Committee of 
Twenty-Five “caved in” and “materially altered” its position on 
many aspects of the new accounting system to meet Adams’ 
 demands. The speaker then echoed the rail industry’s party line 
regarding the new accounting rules by stating that, “to depreci-
ate is to lessen the value” of the equipment [Railway Age, May 
15, 1908, p. 81]. C.F. Calvert [1908, p. 230] disputed Blauvelt’s 
accusations by explaining that the “loss in value feared” by the 
railroad executive should actually be viewed in much the same 
way the ICC saw it, as a part of the cost of production.
 After chastising the AARAO, Blauvelt then brought a new 
dimension to the anti-depreciation argument when he suggest-
ed that the ICC might not have the authority to compel rail-
roads to show properly maintained equipment in a state of 
 depreciation. This was an early indication that if rhetoric and 
public opinion would not change the mind of Professor Adams, 
then maybe the courts could. The Commission probably fore-
saw these future arguments from Blauvelt when it wrote in its 
1907 annual report [ICC, 1907b, p. 141] that it interpreted the 
Act, “as imposing upon it the duty of protecting the integrity 
of the net revenue statements published by carriers, and it be-
lieves that formal depreciation charges, conservatively admin-
istered, are essential for attainment of this end.” 
 The Gazette [October, 1908, p. 1,050] presented another com-
promise by urging the ICC to drop depreciation accounting 
and require current replacement cost accounting, which it felt 
would be an improvement over betterment accounting. The ar-
ticle focused on the fact that no two railroads were alike, and 
that any standardized depreciation rates and accounts were not 
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feasible. The article went on to address ten more problems with 
the new system. Most of these dealt with procedures and theo-
retical questions like obsolescence and reserve accounts. How-
ever, the most prominent was the ICC’s assumption that depre-
ciation charges would better protect the stockholder by making 
the charges more standardized and understandable.
 Nearly 15 months before, the Times [August 12, 1907, p. 
10] had supported this position when it focused on the impact 
the new accounting changes had on the stockholder and the 
market. The article went on to say, “the new system would en-
able both the bondholders, and stockholders of the railroad to 
better understand the nature and amount of the company’s in-
come.” By contrast, the issue was raised that the new ICC rules 
favored railroad accountants and not line operations people. 
The argument behind this complaint was unclear, but seemed 
to center on the supposed rigidity of the new rules. As noted 
 previously in the June Gazette article, the railroads were wor-
ried that the new rules would preclude the gathering of addi-
tional and specific “non-financial operating data” used for effi-
cient rail operations. This type of managerial accounting data 
may have included studies of wear and tear on locomotives, 
not the corresponding economic depreciation as intended by 
the ICC.
Problems with the Application of the New Rules: As the report-
ing period for June 30, 1908 came and went, it was clear that 
the railroads were “suffering” under the new rules. The Journal 
[October 13, 1908, p. 1] reported that annual reports of the rail-
roads for the first fiscal year since the adoption of new depre-
ciation rules “. . . may not fully justify the present form of such 
rules, but they go towards affirming the necessity for some more 
uniform and systematic principles for the treatment of equip-
ment maintenance.” The article went on to point out that the 
results of the new accounting rules for fiscal 1908 were marked 
by an “enormous divergence as between one road and another.” 
The Journal felt that these problems revealed “to what extent 
each has in the past been a law unto itself not merely as to 
meeting the individual idiosyncrasies of its own service, but also 
to the ideas concerning the maintenance of the integrity of cap-
ital investment.” These comments seem to correspond with the 
ICC’s hidden maintenance agenda that would force the roads 
to upgrade equipment. In fact, the Journal articles stressed this 
point when it opined that the “popular idea of the new rules has 
been that they required all roads to increase their maintenance 
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charges to cover a more or less imaginary or at best theoreti-
cal depreciation not previously provided for.”
 Though its editorial policy had been decidedly against the 
new rules, the Journal did say it was surprised to find that some 
railroads’ costs actually decreased with the new system as Del-
ano and others had predicted. The real reason for the great di-
versity of operating results was the fact that each railroad had 
a free hand in setting its depreciation rates. The Journal await-
ed future developments: “It remains to be seen whether the 
commission will continue to leave the percentage of deprecia-
tion to the individual determination of the carriers, or attempt 
to fix the percentages for them.” Yet, the Journal’s assessment 
was not totally pessimistic: “Thus far this plan seems to work 
well and pretty directly toward the ends the commission set out 
to accomplish.”
 Were the new rules a failure? From the railroad industry’s 
perspective, the answer was an unequivocal yes! The tone of 
the Journal seemed oddly contradictory when it implied that 
that the ICC’s new rules were failing due to the railroad indus-
try’s intransigence and not because of the concept of deprecia-
tion itself. Regardless of the reasons, it was clear that the ICC 
had a problem on its hands.
 A full year before the Journal’s editorial, a Times article [Oc-
tober 3, 1907. p. 13] reported these potential problems this way: 
“As matters stand, each road has been left to decide for itself 
what percentage it will charge off for depreciation, but all are 
obliged to charge off some percentage. There is no uniformity 
in making these charges for depreciation.” This article pointed 
out that the Rock Island Lines would use a 4% rate for loco-
motives while the Gould Lines were more conservative with a 
corresponding 2% rate. The only guidance on the subject that 
came from the ICC was as an introductory letter from Professor 
Adams in the 1907 The Classification of Operating Expenses. In 
the section entitled “Consideration of Depreciation,” Adams had 
indicated that the depreciation charges should be based on the 
value of the equipment with a percentage applied to the origi-
nal cost. Adams went on to say, “the percentage rate required 
for depreciation of equipment should be limited to the rate re-
quired to replace the price paid” [ICC, 1907a, pp.10-12]. In the 
1908 update [ICC, 1908, p. 22] of the rules, Adams expanded 
and modified his comments to include a depreciation calcula-
tion net of scrap value, and declared that there should be no 
depreciation recognized past the equipment’s estimated useful 
life. Again, the ICC failed to give guidance on useful lives and 
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rates. Adams, in the report, only indicated that the monthly 
charge for depreciation should be computed “using a percent-
age of original or purchase price.”
 Inevitably, the decision that allowed rail companies to se-
lect individual depreciation methods rather than mandating 
a common methodology created a loophole for operating ex-
penses reporting. The Times [October 3, 1907, p. 13] noted that 
the larger rail systems were seeing a decrease in earnings be-
cause of the new depreciation rules. The article then indicat-
ed that the railroad community “in principle approved of the 
requirements of the commission … but in their practical appli-
cation, many have found flaws.” Surprisingly, this article also 
mentioned that some U.S. railroads were already depreciating 
equipment on the books, but this was far from a uniform prac-
tice. The article then closed with a prophecy: “One thing the 
Interstate Commerce Commission will be asked to do is to re-
duce these charges to some uniform basis. Meanwhile some of 
the roads, which have adopted a percentage of depreciation, 
find their net earnings are reduced at a rate, which is very dis-
comforting to the men in charge of finance.” Although this high 
rate of depreciation may have resulted in reduced profits in the 
short run, its probable long-term result may be to increase tar-
iff rates by showing the ICC that return on investment was not 
reasonable since current income is compared to assets whose 
values were reduced by depreciation reserves. The only way to 
stabilize this trend for the railroad was, of course, the contin-
ued replacement of equipment.
 In a companion article, the Times [October 15, 1907, p. 10] 
reported that some roads were concerned that the new depre-
ciation rules might result in a double counting of expenses be-
cause, according to the article, “the commission ruled that in 
addition to the charges for depreciation all charges for renew-
als must be included in operating expenses.” Again, the rail-
roads misunderstood that a charge for depreciation reduced 
book value as the expense was recognized. The article conclud-
ed by forecasting that, “unless the commission does change, 
some railroads will resort to a reduction in the percentages of 
depreciation which they have been charging.” The Times [De-
cember 30, 1907, p. 10] noted that, “It is doubted … whether 
the Commission will be able to decide on any uniform percent-
age of depreciation.” In essence, the railroads were required to 
choose rates that fit their situations, and the Commission had 
put off the temptation of standardizing depreciation rates across 
the board. The article finishing by saying, “it is admitted on all 
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sides that very great care will have to be exercised on the com-
mission in fixing any precise percentage for depreciation charg-
es in order to avoid establishing a standard which would meet 
the case of some roads, but either exceed or fall short of the 
requirements.”
Revised Reporting Rules: The ICC fought back in January 1908 
with the publication of new reporting rules for depreciation, 
which included the aforementioned six-month ICC reporting 
requirements and a new balance sheet classification showing 
equipment at original cost less accumulated depreciation. The 
Journal [February 27, 1908, p. 8] reported on this development 
indicating that the ICC and Henry Adams had “undertaken an 
exhaustive review of the treatment of depreciation charges by 
interstate carriers during the six months ending December 31, 
1907.” The new reporting rules were, in and of themselves, ex-
haustive and included “blanks” for listing all equipment and 
providing separate valuations and depreciation rates, as well 
as the impact per month on income and expenses. The Jour-
nal’s article went on to observe that this was a technical issue, 
and it took familiarity with the railroad accounting to “appreci-
ate fully the labor involved in answering such a series of ques-
tions.” These new rules were not merely clerical in nature be-
cause they also included onerous regulations that required the 
chief railroad accounting officer to certify the accounting and 
depreciation results.11 Finally, the article went on to relate that 
a great many railroad companies had determined their depre-
ciation charges, “making an intelligent guess at the average life 
of locomotives … charging them accordingly.” The writer added 
sympathetically: “It will be no small undertaking to apportion 
these charges as minutely as the Commission’s desires.”
 The problems over depreciation rates would continue for 
many years as indicated in the ICC’s 1913 annual report where 
it was noted [p. 39] that depreciation rates for similar equip-
ment varied from 7% per year to zero. The report said that the 
rates were due to differences in “policy” and were unrelated to 
“physical depreciation.” Although the ICC report provided no 
standard for depreciation rates, it did give an example that in-
dicated a 1% charge rate would be unacceptably low as assets 
11In a similar fashion to the Hepburn Amendment, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002, Section 302, Corporate Responsibility for Financial Reports, required that 
executives of all publicly held corporations had to sign an affidavit regarding the 
accounting procedures used in the financial statements.
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would be overstated and a fictitious surplus created. The exam-
ple then indicated that a 7% rate was probably too high, lead-
ing to an understatement of income and the creation of “se-
cret reserves.” The “manipulation” of depreciation rates was of 
concern to the ICC; it planned to rein in these problem report-
ers. The Commission made it clear to its readers that it had 
the power to do so under law, but the tactics of the railroads 
themselves were about to change. Since rhetoric and protest had 
failed to dislodge the new accounting rules, it was evident that 
the tide of power had turned against these once politically pow-
erful railway concerns. They were left with only one recourse 
– challenge the new accounting rules directly, first through civ-
il disobedience and then, if necessary, the courts.
LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE DEPRECIATION RULES
 The rail industry, in a brief but combative article in the 
Times [March 2, 1908, p. 10], continued to protest the high 
cost of the application of the new depreciation rules. The ar-
ticle noted that there had been plenty of grumbling from rail-
road officers because the ICC had compelled them to include 
monthly depreciation charges in operating expenses. It was re-
ported that the politically powerful Pennsylvania Railroad had 
gone so far as to refuse to comply with the order. Naturally, the 
ICC wished to fortify its position with complete knowledge of 
past and present accounting practices. 
 The Gazette [January 31, 1908, p. 681] confirmed the 
 Pennsy’s stance on this issue and that of the New York Central 
as well. The publication indicated that the railroads, in making 
monthly earnings reports to the ICC, declined to sign an ICC 
affidavit to that effect. In response, the government proceeded 
against these roads for non-compliance by sending a ten-day 
notice compelling the roads to sign the affidavit. Earlier in the 
debate, the Journal [October 5, 1907, p. 8] had reported that 
there was no uniformity among railroads in their planned ac-
tions against the new accounting rules. At this point, it was re-
ported that companies like the Pennsylvania Railroad had not 
yet made final decisions to defy the accounting and reporting 
orders permanently. The railroads’ indecision over litigation 
may have had as much to do with the unknown future effect 
that depreciation would have in the future financial outcomes 
of the companies as to the authority of the orders themselves 
because some roads were actually benefiting from the change. 
 Regardless of the vacillating opinions of the industry, at 
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this late date, any legal recourse appeared limited due to a Su-
preme Court ruling in January 1909 that supported deprecia-
tion charges for determining rates in the public utility indus-
try.12 In City of Knoxville vs. Knoxville Water Company [212 U.S. 
1], the Court ruled that “a deduction for depreciation from age 
and use must be made from the estimated cost of reproducing 
a waterworks plant when determining the present value of the 
tangible property for the purpose of testing the reasonableness 
of the rates fixed by a municipal ordinance.” This ruling indi-
cated that depreciation was a “determinant of, not an allocation 
of net income,” rendering invalid the utility’s argument that de-
preciation was confiscatory in nature.
 The possibilities for legal action began to improve when 
the Lehigh Valley Railroad announced in the Times [October 
18, 1909, p. 13] that it was refusing to recognize the author-
ity of the Commission. In short, their argument was that the 
ICC had the authority to promulgate accounting requirements, 
but not to force them on the roads. This protest was directed 
against the ICC’s final installment of the uniform accounting 
regulations in August 1909. These regulations, according to the 
report, “restrict(s) the discretion of the directors in the matter 
of charges for depreciation of equipment.”13 
 These issues reported by the Times may have been only 
“shadow problems,” while the real issue centered on the new 
form of a balance sheet formulated by the ICC that showed 
more detail about capital and asset accounts. The formal pro-
test to the ICC from the Lehigh Railroad indicated that the com-
pany believed that the accounting orders “assumed an author-
ity which was not intended to be granted to the commission 
by Section 20 for the act … and further believes the adoption of 
said orders will not before the best interests of the railroad.” 
Essentially the railroad felt that the accounting rules were an 
unwarranted appropriation of the company’s surplus.
 The railroad also contended that those depreciation charg-
es applied to the cost of betterments (repairs) and not the pur-
chase of additional or replacement equipment. It argued that, 
“it is not the desire of the [railroad] to enter at this time into 
12Public utilities included water, gas, and power companies which did not 
come under the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
13As a side note, the new rules actually gave the railroads more flexibility 
in determining what amounts should be capitalized by allowing labor to be ex-
pensed under certain conditions. In addition, the ICC relented and combined the 
accounting for betterments and additions. This had the effect of streamlining the 
number of accounts required. 
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any argument with the commission regarding the merit or lack 
of merit of the systems of accounting prescribed in the orders 
mentioned above, as the statistician of the commission, we un-
derstand has been favored in conference with the views of our 
representative.” The ICC had apparently listened to the Lehigh’s 
complaints but had either dismissed or ignored them. The arti-
cle went on to comment that while there were no current plans 
for litigation, the railroad was thinking “about testing the valid-
ity of the orders in law or equity.” It should be noted here that 
the railroad, in its discussion, moved from mentioning Adams’ 
name to the more pejorative “statistician of the commission.” 
The debate was turning personal.
 To add another wrinkle to the rail industry’s anti-deprecia-
tion stance, the article mentioned, “the system promulgated by 
the commission partakes in many respects the practice followed 
by the British railroads, the financial condition of which, and 
their cost of performing service, not withstanding lower wage 
rates paid in that country, being too well known to elaborate 
explanation.” Delano also complained about this perceived Brit-
ish bias and the apparent inefficiencies in its transportation sys-
tem. The “anti-British” focus may have started when Adams, in 
a letter to the railroads in 1908, quoted a British accountant as 
having said: “No profit can exist until the expired outlay of pro-
ductive plant has been provided out of gross revenue” [Chap-
man, 1908, p. 623]. 
 A similar article in the Journal [October 18, 1909, p. 6] a 
week later framed much the same argument by claiming that 
capitalizing betterments (repairs in the eyes of the railroads) is 
an appropriation of income and an increase in asset value on 
the balance sheet that the stockholders would improperly per-
ceive as source of new capital rather than a charge to profit 
and loss. The 1909 rules apparently changed the focus of the 
roads because they were now worried about a public percep-
tion of too little expense rather than the 1907 problem of too 
many new charges. 
 The Journal also thought that it would be unwise for Amer-
ican railroads to adopt excessive capitalization that had worked 
“so disastrously” for English railroads. W.G. Taylor defined the 
term “overcapitalization” as “capitalization (stocks and bonds) 
merely in excess of the cost of production or reproduction of 
the plant” [Johnson, 1908, p. 325].14 It was thought that in the 
14 The British also felt that the Americans were moving to their system. A 
sarcastic article regarding the situation was published in the British account-
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absence of a dollar for dollar match in long-term bonds and 
fixed assets, it would be assumed that the railroads were goug-
ing the public because of the higher rates needed to cover any 
“excess borrowing.” Overcapitalization went against the pub-
lic good. The more colloquial term for this methodology was 
“stock watering,” which had given the railroads a bad reputa-
tion in the past. This issue would continue contentious for the 
next 20 years and would be the crux of future rate arguments. 
It constituted the central reason why the ICC was going to at-
tempt systematically to standardize the “value” of all railroads 
in the U.S.
 Before any of the railroads could file against the ICC, a 
parallel set of lawsuits began working their way through the 
courts. The Goodrich Transportation Company and the White 
Star Lines attempted to have the 1910 issuance of Special Re-
port Circular 10, which required them to report certain ac-
counting data to the ICC, overturned in court. In ICC vs. Go-
odrich Transportation Lines and White Star Line [224 U.S. 194], 
the two companies argued that they did not come under ICC 
jurisdiction because the law creating the ICC implied that only 
shipping lines affiliated with railroads could be regulated. As 
independent Great Lakes steamship lines, they were therefore 
exempt. The Times [April 2, 1912, p. 15] reported that that the 
court disagreed and indicated that they were required to follow 
ICC regulations because they were a business in the pursuit of 
interstate commerce by definition of the law. 
 Because the courts allowed the ICC to require formal re-
porting by the water-borne carriers, the railroads’ protests over 
accounting and reporting issues appeared to be dead, except for 
one challenge from the Kansas City Southern Railroad filed in 
November 1911. The Journal [November 17, 1911, p. 1] report-
ed that the railroad sued in Commerce Court over the refusal 
of the Commission to allow the capitalization of certain outlays. 
The argument was narrow and dealt with a $10 million charge 
that the ICC wanted taken into income because the railroad did 
not “charge against earnings the estimated replacement value 
of six parcels of abandoned roads incident to grade reduction.” 
Simply put, it had not offset the cost of new railroad grades 
ing journal Accountant on July 20, 1907. It noted: “The ‘reform’ is curiously in-
teresting inasmuch as it affords a rather pathetic spectacle of the United States 
striving to get back to the low level of British railroad statistics and Great Brit-
ain struggling to attain the fullness of perfection exhibited by the now discarded 
American method” [ Journal of Accountancy, 1907, p. 318].
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they had completed with the value of the abandoned right-of-
ways for depreciation purposes. The railroad felt that this pro-
cess not only hurt income but also impaired the market val-
ue of bonds issued to pay for the betterments. There appeared 
to be a contradiction in the ICC regulations because it allowed 
capitalization on the grade changes to the existing right-of-way 
but not for the change in location of the same rail system that 
would have substantially reduced operating costs. 
 The Supreme Court issued its ruling in Kansas City South-
ern vs. U.S. [231 U.S. 423], upholding the ICC’s rules [the Jour-
nal, December 6, 1913, p. 1]: “The Supreme Court sustained a 
ruling of the ICC, and established absolute authority of that 
body to decide questions of accounting practice.” Adams, how-
ever, could not savor this 1913 victory as he had retired two 
years earlier from the ICC after nearly 25 years of service. Al-
though the seven-year debate over accounting policy had started 
out cordially enough, by the time of his retirement it was begin-
ning to get ugly with civil disobedience, litigation, and recrim-
inations. A Times editorial [September 24, 1910] eyed the sus-
picious nature of the ICC as it pertained to the dual issues of 
accounting treatments and railroad valuation. The article took 
the stance that no two railroads could ever be valued the same, 
“Yet, it is the [holy] grail of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion.”
 The critical tone of the editorial seemed to point to the ill-
advised concept that all railroads were equal and that such regu-
lations would harm the industry. Adams was portrayed sarcasti-
cally: “In obedience to the theories of Prof. Adams [the ICC] has 
adopted a system of accounting designed to impede the meth-
ods of betterments from earnings which has made the capital-
ization of American railroads a world’s marvel.” This was prob-
ably another veiled reference to the opinion that English roads 
were overcapitalized. Whether the ICC indeed viewed the Eng-
lish system of accounting to be superior is not known, but it 
probably saw most other industries embracing economic de-
preciation and became unrelenting on the issue, wavering lit-
tle from its basic theory. Such regulations, as the railroads and 
the press felt, penalized the efficient and well-run railroad. 
AFTERMATH AND CONCLUSIONS
 By the end of 1913, the ICC had essentially won on the 
 issues of uniform accounting measures and its authority to 
 impose reporting requirements on the railroads. The ICC’s 
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 annual report [1913, p. 39] noted: “The Commission continues 
to receive … the cooperation and assistance of different classes 
of carriers in formulating accounting systems which will fur-
nish the Commission with the largest possible measure or in-
formation while recognizing the practical limitations.” Within 
the next year, the ICC would issue a wide range of accounting 
regulations for all the constituent industries and companies un-
der its jurisdiction. Round one of the great American deprecia-
tion debate was over.
 The ICC and the related concepts of “economic deprecia-
tion” and “cost matching” were clear winners, but the necessi-
ty of maintaining efficient rail operations in a large, prosper-
ous, and growing country would take precedence over theory 
for the near future. In an apparent vindication and a mild re-
buke to the theories of Henry C. Adams, the ICC granted the 
railroads a five percent rate increase on December 18, 1914. Al-
though reported as a victory for the railroads, it was indicat-
ed in the Times [December 19, 1914, p. 1] that gross revenues 
compared to expenses had dropped drastically since 1910 due to 
the “inelastic nature of many expenses.” According to the Com-
mission, the “recent increased provisions for depreciation … that 
may militate against a fair comparison of … comparable statis-
tical items … we cannot say this on the record that such charg-
es as the present returned by the carriers are excessive, viewed 
with from the standpoint of proper accounting.”
 The ICC commissioners, even with the accounting data be-
fore them, could not decide upon the reasonableness of rates of 
return as envisioned by Adams, but neither did they scrap the 
new system in favor of the old pre-1907 betterment accounting 
rules. In this case, it appeared that regardless of what the rates 
of return were telling the ICC about them, the railroads were 
not generating enough income and corresponding cash flow to 
cover operations and complete the necessary asset replacements 
mandated by the ICC. In fact, the ICC realized that the roads 
were in a dire situation because they would be unable to float 
bonds in Europe to finance replacements due to the war that 
had erupted in August 1914. In the end, even with Professor 
Adams’ rate theories and uniform accounting data, the decision 
had come down to one of expediency and necessity to maintain 
the integrity of the American rail system for the traveling and 
shipping public. In the meantime, the accounting policy of the 
railroads would remain at odds with those of American indus-
try in general for some time to come. 
 The depreciation debate was again renewed in 1923 when 
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the ICC ordered the depreciation of track right-of-way and way 
structures. This order set off another ten years of protests and 
litigation that would culminate in the ICC’s canceling the or-
ders in 1933 due to the economic depression. The final phase 
of the debate over betterment accounting would recommence in 
the mid-1950s with an attempt by Arthur Andersen to reinvig-
orate an economically moribund rail system through the con-
vergence of railroad accounting practices with industry GAAP. 
This time Arthur Andersen challenged the theoretical under-
pinnings of railroad accounting rules in light of depreciation 
standards issued by the Committee on Accounting Procedures 
during World War II. The debate created a strange coalition as 
Arthur Andersen stood against the American Institute of Certi-
fied Public Accountants which sided with the railroads and the 
ICC. The final demise of betterment accounting for rail struc-
tures would occur in February 1983 when the ICC, bowing to 
pressure from the Internal Revenue Service and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, abolished its usage. Congress abol-
ished the ICC itself in December 1995.
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GOVERNANCE
Abstract: Canal companies were among the first enterprises to be 
 organized in the corporate form and to require large amounts of 
capital. This paper examines the stockholder review committee of a 
19th century corporation, the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Compa-
ny (C&O), and discusses how the C&O used this corporate govern-
ance structure to monitor and improve financial management and 
operations. A major strength was the concern and dedication of the 
stockholders to the company, while a major weakness was the po-
litical control exerted by the State of Maryland. The paper provides 
an historical perspective on corporate governance in the 19th centu-
ry. This research contributes to the literature by providing detailed 
workings and practices of a stockholder review committee. The paper 
 documents corporate governance efforts in archival sources that pro-
vide an early example of accountability required in a corporate char-
ter and the manner in which the stockholders carried out this respon-
sibility. 
INTRODUCTION
 Canal companies were among the earliest enterprises to be 
organized in a corporation form, and they were also among the 
first to require large amounts of capital. Raising the needed cap-
ital resulted in absentee owners who required financial infor-
Acknowledgments: We express our appreciation to the anonymous review-
ers and the editor emeritus, Steve Walker, for their comments and suggestions 
which improved the paper significantly.
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mation. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to a better 
understanding of the origins of corporate governance and fi-
nancial management in the U.S. by examining activities of a 
19th century canal corporation’s stockholder review committee, 
specifically that of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company 
(C&O). While other studies have discussed accounting practic-
es and procedures of companies in different industries during 
this time [Kistler, 1980; McKinstry, 1996; Michael, 1996; Pre-
vits and Samson, 2000], there is limited discussion in the liter-
ature of corporate governance during the canal era. The C&O 
broke ground in 1828, and construction was completed to Cum-
berland, Maryland in 1850.1 The company continued operations 
until 1889. 
 A review of the accounting literature reveals that little has 
been written about the corporate governance and financial man-
agement practices of canals. Kistler [1980] presented an anal-
ysis of the accounting practices and management of the Mid-
dlesex Canal, which was built from 1793 to 1804 and operated 
until 1850. As part of its corporate governance, the Middlesex 
Canal Company used a stockholder review committee to au-
dit the company financial records. Stockholder review commit-
tees have also been found in early railroad companies (e.g., the 
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad [Previts and Samson, 2000]). While 
these studies present evidence of the existence of stockholder re-
view committees, they do not provide details of their workings 
or findings although some limited evidence of the operations of 
a review committee is presented by McKee [1979]. Our study 
of the stockholder review committee of the C&O contributes to 
the literature by providing evidence of the workings and prac-
tices of a canal company that operated independently between 
1828 and 1889. It identifies an early example of accountability 
required by a corporate charter. 
 At the time of the C&O’s founding in 1828, there were 
very few corporations. There were no known established corpo-
rate governance or financial reporting practices in the U.S. In 
his discussion of the Forth and Clyde Navigation Company of 
 Scotland, Forrester [1978] noted many innovative business prac-
tices. Boockholdt [1983], in describing early railroad account-
ing, observed that prior to these early corporations, there were 
no precedents for disclosure or accounting methods to be used. 
Previts and Samson [2000], in their study of the Baltimore & 
1For comparison, the Erie Canal was 363 miles and built in eight years 
(1817-1825). The C&O was 186 miles and took 22 years to construct. 
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Ohio Railroad (B&O), provided evidence that the financial re-
porting of early corporations evolved over time. They observed 
that the B&O served as a school for railroad companies by pro-
viding an example of company management that other com-
panies could emulate. Claire [1945] provided further evidence 
by describing the evolution of financial reporting at U.S. Steel 
around the turn of the century and noting that a measure of 
reporting progress was to chart the changes in the annual re-
porting style of a single company. 
 The research of the current study takes the evolution in fi-
nancial reporting a step further by examining the catalyst for 
evolutionary change. It is hypothesized in this paper that one 
catalyst for change resulted from the accountability demands of 
stockholders. In the case of the C&O, the stockholders used the 
stockholder review committee to effect this evolutionary change 
not only in financial reporting but also corporate governance. 
 The following section provides a brief discussion of the ca-
nal era in the U.S. Information regarding the origins of corpo-
rate governance at the C&O is then presented, followed by a dis-
cussion of the stockholder review committee and the financial 
management of the company. The final section provides some 
concluding comments. 
THE CANAL ERA IN THE U.S.
 As a young man, George Washington had surveyed land and 
rivers throughout Virginia into the Ohio Valley. In 1772, Wash-
ington proposed the establishment of a company to make im-
provements on the Potomac River. In that year, Washington ob-
tained a charter from the House of Burgesses in Williamsburg, 
Virginia; however, the charter was not ratified by the Maryland 
legislature.2 The start of the Revolutionary War ended all con-
sideration of the project. 
 In the fall of 1783, General George Washington resigned his 
commission as commander-in-chief of the revolutionary army. 
On September 2, 1784, Washington started a tour of the west-
ern territories to examine his land holdings and to determine 
the feasibility of waterway improvements between the coastal 
region of the country and the Ohio Valley. In a letter to Virginia 
governor Benjamin Harrison on October 10, 1784, Washington 
2Thomas Johnson presented the charter proposal to the Maryland legisla-
ture. Joint approval of the charter was necessary because the state boundary was 
set on the Virginia shore. 
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bespoke the need for improved communication and transpor-
tation with the western territories. The letter reflected Wash-
ington’s fears that without communication and trade, the west-
ern territories would become Spanish by virtue of trading with 
then Spanish New Orleans. From this letter was born the ca-
nal movement in the U.S.3 Survey notes of George Washington, 
included in the letter to Governor Harrison, indicated that the 
Potomac River route was the shortest distance between Pitts-
burgh (on the Ohio River) and Tidewater (an Atlantic seaport). 
Over the next three months, Washington would travel between 
Mount Vernon, Annapolis, and Richmond to obtain, in 1784, 
the corporate charter of the Potomac Company. 
 The Potomac Company made various improvements in the 
navigation of the Potomac River. Obstructions were cleared and 
canals built around major obstructions, such as the great falls 
several miles upriver from Georgetown, Maryland (now in the 
District of Columbia). 
 However, by the early 1820s, the Potomac Company had ex-
hausted its funds, and the navigational improvements carried 
out by the company were proving inadequate for the needs of 
the region and country. In 1823, a new group of individuals ob-
tained a charter from Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and the 
federal government to form a new company. The new company, 
the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company, would absorb the as-
sets, liabilities, and stockholders of the Potomac Company. The 
goal of this new enterprise was to build an artificial river (ca-
nal) from tidewater Potomac to the Ohio River at Pittsburgh 
[Sanderlin, 1946].
 The C&O was never profitable enough to pay off the cor-
porate debt borrowed for construction and repairs. However, 
the company was able to survive for over 100 years (including 
the predecessor Potomac Company). The canal was financially 
successful during the 1870s to the 1880s, but this success was 
neither sufficient to pay off the corporate debt nor to provide 
a return to the stockholders. During this time, the company’s 
administrators were successful in waging a political war with 
the B&O [Dilts, 1993]. Severe flooding in 1877 and 1889 caused 
major damage to the canal works. After the 1889 flood, fund-
3Persons promoting the C&O Canal and the Erie Canal [Shaw, 1966], as well 
as other canal promoters, quote the letter from Washington to Governor Har-
rison. During the canal era in the U.S., hundreds of miles of canals were con-
structed to provide transport and communications between cities and states [Ap-
pendix 1].
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ing was not available to make repairs, and the C&O was forced 
into receivership. 
 Following receivership, the B&O Railroad emerged as the 
majority owner of the repair bonds holding the mortgage on 
the canal and assumed control of the C&O. Funding provided 
by the B&O allowed the canal to be repaired and returned to 
service in 1892; however, another flood in 1924 resulted in the 
canal being closed permanently. In 1938, the federal govern-
ment purchased the canal assets from the B&O for $2 million 
[Sanderlin, 1946], and in 1971, the canal was designated a na-
tional park. 
 With the impacts of nature and technology, the C&O suc-
cumbed to its archrival, the B&O. The B&O competed on three 
fronts – goods to transport, construction routes, and construc-
tion funding. The railroad was also a technological rival. Over 
the life of the C&O, railroad technology improved and lowered 
the cost of rail transport. Canal technology was at its peak and 
was unable to make additional efficiency improvements to com-
pete with the railroad. The C&O stockholders, including states, 
towns, and the federal government which had contributed the 
millions of dollars needed for construction, never received a re-
turn on their investment. 
 The C&O, while never profitable for the individual inves-
tors, was beneficial for the region it served. Ransom [1964] stat-
ed that economic historians have focused on the railroad as the 
most important factor in U.S. economic growth. He argued that 
this is misguided, that canal construction in the U.S. predated 
the railroads, and that the canals should be re-evaluated to re-
flect their contribution to U.S. economic growth. Ransom fur-
ther urged that since canals were not a system, they should be 
evaluated individually for their economic contributions. 
 At the time the federal government purchased the C&O 
canal assets (1938), the available corporate records were also 
transferred to the government and now reside at the Nation-
al Archives in College Park, Maryland. Included in the records 
are the board of directors’ minute books and The Minutes of the 
Proceedings of the Subscribers of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal 
Company (referred to in this paper as the stockholder minute 
books) which are the primary sources for this paper. As sepa-
rate documents, annual reports were presented to stockholders 
of the C&O; however, the annual reports for only select years 
reside in the National Archives. The list and location of the an-
nual reports for the years covered in this study are presented 
in Appendix 2. 
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THE ORIGINS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
AT THE C&O
 The accounting records left by the C&O present evidence of 
the corporate governance and financial management of a 19th 
century corporation. The 1784 charter of the Potomac Compa-
ny, after which the C&O’s charter was modeled, required an an-
nual meeting of the stockholders. Thus, the Potomac Company 
charter stated that at the annual meeting the “president and di-
rectors shall make report, and render distinct and just accounts 
of all their proceedings, and on finding them fairly and just-
ly stated, the proprietors then present, or a majority of them, 
shall give a certificate thereof” [1784 Virginia Act, p. 515]. This 
charge to the corporate officers represents a significant event in 
the history of U.S. corporate governance and financial manage-
ment for it provides a very early example of corporate account-
ability required by charter. To accomplish this requirement, the 
stockholders at each annual meeting of the Potomac Company 
selected a committee to review the annual report of the com-
pany. The first stockholder meeting was held May 17, 1785. At 
the next meeting, held August 7, 1786, a committee of stock-
holders was selected to examine the records of the treasurer. 
The committee reported back to the stockholders the following 
day that the accounts were “fairly and justly stated” [Potomac 
Company, 1785-1796]. This process was repeated annually. 
 The 1823 charter of the C&O was almost identical to that 
of the Potomac Company and included the phrase above ref-
erenced. The charter also stated that the C&O would absorb 
the assets, liabilities, and stockholders of the Potomac Compa-
ny. In so doing it also adopted some of the practices of the Po-
tomac Company, including its corporate governance structure. 
The C&O hired a full-time president and a part-time board of 
directors. 
 The C&O continued the practice, started by the Potomac 
Company, of having a stockholder committee appointed at the 
annual meeting review the current year’s annual report (pre-
sented by the company president and the directors) and report 
their findings back to the stockholders. A subcommittee would 
be selected within the review committee to scrutinize the fi-
nancial records of the company. This procedure continued until 
the June 1831 stockholders meeting at which time this practice 
was modified. The stockholders then passed a resolution stat-
ing that a committee should be appointed each year to review 
the annual report of the next year. The resolution directed that 
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the president and directors should have the report ready two 
weeks before the scheduled annual meeting to allow the review 
committee time to examine the report and prepare its evalua-
tion. The reports prepared by these annual review committees 
are presented in the stockholder minute books and assist us in 
understanding the functioning of the company’s corporate gov-
ernance structure. 
 After completing the canal to Cumberland, Maryland in 
1850, the practice of having a committee review the annual re-
port was again modified. As mentioned, the original practice 
was for the committee to review the practices and decisions of 
the president and directors with a subcommittee reviewing the 
company’s financial records. With the completion of the canal 
to Cumberland, it seemed there was less need for the stock-
holder committee to review the decisions of the president and 
directors. Therefore, under the new arrangement, three or four 
stockholders present at the current stockholder meeting were 
selected to review the next year’s annual report, mainly focus-
ing on an examination of the financial records of the compa-
ny. Additionally, other committees would be established as the 
stockholders felt necessary to examine particular issues of inter-
est to them. For instance, a committee in 1855 was appointed 
to review a proposal for leasing waterpower to the Alexandria 
Canal Company, and again in 1869, a committee was selected 
to investigate a proposal to abandon the C&O and turn its as-
sets and operations over to the corporate bondholders. 
 The company charter provided for a weighting process of 
stock voting rights to favor the small, individual investor. The 
charter stated that “each member shall be allowed one vote for 
every share, as far as ten shares, and one vote for every five 
shares above ten” [1784 Virginia Act, p. 513]. The original stock 
subscriptions gave the U.S. federal government 40 percent of 
the voting rights at stockholder meetings. By 1836, the State of 
Maryland had taken control by means of continued subscrip-
tions to stock in the company [Sanderlin, 1946]. 
 Exhibit 1 demonstrates that the State of Maryland invest-
ment was five times larger that any other governmental investor. 
With the additional subscription of stock in 1836, the State of 
Maryland controlled more than 50 percent of the voting stock 
rights of the company. Individual investors were noted in a sub-
scriber’s log maintained by the company. 
 The charter for the C&O was obtained in 1823; however, the 
first annual meeting was not held until 1828. These years were 
spent obtaining stock subscriptions from the States of Mary-
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land and Virginia, as well as stock subscriptions from the U.S. 
government. 
Political Environment of the C&O: Any study of the C&O Canal 
Company must consider the economic development and polit-
ical role of the company. The first president4 of the C&O was 
Charles Fenton Mercer who served from 1828 to 1833. Mercer 
was then chairman of the U.S. House Committee on Roads and 
Canals. It was Mercer who had introduced the legislation for the 
C&O charter and for the U.S. government’s subscription to stock 
in the company. By 1833, when John Eaton replaced Mercer as 
company president, Andrew Jackson had been elected president 
of the United States. Jackson’s predecessor, John Quincy Adams, 
was a member of a different political party, and the stockhold-
ers of the C&O, in an attempt to enlist further support of the 
federal government, supported a change in the company’s pres-
idency to Eaton, who was a member of Jackson’s political par-
ty [Garraty and Carnes, 1999]. 
 The officers of the C&O changed to reflect the political par-
ty in power in the Maryland statehouse. Maryland had by far 
the largest financial interest in the C&O. Such was the pow-
er of Maryland over the company that the state’s selection of 
nominees for the president and the directors of the company 
was tantamount to their election. At the April 1841 stockhold-
er meeting, the committee reviewing the annual report made 
the following statement [Minutes of the Proceedings of the Sub-
scribers … , Vol. B (1836-1841, pp. 417-418]:
4The company president was elected annually to serve a one-year term. 
EXHIBIT 1
Stock Subscriptions to the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal 
Company, 1828-1836
Subscriber 1828 1836
Federal Government $1,000,000 $1,000,000
City of Washington 1,000,000 1,000,000
City of Georgetown 250,000 250,000
City of Alexandria 250,000 250,000
State of Virginia 250,000 250,000
State of Maryland 500,000 5,000,000
Individuals 468,889 468,889
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 The committee, from evidence given them, are sat-
isfied that very valuable and faithful officers have been 
removed from the service of the company, and, in some 
cases, men not competent to perform the duties re-
quired have been appointed in their places, to the seri-
ous injury of the best interest of the company.
  Some of these removals have been as admitted by 
the president’s report to the governor of Maryland, for 
political opinion’s sake which, as your committee con-
ceive, no direct interest of the company either required 
or demanded.
 In addition to these views already presented, there 
are other matters which might be adverted to if the time 
allowed for this report would permit, which go strongly 
to induce this committee to believe that the affairs of 
the canal company have been most unfortunately man-
aged. 
At this same 1841 meeting, the stockholders, recognizing the 
costs of continuous changes in company management, passed 
a resolution stating that the C&O is a work of national impor-
tance and should not become a political engine and fluctuate 
with the tide of the party in power [Minutes of the Proceedings 
of the Subscribers … , Vol. B (1836-1841), p. 414]. 
 Sanderlin [1947] further illustrated the political nature of 
the company in his article on Arthur Gorman and the C&O Ca-
nal Company. Sanderlin described Gorman’s rise to power in 
Maryland politics through his position as the president of the 
C&O Canal Company. In 1872, Gorman was “elected” to the 
presidency of the canal company in the same year that Gor-
man’s benefactor William Whyte was elected governor of Mary-
land. Sanderlin [1947, p. 324] called this “an appointment to 
the presidency  …  as a reward for his services in behalf of his 
party.” 
 In 1881, the bondholders also complained about political 
appointments in company management. They presented a pe-
tition at the annual stockholder meeting containing the follow-
ing statement [Minutes of the Proceedings of the Subscribers  …  , 
Vol. E (1856-1889, pp. 336-337]:
 That they [the bondholders] have received no pay-
ments on account thereof since December 1876. That 
they believe if the canal is managed on business prin-
ciples, free from political influences, it can and will pay 
the debts due to them.
 That they believe it is now and has been for years 
too much controlled and managed as a political ma-
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chine for the purposes of promoting the interest of par-
ty without proper regard to those of the State of Mary-
land, who is the largest creditor or of the bondholders.
 The minority stockholders made attempts to gain more in-
fluence within the company. At the June 1879 annual meeting, 
the individual representing the stock held by the U.S. govern-
ment presented a motion to change the method of election of 
the board of directors. The motion was that the board of di-
rectors should consist of three members elected by the State 
of Maryland and two members elected by the minority stock-
holders. This motion failed with the State of Maryland voting 
against the motion and all other stockholders voting in favor. 
 By 1836, the State of Maryland had purchased more than 
50% of the voting stock of the C&O through additional stock 
subscriptions. To oversee the state’s interest in the various com-
panies in which the state had invested, a Board of Public Works 
was created in 1825. The original purpose of the board was to 
oversee state investments in corporations and to locate addition-
al investment opportunities. The goal of the state was to pro-
vide income for the operation of the state government without 
direct taxation [Wilner, 1984]. 
 The state did not exercise direct managerial control over 
the various state investments. In 1850, the State of Maryland 
held a constitutional convention and the oversight of the vari-
ous state corporate investments was an area of significant de-
bate. Mr. Thomas, the representative from Frederick County, 
stated that there was a difference between Maryland and oth-
er states with canal investments. The difference was that the 
internal improvements companies in other states were owned, 
built, and operated by the states as state non-profit entities. Mr. 
Smith of Alleghany County said that the state had no duty but 
to attend the annual meeting and cast the state’s vote. He fur-
ther said that the state can have no supervision over the works; 
the charter gives entire control to the president and directors 
of the company [Wilner, 1984]. 
THE STOCKHOLDER REVIEW COMMITTEE AND 
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
 As stated previously, the C&O annually created a commit-
tee of stockholders to review the annual report of the presi-
dent and directors. McKee [1979] discussed the use of a stock-
holder review committee to perform the audit function at the 
East Tennessee and Western North Carolina Railroad Company 
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(ET&WN), a company organized in 1866. His paper presented 
evidence of the stockholder review committee’s querying certain 
payments in the ET&WN company records. 
 In her paper on the Middlesex Canal, Kistler [1980] stated 
that the stockholders of that company relied upon a commit-
tee of their number to perform the audit function each year. 
She further stated that the committee does not appear to have 
reviewed all transactions, noting that the review performed in 
1830 was completed in one week, too short a period to com-
plete an audit of all transactions However, she noted that the 
degree of audit thoroughness could not be determined. 
 The C&O review committee recognized similar limitations 
in their auditing. In 1838, the review committee made the fol-
lowing statement [Minutes of the Proceedings of the Subscrib-
ers  …  , Vol. B (1836-1841), pp. 176-177]:
 The committee have [sic] not, of course, been able to 
examine the vouchers of all whom money has been paid 
during the year, because such an investigation would re-
quire much more time than was allowed them to devote 
to it; nor did it seem necessary, inasmuch as the requisi-
tions had received the approbation and were authorized 
by the board of directors. They could do nothing more 
than look over the requisitions, or warrants, issued for 
disbursement, examine the books of the treasurer and 
clerk, and vouchers for the expenditure of the contin-
gent fund, etc. and these they have found to be correct 
and satisfactory. 
In 1839, the C&O review committee, commenting on estimat-
ed figures on the financial statements, made this further obser-
vation [Minutes of the Proceedings of the Subscribers … , Vol. B 
(1836-1841), p. 291]:
 From these causes the statements may be found to 
require some variation but although not exact, the sub-
committee are [sic] induced to believe, that they are at 
least proximately correct in the available basis that they 
exhibit for the demands of the current year.
Such “limitations” did not keep the review committee from ad-
monishing the company officers when irregularities were en-
countered. 
 Early corporations were founded without any pre-existing 
corporate governance methods to follow. The C&O was one of 
the first U.S. corporations and, thus, had no other companies 
to emulate with respect to its financial reporting or corporate 
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governance systems. One outcome of this was a trial and error 
approach to corporate governance and financial reporting. 
 Over the life of the C&O, the stockholders reviewing the 
company finances made numerous observations and recom-
mendations. The first recommendation for change came in 
1834, when the review committee directed that [Minutes of the 
Proceedings of the Subscribers … , Vol. A (1828-1835), pp. 361-
362]:
1) Requisitions for salaries and services state the time 
period the person was being paid for and the capac-
ity in which the person had served the company. 
2) Changes be made regarding presentation of the fi-
nancial statements. For instance, previously the 
treasurer’s report consisted of one statement show-
ing total receipts and expenditures for the company 
to-date. The recommendation of the review commit-
tee was to present a column for the current year in-
formation and a separate column for the company 
to-date information. 
3) Expenses for repairs be accounted for and reported 
separately from expenses for construction of the ca-
nal. 
4) A statement showing the amount of goods being 
transported on the canal be presented.
In 1839, the review committee made the following observation 
[Minutes of the Proceedings of the Subscribers … , Vol. B (1836-
1841), p. 289]:
 The clerk’s statement however shows other receipts 
to the amount of $11,175.58 arising from tolls, rents, 
etc. gathered by the several superintendents, which 
have been used and accounted for by them in disburse-
ments in the service of the company; consequently these 
receipts have not passed through the books of the treas-
urer.
Stating that the “practice seems irregular and inconvenient,” 
the review committee directed that this process be terminated 
and that all receipts and expenditures be “passed through,” or 
recorded, in the treasurer’s books. 
 Two stockholder meetings were held in 1841. At the April 
meeting, the review committee admonished the company with 
the following statement [Minutes of the Proceedings of the Sub-
scribers … , Vol. B (1836-1841), pp. 415-416]:
 In one of the documents referred to by the presi-
dent and directors, in their report of this day, there is a 
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statement purporting to be a ‘statement of the debts & 
 credits of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company on 
the first of January 1841,’ but this is admitted to be in-
correct. It is therefore not to be relied upon.
 The committee are [sic] therefore unable to present 
any satisfactory view on this point but will briefly state 
that as well as they can ascertain, in the absence of offi-
cial statements  … 
The review committee further stipulated that the company by-
laws required that the treasurer present a financial report at 
each monthly board meeting, which had not been done since 
the current treasurer had been in office.5 The review commit-
tee made further statements regarding individual transactions 
relating to the sale of bonds issued by the State of Maryland 
for stock subscriptions. It also observed that the manner in 
which the bond sales were handled had cost the company a 
substantial amount of money. As a result, the stockholders re-
moved the company president, the treasurer, and the directors 
from office. 
 At the August 1841 stockholders meeting, the review com-
mittee, having examined the company records further, identified 
additional problems. The review committee noted that several 
irregularities in vouchers were traced to a disregard of compa-
ny policy by the former company president. The review com-
mittee also divulged that during the five months leading up to 
the change in officers, no accounting entries were made in the 
company books. 
 In 1845, the review committee made the following obser-
vation about the company’s method of bookkeeping and asked 
that it be changed [Minutes of the Proceedings of the Subscrib-
ers … , Vol. C (1842-1846), pp. 488-489]:
 They find that under the directions given to the 
 treasurer, and in accordance with the custom, which 
has heretofore prevailed in the company, payments have 
been made for more than one purpose on the same war-
rant and the whole payment charged under the head of 
the principal item for which the warrant was drawn.
 In consequence of this circumstance the abstract of 
receipts into and payments from the treasury instead of 
5The treasurer referred to had been elected at the last annual meeting for the 
first time and had not served a full year. The board of directors met monthly. The 
company treasurer was supposed to present a financial report to the board at 
each of these monthly meetings. 
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exhibiting the actual condition of the affairs of the com-
pany in its items as well as in its final balances, only 
show the amount charged in the treasurers books under 
each head in the abstract instead of the whole amount 
of expenses properly chargeable under that head. Thus 
under the head of pay of lockkeepers, it appears by ab-
stract that the amount paid in 1845 was $627, whereas 
by reference to the accounts of the company it is found 
that the whole amount properly chargeable under this 
head is $7,801,00.
 The final review committee admonishment contained in 
the stockholder minute book came in 1857 and related to the 
organizational structure. At the 1855 annual meeting, a new 
slate of company officers had been elected. These officers had 
made changes to the company organization (such as combin-
ing the offices of treasurer and clerk). As a result of these un-
popular changes in company organization, a new slate of offi-
cers was elected at the 1856 annual meeting, and the former 
company organization was restored. The 1857 review commit-
tee opined that they were grateful to see the former organiza-
tion restored. 
 Once the canal was completed to Cumberland in 1850 [Ap-
pendix 1], the activity level of the review committee tapered off 
with respect to officers and directors, but admonitions with re-
gard to company finance increased. After 1857, the review com-
mittee ceased providing commentary. No specific evidence in the 
records at our disposal seems to explain this phenomenon, but 
some observations seem plausible. After the two decades that 
constituted the development stage of the canal, the review com-
mittee may have outlived its role as the protector of the stock-
holders’ interests. 
 By l850, the prospects for the canal’s completion to Pitts-
burgh were greatly diminished. The exploitation of recently 
discovered coalfields, proximate to Cumberland, made a ready 
market for canal transport. With the changing leadership and 
political climate in Maryland, this revised market role wherein 
rail transport was in ascendancy decreased the incentives for 
additional effort to perfect canal transport. In short, the canal 
era was reaching an end. A new generation of shareholders 
with different, and perhaps less ambitious, expectations may 
have become resigned to the declining viability of this form of 
transportation. Evidence of this change in interest is found in 
the significantly diminished levels of attendance and participa-
tion at stockholder meetings. Given the prominent past profile 
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of state ownership representatives, it is apparent that the politi- 
cal interest in, and support for, the canal as the “best bet” in 
transportation had waned. By the l870s, an entirely different 
generation of shareholder representatives were likely involved, 
those content to accept the diminished prospects of the canal 
despite a brief interlude of profitability. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
 The surviving records of the C&O Canal Company pro-
vide opportunities for improved understanding of the process-
es of corporate governance and relatedly the financial man-
agement and reporting techniques employed by officials of an 
early American corporate enterprise. In addition, the materials 
provide an early example of accountability required in a cor-
porate charter. In the discharge of this accountability require-
ment, the company adopted a stockholder review committee to 
oversee the annual reporting of the company to the stockhold-
ers. The process and findings of the review committee provide 
an example of the innovative processes by which the stockhold-
ers amended the corporate governance and financial reporting 
practices of the company. 
 The details of the activities of the shareholder review com-
mittee discovered in the C&O records reveal a pronounced lev-
el of involvement in the oversight of financial activities. This 
paper contributes to the literature of accounting history identi-
fied in previous research by McKee [1979], Kistler [1980], and 
Boockholdt [1983] which has been used to orient our findings 
with reference to stockholder committees and canal accounting 
and operations in other U.S. settings.
 The activities of the C&O stockholder review committee 
 discovered in our research support and inform our understand-
ing of early control and reporting practices in U.S. corporations 
during the canal era. This evidence has shown that in the case 
of the C&O, the evolutionary process of financial reporting and 
corporate governance was greatly affected by the stockholder re-
view committee. This group requested and effected changes in 
financial reporting and corporate governance. Previts and Sam-
son [2000] described the evolution of financial reporting found 
in the annual reports of the B&O. This paper provides evidence 
that in the C&O, the catalyst for this type of evolutionary change 
was the stockholder review committee. 
 Future research into the financing, operations, and gov-
ernance of U.S. canals is called for in order to identify the 
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 practices of other canal companies. Such knowledge may assist 
both in identifying what constituted commonplace practice and 
the further tracing back of the origins of such practices. 
 We encourage scholars to continue to investigate canal com-
panies and the canal era not only for the sake of improving our 
understanding of the origins of corporate governance and finan-
cial management, but also to provide a clearer conclusion as to 
a particular episode, the dissolution of the C&O. 
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APPENDIX 1
Canal and River Transportation in the 1850s
Source: http://www.nps.gov/carto/index.htm
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APPENDIX 2
List and Location of Annual Reports for the Chesapeake 
and Ohio Canal Company for the Period of this Study: 
1829-1857. 
Number Year Location copied from
1 1829* Library of VA
2 1830 Library of VA
3 1831 Library of VA
4 1832 Library of VA
5 1833 Library of VA
6 1834 Library of VA
7 1835 Library of VA
8 1836 Library of VA
9 1837 Library of VA
10 1838 Library of VA
11 1839 Library of VA
12 1840 MD Law Library
13 1841 MD Law Library
14 1842 MD Law Library
15 1843 Library of VA
16 1844 MD Law Library
17 1845 MD Law Library
18 1846 MD Law Library
19 1847 MD Law Library
20 1848 MD Law Library
21 1849 MD Law Library
22 1850 MD Law Library
23 1851 MD Law Library
24 1852 MD Law Library
25 1853 NARA
26 1854 UVA
27 1855 MD Law Library
28 1856 UVA
29 1857 Report not located
NARA: National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland
MD Law Library: Maryland State Law Library, Annapolis, Maryland
Library of VA: The Library of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia
UVA: The University of Virginia Library
* The C&O broke ground in 1828, and the first annual report was presented at 
the end of the first year of operations in 1829. 
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topics, including those on the above theme, and a variety of methodological and 
theoretical perspectives.  However, in signifying a conference theme, authors are 
encouraged to think about non-traditional topic areas and explore other places 
and other peoples.
“Accounting in other places, Accounting by other peoples” would include such 
topics as:
– The professionalisation of accounting in the developing world;
– The role of imperialism in spreading accounting practice;
– Accounting history issues that interface with race, gender or culture; and
– The role of accounting and accountants in non-business settings such as 
art and music.
Submission and Review of Papers:  Papers written in the English language 
should be submitted electronically no later than 26 March 2007 to 5AHIC@mu-
private.edu.au.  All papers will be subject to a double-blind refereeing process 
and will be published on the conference web site, as refereed conference pro-
ceedings unless otherwise advised.
Notification of Acceptance:  Notification of papers accepted for inclusion in 
the conference program will be made by 15 May 2007.
Conference information is available at the Conference website: 
http://www.commerce.usask.ca/5AHIC
Information about The Banff Centre is available at:  
http://www.banffcentre.ca 
Inquires may be directed to the Conference Convenor,  
Nola Buhr of the University of Saskatchewan, at the following e-mail address:  
nola.buhr@usask.ca.
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THOUGHT AND PRACTICE
Abstract: A major, unique accounting archival source, the R.J. Cham-
bers Collection comprises both hard copy and, utilizing cutting-edge 
search technology, internet accessible materials. From his academic 
beginnings, Chambers was an orderly person, an archivist of the ex-
tensive and varied evidence that underpinned his proposals for ac-
counting reform. 
 Opening research areas for accounting biography, the develop-
ment of accounting thought, the history of accounting institutions, 
prosopography, public sector accounting history, and comparative in-
ternational accounting history are foremost amongst the myriad jus-
tifications for seeking to unravel the accounting history “lodes” in 
archives such as the Goldberg, Chambers, and Briloff Collections 
[Potter, 2003]. The archiving of the meticulously kept Chambers pa-
pers from 1947-1999 provides an opportunity for unfolding the back-
ground to events previously withheld from accounting history schol-
ars. Professional episodes in relation to inflation accounting, standard 
setting, proposals to reform accounting education, and the like that 
appeared prima facie to be worth investigating are now open to scru-
tiny from a different angle, with a different type of evidence available 
in this Collection. This Collection provides a high degree of archival 
provenance. In particular, it represents an orderly retention of past 
documentation of what Chambers wrote, and perhaps uniquely for 
accounting historians, received; thus, providing an extensive window 
from which to examine the disorderly present environment of acount-
ing.
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BACKGROUND
 Raymond John Chambers (1917-1999) has been described 
by his 20th century peers as an “accounting pioneer” [Moonitz, 
1982], an “intellectual giant of 20th century accounting thought” 
[Barton, 1982; Mathews, 1982; Staubus, 2003], truly a “Renais-
sance man.”1 He was selected by Edwards [1994] as one of the 
“twentieth century accounting thinkers;” by Colasse [2005] as 
one of “les grands auteurs en comptabilité; and, at the time of his 
admission, he was the only non-North American to be inducted 
into the Accounting Hall of Fame of Ohio State University. He 
achieved many other awards and recognitions as listed in Cham-
bers’ Aide Memoire, which appeared in Vol. 6 of his collected 
works, reproduced in Chambers and Dean [2000a]. As Founda-
tion Professor of Accounting (1960-1982) at The University of 
Sydney, Chambers founded and built what was to be known in-
ternationally as the Sydney school of accounting thought [Wells, 
1976; AAA, 1977]. Together with Professor Louis Goldberg (Uni-
versity of Melbourne), Professor Russell Mathews (Australian 
National University), and other contemporaries, such as Profes-
sor Reg Gynther (University of Queensland) and Professor Ken 
Wright (University of Adelaide), Chambers pioneered scholar-
ship in the teaching, learning, and research of accounting in 
Australian universities [Barton, 1982].
 Chambers is probably best known for his proposed sys-
tem of accounting, Continuously Contemporary Accounting 
(CoCoA), a summary of which is provided by Clarke and Dean 
[1996; Chatfield and Vangermeersch, 1996, pp. 109-111]. The be-
lief in his system and academic tolerance may be gleaned from 
this quote from a previously unreported correspondence: “Co-
CoA [like airplanes, etc] will rest on its functional superiority; 
if not today, then tomorrow, for all change takes time to be as-
similated” [R.J. Chambers Collection, SUA P202, Item # 6258, 
June, 19, 1981].
 To put some balance into this background, Chambers was 
certainly not without his critics. He had many debates in the 
literature with contemporaries such as Moonitz [1982], Ijiri 
[1967, 1982], Littleton [1953], Mattessich [1964, 1995, 2005], 
Staubus [1961], and Edwards and Bell [1961]. They gave “as 
good as they received” from him. A recent issue of Accounting 
1Giuseppe Galassi [1999], private correspondence with one of the authors
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Education contained a forum on Chambers’ ideas on education 
where again critics and supporters discussed those ideas.2 
  This work will demonstrate another previously unknown 
characteristic of Chambers. He was an archivist, and seemingly 
so from the beginning of his academic career. On November 15, 
2004, the R.J. Chambers Collection (the Collection hereafter), 
Chambers’ collected papers and related materials, was launched 
by the vice chancellor and principal of The University of Syd-
ney, Professor Gavin Brown. The Collection is both in hard 
copy, stored in the Archives Unit of The University, and is in-
ternet accessible at [http://chambers.econ.usyd.edu.au]. Brown 
observed that Chambers not only wrote a substantial set of ma-
terials but he carefully ordered them, together with correspon-
dences with other academics and interested parties, so that he 
and others would be able to access them easily.
 The Collection’s development and its features described be-
low give insight into how this archive will provide an impor-
tant missing link in what is known publicly regarding Chambers’ 
contribution to the accounting literature and to the profession-
al practicing community. There are expected to be several arti-
cles and monographs produced (see possible projects noted be-
low in the conclusion).
 In the current unsettled environment of accounting, evi-
denced, for example, by the disputes regarding principles v. 
rules-based standards, the canons of accounting measurement, 
and the function of fair values in the new regime of Interna-
tional Financial Reporting Standards, the Collection is a unique 
historical source. For, unlike many historical enquiries in ac-
counting in which hazy sources are accessed to explain a rela-
tively unequivocal present state of affairs, the Collection, by 
 virtue of its completeness, order, and comprehensiveness, pro-
vides a relatively unequivocal record of the state of past affairs 
with which to point to what is reasonably described as the hazy 
state of contemporary accounting thought and practice.
 CHAMBERS: AN INSIDER OR FRINGE DWELLER?
 There are many sources detailing various aspects of Cham-
bers’ life, including two festschrift issues of Abacus (December 
1982 and October 2000). Chambers provided useful summaries 
in “An Accounting Apprenticeship” [1991] and in the introduc-
2The current authors [Clarke et al., 2005] contributed to that forum, as did 
Tinker [2005], Amernic, [2005], Mattessich [2005], and Lee [2005].
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tory preface to the 1974 reprinting of Accounting, Evaluation 
and Economic Behavior. Those aspects have been augmented by 
the cataloguing of Chambers’ full correspondence files (1947-
1999) stored in the Collection.
 What is unlikely to be well known, especially by younger 
accounting academics, is Chambers’ role in lifting the status of 
accounting to that of an equal discipline in the learned halls of 
The University [Barton, 1982; Wolnizer and Dean, 2000; Clarke 
et al., 2005]. He fought for this recognition for half a centu-
ry. Chambers [2000b] described his struggle on this and other 
fronts as being a “life on the fringe.” His posthumously pub-
lished “Early Beginnings: Introduction to Wisdom of Account-
ing” [2000c] recounts his early struggles in gaining an eco-
nomics degree and an understanding of business, finance, and 
accounting. Accepting Chambers’ view that he worked “on the 
fringe” may appear, prima facie, at odds with our belief that 
this Collection provides unique insights by an “inside observer” 
of many of the major events affecting accounting thought and 
practice in the 20th century. The following shows that there is 
scope for both to be correct.
 Chambers [2000b] aptly captures his professional and prac-
tical experiences in respect of what he perceived to be the out-
comes of those experiences. A perusal of many of the materials 
in the Collection shows clearly that Chambers observed first-
hand the “inner workings” of the early professional attempts 
(1950s and 1960s) to have accounting accepted as a truly pro-
fessional activity; he was also at the forefront of efforts by the 
Australian professional accountancy bodies to have graduate 
entry into the profession. He was a major proponent of the in-
troduction of a “professional orientation” for new entrants to 
the profession’s ranks. He fought unsuccessfully for the merger 
of Australia’s two major professional bodies in the 1970s. He 
worked on many professional committees for over fifty years, 
particularly those dealing with education and the introduction 
of a more serviceable system of financial reporting to incor-
porate the effects of changes in prices and price levels. In this 
sense, Chambers was an “insider.” The Collection reveals that, 
as an insider, his counsel was sought by Australian universities 
on all the early accounting professorial appointments in the 
1960s and 1970s. His advice was also solicited for many over-
seas professorial appointments as well during that same period.3 
3The first accounting professorial appointments occurred in the early to 
mid-1950s. These were followed by several more in the 1960s [see Mathews, 
1982; Carnegie and Williams, 2001].
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On the regulatory side, Chambers’ voluminous critical works led 
to his appointment as chairman of the 1978 NSW Parliamen-
tary Committee of Inquiry, “Company Accounting Standards.” 
The Collection contains all of the expert evidence reports pre-
pared by Chambers throughout the 1960s and 1970s, highlight-
ing his close connection to business matters, leading business 
personalities, and members of the profession.
 Significantly, the Collection also contains details of his over-
seas travels in the late 1950s through to the early 1990s, fea-
turing his association with the international academy. At the 
Collection launch, Professor Gary Previts spoke and referred to 
Chambers as perhaps the world’s first “geoaccountant.” On those 
travels, he pursued his desire to have accounting thought and 
practice viewed as research and principles driven, rather than 
merely the product of rote learning and dogma.
 Recent interest in Chambers’ ideas is evident in the above-
mentioned March 2005 issue of Accounting Education, includ-
ing a forum on Chambers’ [1999] provocative work, “The Pover-
ty of Accounting Discourse.” The forum confirms that his ideas 
continue to be considered and debated. In a similar way, the 
Collection seeks to ensure that academics in future decades will 
be able to access and debate his work, using evidentiary source 
material.
HISTORY AND NATURE OF THE COLLECTION
 To create the second of The University of Sydney’s Founda-
tion Professors’ series,4 the Archives Unit, the Accounting Foun-
dation, the Faculty of Economics and Business within The Uni-
versity of Sydney, and CPA Australia combined to provide initial 
funding and other support to archive in the Collection all of 
Chambers’ collected papers, with particular attention being giv-
en initially to his private correspondence.
 Fittingly, the Collection was launched in the Great Hall of 
The University of Sydney, a venue of some of Chambers’ finest 
speeches. Chambers described the period to which the Collec-
tion relates as “perhaps the most eventful period in the histo-
ry of accounting up to the terminal date [1985]. It was a peri-
od of substantial growth, of conglomeration on a large scale by 
4Chambers was appointed in 1960 as the Foundation Professor of 
Accounting at The University of Sydney. The first in the Foundation Professors’ 
archive series was the Philosophy Department’s John Anderson Collection. 
Both collections are located within the Archives Unit on the fifth floor of Fisher 
Library.
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mergers and takeovers, of intense multinational corporate devel-
opment, of increasing use of modes of organization and meth-
ods of financing that were novel at the beginning of the inter-
val [1946]” [Chambers and Dean, 1986, general preface].
 The Collection had a lucky escape from destruction fol-
lowing several moves after Chambers officially retired in 1982. 
Physical moves continued in 1999 after Chambers’ death. Many 
of the papers were boxed again and placed in rather insecure 
storage in a University-owned building that was scheduled to 
be demolished. The return to The University of Sydney of Pe-
ter Wolnizer as dean of the Faculty of Economics saw urgent 
manoeuvres to ensure the Collection was recovered from its 
several locations and recompiled in a similar form (layout of 
room, etc.) to when Chambers was researching. The Collec-
tion was saved from imminent destruction, which would have 
been a tragic loss not only for accounting historians, but also 
for the history of accounting. With the Collection thus saved, 
Graeme Dean assumed principal responsibility for managing the 
archiving and digitizing processes that have yielded the inter-
national accounting treasure that is the R.J. Chambers Collec-
tion. The entire project has been a collaboration by those who 
had worked closely with Chambers over an extended period of 
time. 
 The Collection comprises hard-copy files and approximate-
ly 20,000 catalogued summary items accessible within a full-
text, searchable electronic repository (see below for details). 
The complete electronic archive is expected to be accessible to 
scholars and postgraduate students worldwide by the middle of 
2006.
 The Collection augments a recently launched archive of an-
other Australian academic accounting pioneer, Louis Goldberg, 
so ably described in Potter’s [2003] “The Louis Goldberg Col-
lection at Deakin University: Exploring a Rich Foundation for 
Historical Research.” Potter provides a useful framework to ex-
amine both the Chambers and Goldberg Archives, outlining sev-
eral historiographic approaches [e.g., the “source-oriented” and 
“problem-oriented” approaches]. A smaller collection of papers 
of Russell Mathews also exists. Further, the collected papers of a 
contemporary U.S. iconoclast, Abe Briloff, are being made avail-
able at City University of New York. These, and hopefully more 
collections, will form an invaluable database for accounting his-
torians to explore how accounting ideas underpinning current 
practice have been forged. Increasingly, that is becoming a per-
tinent issue as, arguably, practice effectively has changed little 
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since the 1930s. Yet, the incidence of criticisms of those prac-
tices recur, decade after decade, following, inter alia, the large 
unexpected crashes of the genre of Maxwell Communications, 
Enron, WorldCom, Vivendi, Parmalat, and HIH [Clarke et al., 
2003].5 This is notwithstanding that practice is now governed 
by a plethora of accounting standards.
 The Collection augments the different types of material 
contained in the Goldberg Collection. Whilst the latter is richer 
in “old manuscripts,” the Chambers Collection has a more ex-
tensive contemporary book collection, especially in areas such 
as education generally and management education specifically, 
philosophy of science, accounting and financial management, 
auditing, financial statement analysis, and professional com-
mittee papers. It also has more extensive web-accessible mate-
rial. Whilst both collections contain substantial correspondence 
items, the Chambers Collection has approximately three to four 
times the number. It includes letters not only sent by Chambers 
but also, it would appear, nearly all of the academic correspon-
dence he received from contemporaries during 1947-1999.
 The collections of Goldberg and some other contemporaries 
provide useful benchmarks for analyzing the “utility” of the R.J. 
Chambers Collection. There will be opportunities for research-
ers to cross check their sources, thereby reducing possible Col-
lection bias, one of the main criticisms of research done on 
such biographical collections [Potter, 2003]. 
 In contrast to many archives, a feature of the Collection is 
its provenance,6 the exceptionally good order that the material 
was in when Chambers died. He kept the items in chronologi-
cal order and sometimes by topic or corresponding person. The 
Collection contains several photographs of the library in situ. 
This high degree of provenance makes the Collection unique as 
an accounting history source.
 The physical dimensions of the Collection show the diffi-
culties in maintaining his records. Chambers’ library contained 
over 2,500 books, hard copies of over 2,500 articles, newspaper 
cuttings, etc. in his numerous filing cabinets. The correspon-
dence files amounted to approximately 15,000 individual items 
or letters that Chambers wrote and received from 1947-1999, 
5Other catalysts for criticisms include: asset stripping following takeovers 
in boom periods, as well as undervaluations and undercharges due to price and 
price level changes.
6“Provenance” is an archivist term that refers to the extent to which the envi-
ronment from which an archive is created has been retained.
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which, with grouping, has been reduced to around 12,500 en-
tries in the electronic archive. Cabinets of myriad index cards 
contained the references that ultimately became the corpus of 
his An Accounting Thesaurus: Five Hundred Years of Accounting 
[Chambers, 1995].
 There were several stages in the archiving process. All en-
tailed classification, metadata creation, and cataloguing of the 
material: 
ß The initial phase (2000-2002) focused on the cataloguing, 
boxing, and storing in acid-free archival boxes of the ap-
proximately 15,000 items that constituted more than fif-
ty years of personal correspondence. The Archives Unit 
within The University of Sydney provided an archivist to 
undertake this task. 
ß Then followed (2002-2003) a more extensive recording of 
the residual of Chambers’ resource materials – the 2,500 
books in his personal library; the 2,500 journal articles, 
newspaper cuttings, and miscellany stored then in nu-
merous filing cabinets; and his 20,000-odd card entries. 
ß During 2003-2004, another research assistant added 
metadata to Chambers’ personal papers, providing index-
ing according to his Chambers on Accounting series and 
Aide Memoire classificatory schema. The various schema-
ta are all described on the Collection website.
ß Finally (March 2005-present), a consultant integrated all 
of the records into an electronic archive which offers 
full-text search, supports innovative search and extrac-
tion strategies, and is integrated to a publishing system 
(to be completed in a second stage) to create a “dynam-
ic archive,” allowing researchers to submit their research 
into the archive, whilst ensuring that we preserve prov-
enance of the initial material. At this point the value of 
research undertaken will be dynamically linked with the 
original material to the benefit of those who follow. Also, 
the data were double-checked by a research assistant.
 Below we provide a more detailed description of the vari-
ous characteristics, some of which are briefly noted above.
 
CHAMBERS’ PUBLISHED WORKS –  
COLLECTION INSIGHTS
 Chambers’ teaching and writing characteristically used 
analogies, drawn from economics, decision sciences, law, soci-
ology, philosophy, psychology, art, the physical sciences, and lit-
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erature, to illustrate the essence of the infelicities of which he 
complained in contemporary accounting, to explain the princi-
ples underpinning his preferred solutions and to elaborate the 
reasoning driving his analyses of contrary suggestions. Those 
illustrations were at his elbow. He perceived linkages between 
them and the legitimate methods and focuses of accounting, 
for they related to other critical elements influencing human 
endeavor, of which accounting too is part. In many ways, it is 
less remote a part than many of those for other disciplines since 
the focuses of accounting (decision making, economic activity, 
economic evaluation, monetary calculation, evaluation and as-
sessment) are everyday events to a greater or lesser extent for 
virtually all. 
 A unique feature of the Collection is the lack of distinction 
it makes between those matters that elsewhere would normal-
ly be so classified to indicate their special relation to teaching 
or to research, or to the frequently drawn distinction between 
accounting theory and practice. In retrospect, it seems unlikely 
that he contemplated any real distinction between teaching and 
research, or between what constituted good theory and good 
practice. 
 His teaching was always peppered with examples and anal-
ogies drawn from his treasury, his analyses of them, his rea-
soning, and the supporting evidence. His written contributions, 
the output from his research, were the end product of an exten-
sive learning process. Part of that process entailed “exposing” 
his ideas in discussion with his colleagues, his contemporaries, 
friend and foe alike, and his students. The other part was his 
penchant for sending copies of drafts of the proposed piece to 
scholars around the world for comment. Many of the resulting 
debates through correspondence between Chambers and ac-
counting scholars; e.g., Barton, Baxter, Briloff, Galassi, Gold-
berg, Hansen, Ijiri, Littleton, Mathews, Mattessich, Moonitz, 
Onida, Paton, Shiobara, Someya, Spacek, Stamp, Staubus, 
Sterling, Sweeney, and many other European scholars, are pre-
served in the Collection. These provide not only insights into 
how Chambers’ ideas were hewn and honed, but also insights 
into the development and firming up of the ideas of many cor-
respondents, both those who held similar ideas and those who 
held to the contrary. By the time Chambers was in print, his 
thoughts had been well exposed, refined, tested, and rehearsed. 
His archive was not a mere museum of which he was the cu-
rator; it was his tool kit to which he was forever adding and 
from which he was forever learning.
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 As such, the Collection provides hitherto unpublished in-
sights into some of the influences that shaped the refinement 
of those ideas, the support he received from colleagues, and the 
frustrations endured over an academic “odyssey” of more than 
fifty years. It augments the six volumes of Chambers on Account-
ing [1986, 2000a] which contain the distillation of Chambers’ 
published scholarship, other than that published in books, over 
a fifty year period. 
 Many of those published works addressed the pressing 
 professional matters of his time. Almost without exception he 
corresponded with academic colleagues from many cognate 
 disciplines, including law, economics, decision sciences, psy-
chology, sociology, etc., with academics who shared and op-
posed his ideas and with the profession’s policy makers and pol-
icy followers. His published papers provide only limited insight 
to those ideas and their formulation. Meticulously kept papers 
from 1947-1999 provide a unique window into the background 
to so much of his work previously withheld from accounting 
scholars and practitioners. It is already apparent that the Col-
lection is going to be the object of immediate inquiry by senior 
scholars, nationally and internationally, especially, it seems, 
those from the U.S. and the U.K. As Potter [2003] notes, such 
unpublished material provides insights of a hitherto unknown 
research lode. The types of positive research he suggested in 
respect to the Goldberg archive aptly apply to the Chambers 
Collection: “… biography, institutional history, prosopography, 
public sector accounting history, as well as comparative inter-
national accounting history.”
 The December 1982 and the October 2000 issues of Aba-
cus were devoted to reflections of contemporaries on Chambers’ 
contribution to accounting thought and practice.7 Arguably, his 
influence has not been fully appreciated by modern-day account-
ants, by neither those in practice nor those in academe. A re-
cent autobiographical article by one of Chambers’ contempo-
raries and at-times critic, George Staubus [2003, p. 179], goes 
some way to redressing the balance. He includes the observation 
in the subsection, “My Greatest Intellectual Debts,” that “Cham-
bers [had] the ‘greatest’ intellectual effect on him.” As noted in 
 
7As well as the October 2000 Abacus festschrift, there is the Abacus 1982 
“Special Issue” celebrating Chambers’ “official” retirement from The University 
of Sydney. A special forum in the March 2005 issue of Accounting Education 
paid tribute to Chambers’ contribution to accounting education. 
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the Background, there are many others who have sung Cham-
bers’ praises and many who have critiqued his ideas.
 But, it may have surprised some that Chambers’ contribu-
tions were made against enormous resistance, both academic-
ally and professionally. His posthumously published 1992 con-
tribution “Life on the Fringe – An Accounting Odyssey” [2000b] 
explains an in-depth involvement in the teaching of account-
ing, his research into accounting, the confronting head-on 
of the problems that beset conventional accounting, and his 
participation in the management of the profession. Consider 
also the following observations made in a whimsical-cum-
 serious speech delivered upon his appointment as a senior lec-
turer in accounting in 1953 (Chambers Collection, SUA P202, 
Item #10770):
Outside these walls certainly, and inside them perhaps, 
the accountant is a curious figure. Technical people find 
him hard to endure; he is rather too thrifty in business 
matters to be hail fellow well met. In fact they say it 
runs in his veins: some their hearts don’t beat, they click 
like cash registers: and I have heard of one business 
 executive who in high disdain observed Accountants – 
they walk just like men. Now there may be something 
pathological about accountants that the school of med-
icine might be interested in. The accountants also have 
their rituals, doctrines and dogmas which is something 
they have in common with the churchmen; they have 
their mumbo jumbo, their abracadabra and their folk 
lore which may interest the anthropologist. And what 
they do with money symbols I’m sure would intrigue 
the mathematician. 
Those observations would seem to sit equally well in the post-
Enron era with the current ongoing debates about accounting 
measurement, fair value, and standards, whether they should 
be principles or rules-based.
 From day one of his academic career, Chambers [Cham-
bers Collection, SUA P202, Item #141, 1955 correspondence] 
was keen to rid accounting thought and practice of its myriad 
dogma, to replace them “with a sound theoretical, may I say 
academic foundation to the subject.” Notwithstanding, he was 
always kept at arms length by those he sought most to inform, 
those more concerned about protecting their reputations, elevat-
ing the importance of their product, and enhancing their social 
status. As he put it, he was “on the fringe.” His documented 
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 experiences provide insights into how ideas do, or do not, get 
on to the regulatory agendas.
DETAILED CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COLLECTION
 This section provides an overview of (1) how the Collection 
is arranged, the schemata used, (2) how it can be accessed, and 
(3) the prospect for a “dynamic archive.” These characteristics 
provide a window into the environment in which Chambers 
plied his trade, allowing researchers to immerse themselves in 
his various time-dependent “knowledge spheres.”
Schemata: Retaining its provenance, the Collection’s physical 
items are ultimately catalogued for electronic search purposes 
primarily. It uses an extended Dublin Core metadata set, allow-
ing for easy extraction of search strategies based on different 
contexts. The Collection comprises four main areas: 
I. Published Works: About 300 records of his published works 
are classified using his autobiographical system. In the ear-
ly 1970s, Chambers began collecting and summarizing all his 
published works, the forerunner of his Autobibliography [1976] 
monograph, published by the International Centre for Research 
in Accounting. It contained paragraph-level summaries of his 
published works in chronological order. All articles are cata-
logued to Dublin Core with abstracts and, where possible, arti-
cles are included either in full or as an integrated, searchable, 
full-text index as determined by copyright constraints.
II. Unpublished Works: Over 12,000 records, mainly correspon-
dence, are classified using Chamber’s schemata of “On Account-
ing,” “Aide Memoire,” and “Series,” developed by the Sydney 
University archivist in line with Chambers’ files. This materi-
al has been further indexed using extended Dublin Core to ca-
ter for recipient (the receiver of the correspondence), organiza-
tion (the organization of the recipient or writer), and theme (an 
overarching classification based on major thematic concepts). 
Finally, as the material is currently in physical format primari-
ly, the metadata has been extended to cater for the eventual on-
going digitization of material based on a researcher’s use and 
requirement, offering details of original status, pagination (size 
and number), cost of digitization, and copyright management. 
 Within the Unpublished Works, there are further schemata 
supporting extended metadata elements of:
III. Series: A classification prepared by a professional archivist 
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who, upon examining his personal correspondence and related 
materials, identified a 66 item schema that Chambers had ex-
plicitly or implicitly used to store the materials on shelves in 
his work office. The schema reflects faithfully how Chambers 
had catalogued those materials. 
IIIa. On Accounting: In their general preface [Vol. 1, Manage-
ment and Finance, 1985] to the six-volume set, Chambers on Ac-
counting, editors Chambers and Dean observed: 
The selection includes direct contributions to profes-
sional and academic periodicals, the prepared scripts 
of a number of conference papers and other addresses 
published in professional and academic journals, con-
ference proceedings or otherwise, a number of pub-
lished pieces, and a selection of texts of addresses and 
submissions to inquiries not otherwise published. With-
in this selection there are a series of papers on observed 
accounting practices, on the generation and content of 
recommendations and standards devised or endorsed 
by professional and other organizations. There are se-
ries on information generation, measurement, commu-
nication, and choice. There are series on basic ideas, 
theories, and theory construction and on research in ac-
counting education. But the individual pieces in any of 
these series may appear at widely separated dates; some 
pieces could quite properly fall into any one of sever-
al of the above groups; and ideas first treated in one set-
ting have been used or developed in other settings. The 
division of the materials of selection was intended to 
minimize mere repetition, but that intention was mod-
erated where it seemed desirable to indicate the origin 
or development of some specific theme. The volume ti-
tles are indicative of the general themes of each, but 
within each the arrangement is chronological.
IIIb. Aide Memoire: This classification is based on what was de-
signed by Chambers following his official retirement in 1982. 
As noted in the preface of Vol. 6 of Chambers and Dean [2000], 
Chambers’ Aide Memoire gives in chronological order the plac-
es and circumstances which gave rise to the contents of Vols. 
1-VI of Chambers on Accounting and to other publications and 
unpublished material over some 60 of the most turbulent years 
in the history of accounting. The contents of Vols. I-V were 
grouped by material content. The references in the Aide Mem-
oire ease access to any item reproduced in Vols. I-VI. 
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IIIc. Recipient/Writer: the recipients of letters written by Cham-
bers and the writers of material to Chambers
IIId. Organization: the organization of individuals to whom 
Chambers wrote and from whom he received material
IVa. Personal Library Book Listings: About 2,500 records of ma-
terial from his personal library have been classified according 
to the Chambers library system. Chambers maintained an ex-
tensive collection of books over his academic and professional 
life. Correspondence in the late 1940s and early 1950s in the 
Chambers Collection reveal that he was arguably one of the first 
Australian accounting academics to seek overseas books on ac-
counting and cognate discipline matters to inform his theoret-
ical ideas about a “better system of accounting.” Those books 
were also classified on his office shelves using an abridged Dew-
ey classificatory schema, retained in this Collection. His 2,500 
book collection entails great breadth, covering education, deci-
sion making generally, communication, economics, accounting, 
law, ethics, business biography, psychology, metrology, philoso-
phy, and scientific methods. 
IVb. Personal Reading Material: Thousands of records of ma-
terial from his filing cabinets are referenced using an abridged 
Dewey-type classificatory system developed by Chambers. This 
part of the Collection is testimony to Chambers’ obsession with 
order. Having maintained an extensive set of professional and 
academic material for many years, the system he developed was 
to be the antecedent of what appeared as the schema for ar-
ranging nearly 6,000 (of approximately 20,000 available) items 
in his magnum opus, An Accounting Thesaurus: Five Hundred 
Years of Accounting [1995]. This aspect is described in detail in 
Clarke [1996].
Access: The archive website serves as a reflection on Chambers 
as an individual, educator, mentor, and researcher. It provides 
details about his seminal work on a comprehensive theoretical 
foundation for a style of accounting, CoCoA. Once the archive 
is accessed, the user is presented with the ability to review with 
ease the records based on the major metadata elements (e.g., ti-
tle, creator, date, publication) over the major groupings – Pub-
lished Material, Unpublished Material, Personal Library Book 
Listings, and Personal Reading Material. Further, the archive 
supports two main search strategies: (1) standard searching 
with keywords or advanced Boolean searching using different 
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metadata elements; and (2) phrase (context) searching wherein 
the user is presented with a comprehensive list of phrases with-
in the material (including metadata) based on the input of a 
single keyword. The researcher can thus understand the context 
in which words are used. Finally, there is the ability to search 
by date, allowing a chronological view of what was happening 
in different periods.
 The archive will also eventually support an innovative ex-
traction tool which will allow researchers to extract the results 
of their work as in overview, summary, and page format as an 
e-book that can be downloaded and used off-line as a basis for 
their research. The archive is developed using a mixture of open 
source and managed source products. It uses Unicode and sup-
ports numerous data types, including audio and video.
A Future Dynamic Archive: Classifying the archive “dynamic” 
is perhaps a somewhat curious, and certainly novel, notion for 
an archive. But the archive has been developed so as to be in-
tegrated in the future with a publishing system that will allow 
researchers to integrate the information extracted from the ar-
chive with their research and then to resubmit that work back 
as an e-book to a parallel archive for inclusion in an overall 
repository.
 These archival characteristics, especially the classifications, 
provide insights into Chambers’ ordered nature and the breadth 
of his scholarship. Clearly, he was a voracious, insatiable reader 
on myriad aspects of human endeavor, always looking for differ-
ent angles from which to address what he saw as the fundamen-
tal issues in commerce in general and in accounting thought 
and practice in particular. 
CHAMBERS – ARCHIVIST PAR EXCELLENCE
 The scale and systematic nature of this Collection reveals 
Chambers to be an accomplished archivist. Perhaps follow-
ing the approach of the late 16th/early 17th century British 
empiricist, Sir Francis Bacon, Chambers arguably saw value 
in storing his voluminous collection of materials on account-
ing and cognate disciplines in “a goodly huge cabinet.” A com-
mentator on an earlier draft of this piece noted that the ear-
ly amassing and ordering of items begs the question of why 
this was undertaken from the beginning of Chambers’ academ-
ic career. Was it ego driven? Who knows? Possibly it is indica-
tive of his commitment to lifelong learning. It is clear from the 
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correspondence he had with others that, although confident of 
his own reasoning, he was always sufficiently humble intellec-
tually to stand corrected if presented by a more formidable ar-
ray of evidence than his own or with superior argument.
 But, there are some plausible explanations in the Collection 
itself for its detailed classificatory order. Several correspondence 
items reveal that Chambers was directly involved in the forma-
tion of the NSW Division of the Business Archives Council of 
Australia in the early 1950s. Indeed, Chambers was its first treas-
urer, a position he held from many years. Later he would be-
come the national body’s secretary. As likely as not, his expo-
sure to and interest in those business archives was a natural 
by-product of this venture. Perhaps a contiguous explanation for 
his early desire to have order is Chambers’ lifelong interest in 
mathematics, exemplified by his fascination with Euclidian ge-
ometry. Chambers sought to bring order, by “shuffling things” 
systematically, and through that archiving process, he sought 
a better understanding of the relationship between accounting 
and its context. Perhaps, equally likely, it was driven by his pas-
sion for accounting and a desire to rid it of its infelicities. His 
early interest in seeking order contrasted with what he saw as 
a chaotic accounting world of accounting thought and prac-
tice. Hence, likely as not, imposing order to his ever burgeon-
ing tool kit was crucial were he to achieve a better understand-
ing of the “nature of things,” including especially the function 
of accounting.
 Whatever his motivations, Chambers was extremely ordered 
in keeping a hard-copy record of the development of his initial 
ideas on the issues he addressed over the following 50 years, 
and the basis upon which they became modified or further en-
trenched and honed to emerge in the literature. So, what even-
tually appeared in print, in a congress plenary, or in a mere talk 
to a professional body, Rotary Club, or student orientation func-
tion, invariably was not “first thoughts,” but his current state 
of thinking, shaped by the extensive exposure of his ideas in a 
wide variety of settings.
 Those who were colleagues of Chambers within his Depart-
ment of Accounting will attest that it was always difficult to ar-
gue with him and emerge with other than a feeling of having 
learned something new. Frequently this meant exposure to an 
angle that had not been in your mind previously or an histor-
ical insight into the issue of which you had not been aware. 
The many who engaged him in debate in the staff common 
room in the Merewether Building, the heartland of The Univer-
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sity of Sydney’s Faculty of Economics at that time, the account-
ants, economists, political scientists, economic historians, and 
the statisticians were visibly struck by the extent of his knowl-
edge of their discipline, its core theorems, current practices, 
contemporary dilemmas, disputes, arguments, and counter-ar-
guments.
 Those who were his colleagues were aware that his exten-
sive library included books and journals relating to each of 
those disciplines. They also were aware of the large card sys-
tem he maintained to house his references, quotes, and the like 
for invariably he could quickly direct us “go and read this” or 
confront us with a “you haven’t dealt with …” as he rattled off 
a list of relevant literature much of which we were unaware. 
It was also common knowledge amongst his colleagues that he 
scoured the financial pages of newspapers and financial bulle-
tins every day and marked up items to be processed by his re-
search assistant to be included in an extensive, classified cut-
tings file that was kept in blue folders or in his extensive filing 
cabinets, all of which have been retained but for those blue 
folders. This helps to explain how seemingly within a few mo-
ments he could come up with numerous examples of the mat-
ters in issue. Whereas in debate his opponents could produce 
one or two examples, almost invariably Chambers could pro-
duce a more substantial array, frequently both contemporary 
and historical. It is a reasonable suspicion that few colleagues 
were aware of the enormity, extent, or the order of the sourc-
es he archived, and why he was always, almost instantaneous-
ly, so “well informed.”
 Kohn [1989]8 has made the point that the chance of scien-
tific discovery is increased by the extent to which a researcher’s 
mind is “honed” to the making of connections between matters 
not otherwise perceived to be related. This is possibly what Ro-
zak [1986]9 had in mind with his notion of master ideas. Cham-
bers indeed dealt with master ideas [1955, 1962, 1966], the ab-
sence of which Hirsch [1987]10 complained in his explanation of 
cultural illiteracy. Chambers’ Accounting Thesaurus [1995] not 
only illustrates that he pursued his scholarship in a manner con-
sistent with the ideas of Kohn, Rozak, and Hirsh, but beyond 
8Kohn explains how hitherto unmade connections were forged only with a 
mind prepared through exposure to a wide variety of knowledge.
9To Rozak, master ideas underpinned lesser manifestations in workable, 
day-to-day practices.
10Hirsch’s complaint was that a chronic unawareness of everyday events, 
facts, and general information constrained one’s capacity to think.
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that, Chambers provides insight into what underpins the accu-
mulation of argument and counter-argument, confirming and 
refuting examples, as well as the understanding of the origins, 
history, and development of the ideas and practices of account-
ing and cognate disciplines. Comprising only approximately a 
25% selection of the contents of his card index, the Thesaurus 
displays the breadth and depth of the knowledge upon which 
he drew to make these connections that formed the basis for 
his adjudication on the ideas and practices of accounting.
CONCLUSIONS
 The Collection contains both the background to the dis-
tillation of Chambers’ ideas and hitherto unpublished insights 
into some of the influences that shaped the refinement of those 
ideas, the support received from his colleagues, and the frustra-
tions endured over his academic odyssey. Many of Chambers’ 
published works addressed the pressing professional matters of 
his time. An extensive correspondence with academic colleagues 
from disciplines including law, economics, psychology, and so-
ciology, many of who shared and many who opposed his ideas, 
as well as the profession’s policy makers and policy followers, is 
the backdrop to Chambers’ published works. His writings pro-
vide only limited insight to those ideas and their formulation. 
 The physical and electronic archiving of meticulously kept 
papers provides a unique opportunity for unfolding the back-
ground to so much previously withheld from accounting schol-
ars and practitioners. Various professional episodes in relation 
to inflation accounting, standard setting, accounting education 
reform proposals, and the like that appeared prima facie to be 
worth investigating now become feasible with evidence avail-
able in this database. That accounting historians are now able 
to explore via the internet issues that have underpinned many 
of the developments in accounting thought and practice in the 
later half of the 20th century is a fitting legacy from Chambers, 
archivist par excellence.
 This article seeks to bring to the attention of scholars world-
wide this immense, newly created historical database. As not-
ed, Potter’s [2003] overview of the Goldberg Collection reveals 
several possible research avenues that such a biographical col-
lection provides. Some possibilities from the Chambers Collec-
tion are illustrated through the following bon môts:
• Numerous unpublished formal submissions made by 
Chambers to many organizations, professional and legislative, 
over many decades appear in the Collection.
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• Multiple items reveal Chambers’ leading role in ensuring 
that accounting was accepted as a legitimate university disci-
pline. They provide insights into Chambers published works 
[1987, 1999] and those of his reviewers [Amernic, 2005; Lee, 
2005; Mattessich, 2005; Tinker, 2005]. In particular, many show 
his drive for accounting is not to be perceived as simply an in-
variant code of accepted practices or a process of learning by 
rote that is passed on uncritically to ensuing decades of stu-
dents and practitioners. 
• Augmenting the point above, influences in the area of cur-
riculum development, inquiry, and critical thinking are shown 
in the Collection to have been worldwide. 
• Further to that point, over 25 years of correspondence re-
veal the impact on Chambers of a relatively unknown U.S. ac-
counting academic, Ernest Weinwurm. Particularly revealing is 
Weinwurm’s correspondence with Chambers generally, but spe-
cifically, their deliberations on theory and measurement. Wein-
wurm apparently opened doors for Chambers into the U.S. deci-
sion sciences literature in the 1960s and an appointment to the 
Executive Committee of TIMS, the leading U.S. management 
science body.
• A fruitful episode in Chambers’ professional career is the 
virtually complete set of correspondence on the formation, pro-
fessional crisis, and alleged “conspiracy of silence” associated 
with the 1978 NSW government-appointed Accounting Stand-
ards Review Committee and its report, Company Accounting 
Standards.
• There are several larger correspondence files with some 
of Chambers’ contemporaries, each worthy of a separate study, 
for the windows they open to the development of accounting 
thought. 
• Chambers’ role in the attempts of Australia’s emerging 
professional bodies to gain university recognition is evident 
from the myriad correspondence between Chambers and pro-
fessional representatives over the period of the Collection.
• Chambers’ frustrations in founding Abacus are well doc-
umented and were the source of Wells’ [2000] account.
• Chambers’ [2000b] perceptions of a “life on the fringe” 
are evident everywhere in the Collection, as is the support from 
one of his fellow market price advocates, Sterling [1970].
• Unusual engagements, such as the observation of a lead-
ing U.K. economist, G.L.S. Shackle, who lamented that he 
had completed a major economics treatise before he had had 
an opportunity to read Chambers’ magnum opus, Accounting, 
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 Evaluation and Economic Behavior [1966], and the dialogue 
between a Melbourne mathematician examining the logic of 
Chambers’ system, contain a rich vein of interdisciplinary en-
quiry.
 But there are many more possibilities. Potter [2003] notes 
that there has been a dearth of studies of intellectual accounting 
pioneers. The Chambers, Goldberg, and other contemporaries’ 
collections certainly ensure that there should be much work to 
add to that hitherto untapped research area. Clearly, Potter’s re-
view and our brief summary above suggest that there will be 
many other projects awaiting researchers’ interest and perspi-
cacity in unravelling the lode to be mined in the R.J. Chambers 
Collection.
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Abstract: On February 19, 1942, following the attack on Pearl Har-
bor and the declaration of war against Japan, President Roosevelt is-
sued Executive Order 9066 which empowered the Secretary of War 
to exclude “any and all persons” from designated areas in the United 
States. Shortly thereafter, some 120,000 civilians of Japanese descent 
were prohibited from living, working, or traveling on the West Coast. 
By October 1942, over 100,000 “evacuees” were relocated and con-
fined to ten remote internment camps for the duration of the war.
 The War Relocation Authority (WRA) administered these camps 
and had the responsibility to feed, house, educate, and provide em-
ployment for the evacuees. This article describes the WRA’s use of ac-
counting information and situates the role of accounting within a la-
bor-process framework. It initially discusses labor-process theory and 
provides an overview of the internment episode and cooperative ac-
counting in the U.S. It then focuses on particular accounting policies, 
procedures, and reports that were used by the WRA to manage en-
terprises, monitor internment activities, and socialize evacuees with 
American capitalistic values. 
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INTRODUCTION1
 The December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor triggered the 
most racially prejudicial, federal governmental action in modern 
American history. As a response to the attack, Japanese and Jap-
anese-American civilians were forcibly relocated to internment 
camps for the duration of the war. The 1940 Census identified 
126,947 U.S. residents of Japanese ancestry, 112,353 of whom 
lived in the Western Defense Command states of Arizona, Cal-
ifornia, Oregon, and Washington. Approximately two-thirds of 
these Japanese Americans had been born in the U.S. Eventu-
ally 104,000 of them (officially called “evacuees”) were forcibly 
resettled into ten remote relocation centers (RCs), while 8,000 
others voluntarily took up residence outside the western states 
[“Notes on the Japanese in the United States,” Entry 16, box 
498, folder 79.100 #1]. While the stated rationale for relocation 
was national security, there was not one documented case of es-
pionage or sabotage by a Japanese American prior to their in-
ternment.
 From March 1942 until the end of the war, the immense-
ly complex issues associated with the control and administra-
tion of the RCs was handled by the War Relocation Authority 
(WRA), a badly understaffed governmental agency that was cre-
ated for this purpose. This article will examine the great vari-
ety of matters with which the WRA was forced to deal, ranging 
from the administration of the ten RCs, the creation of busi-
ness enterprises, and the resettlement of evacuees into employ-
ment opportunities further east. In our view, the WRA estab-
lished cooperative business enterprises, as opposed to ones that 
were WRA or privately owned, in part to monitor, manage, and 
socialize a captive population (i.e., control the labor process) 
given the WRA’s very limited resources within a wartime econ-
omy. In the context of these enterprises, as well as the WRA’s 
ongoing reporting requirements, accounting information played 
a crucial role in the internment episode. 
 The article is organized as follows. We initially discuss 
 labor-process theory in terms of exactly what it says about con-
trol and the use of accounting information. We next describe 
the cooperative enterprises that were established at the RCs. 
We then provide an overview of the internment episode, giving 
particular emphasis to some of its racial aspects. There follows 
1All primary-source records we examined are located in Record Group 210, 
Entries 1, 3, 16, 29, and 48 at the National Archives of the United States in Wash-
ington, DC.
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then a rather lengthy description of the mass of data that the 
WRA was charged to collect, either by virtue of its own deci-
sion or by fiat from higher governmental authorities. A substan-
tial amount of the documentation was prepared by WRA statis-
ticians and accountants and illustrates labor-process theory in 
action, albeit in the tightly controlled, non-market setting of in-
ternment camps. We conclude by describing how this episode 
and its use of accounting and cost-control procedures support 
labor-process theory.
LABOR-PROCESS THEORY
 According to Friedman [1978], labor process necessarily in-
volves resistance between workers and owner/managers and re-
quires that emergent administrative controls and procedures re-
sult from a dynamic process of interaction between these two 
competing groups. Labor-process theory has been helpful in un-
derstanding the interface between workplace dynamics and the 
use of accounting information. Labor process has also been the 
subject of a number of noteworthy studies by accounting and 
labor historians alike, although none of these studies examined 
cooperative businesses in controlled, non-market settings. For 
example, Nelson [1975] described the role of contractors as in-
termediaries in large, 19th century factories. Clawson [1980] 
and Hopper and Armstrong [1991] described how owner/man-
agers sought to dominate and disempower workers in early and 
mid-20th century industries. Braverman [1974] applied Marx-
ist theory to explain the inevitable workplace conflict between 
workers and owner/managers that crosses national boundaries, 
time periods, and industry settings.
 The labor-process literature of the past three decades 
has furnished considerable insight into traditional labor-
 management relationships, although interactions between Jap-
anese-American evacuees and governmental administrators can 
hardly be called “traditional.” Braverman’s Labor and Monopo-
ly Capital [1974] was the catalyst for an outpouring of support, 
revision, and rebuttal. Braverman’s history of U.S. labor con-
trol emphasized a series of devices (piece rates, internal con-
tracting, deskilling) deployed by management to exploit a ho-
mogeneous work force he perceived, in best Marxist tradition, 
to be in class conflict with capital. Later theorists have cri-
tiqued Braverman on three issues – (1) his failure to take into 
account worker resistance, (2) his assumption of labor’s homo-
geneity, and (3) his focus on the exploitative aspects of capi-
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tal (management). Gordon et al. [1982], Thompson [1989], and 
Greenbaum [1994] all wrote that the heterogeneity of the labor 
force, reflected in the diversity of its origins and its ethnic an-
tagonisms, among other factors, reduced the resistance of la-
bor towards management and kept the movement divided. 
 Another compelling argument, and one more germane to 
the Japanese internment episode, was Burawoy’s [1979, 1985] 
demonstration of the community of interests between labor and 
management that has led to a consensual voluntarism on the 
part of workers collectively. Burawoy [1985, p. 28] wrote: “His-
tory suggests, however, that the outcome of class struggle mol-
lifies the opposition of interests and frequently coordinates the 
interests of capital and labor.” This diminished antagonism has 
also been highlighted in the labor-process analyses of Littler 
and Salaman [1982] and Knights and Willmott [1990]. Certain-
ly, accounting has a role to play in making labor systems work, 
be they in captive or market-based environments. As Hopper et 
al. [1986] suggested from a Marxist perspective, the reporting 
structures of accounting and its modes of calculation provide a 
technology to harness the compliance of labor. Similarly, from 
a Foucauldian perspective, the knowledge generated from the 
accounting system permits the efficient wielding of power by 
governmental and business administrators. 
 As we illustrate in later sections of the paper, the relation-
ship between WRA administrators and the thousands of con-
fined evacuee workers and managers generally evidenced both 
cooperation and voluntarism during the three-year internment 
period.2 Thus, the next section of the paper offers a new exam-
ple to support labor-process theory – the cooperative business 
enterprises that were established at the internment camps. Also 
included are brief remarks about the history of cooperatives in 
the U.S.
COOPERATIVE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES
 On March 18, 1942, the WRA was established to adminis-
ter, maintain, and control all aspects of life at the ten perma-
nent RCs, tasks that must have appeared daunting given that the 
WRA’s top officials had no experience with mass relocations of 
2We would be remiss not to point out two major acts of disobedience that 
did occur at the RCs in late 1942: the Poston strike and the Manzanar riot. See 
Okihiro [1973] for details on these particular incidents.
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this magnitude.3 WRA administrators had to act quickly to as-
semble a staff and create policies for the housing, feeding, edu-
cating, and employment of some 100,000 detained individuals 
of all ages in communities of between 5,000 and 20,000 evacu-
ees that would be maintained temporarily, but indefinitely, un-
til the war ended. The RCs were intended to be as self-sustain-
ing as possible given the constraints of a wartime economy and 
the existing prejudice against any policy that appeared to favor 
Japanese evacuees over “native” American citizens. For exam-
ple, evacuee wage rates were capped at $19 per month so that 
they fell below the $21 that was initially paid to American mil-
itary personnel. 
 The decision to structure the centers’ business enterprises 
as cooperative associations was made in May 1942, soon after 
the WRA was established. According to Dillon S. Myer [1971, p. 
41], director of the WRA from June 1942 until the end of the 
interment, “… the WRA had hit upon a formula that it hoped 
would be a stimulant to work performance, would not be cost-
ly, and would be acceptable to the public.” Cooperative associ-
ations were a common form of enterprise and were especially 
popular in the agricultural regions of California. According to 
Kerr and Harris [1939], self-help cooperatives were first estab-
lished in the early 1930s when the federal government provid-
ed financial assistance to stimulate capital formation during the 
economic depression.4 Barter cooperatives were initially creat-
ed for services such as barber shops, sewing rooms, and crop 
distribution. They reached a peak in popularity in 1933 with 
176 different groups and over 30,000 members [Kerr and Har-
ris, 1939, p. 4]. The Wagner-Lewis Relief Act of 1933 stimulat-
ed the development of production cooperatives principally for 
baking, canning, gardening, and sewing products. In the late 
1930s, the Works Progress Administration (WPA) received gov-
ernment funding to aid cooperatives in conjunction with the 
1938 Federal Relief Act. Jones and Schneider [1984, p. 57] not-
ed over 500,000 families and 600 cooperatives had been formed 
in 37 states between 1931 and 1938, and that self-help produc-
3The names and locations of the ten sites were: Central Utah – Topaz UT; 
Colorado River – Poston AZ; Gila River – Rivers AZ; Heart Mountain – Heart 
Mountain WY; Jerome – Denson AR; Manzanar – Manzanar CA; Minidoka – 
Hunt ID; Rohwer – McGhee AR; Tule Lake – Newell CA; Granada – Amache CO.
4“A self-help production cooperative may be defined as a democratic asso-
ciation of the unemployed and underemployed who have organized to obtain 
the necessities of life through their own production of goods” [Kerr and Harris, 
1939, p. 1]. 
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tion cooperatives “represent the only major historical attempt 
by the U.S. legislature to incorporate workers’ participation in 
management into government programs.”
 By their nature, cooperatives draw on their membership for 
managers and governance, a structure ideally suited to the RCs 
because of the WRA’s limited resources, the RCs’ remote loca-
tions, the shortage of professionally trained managers, and the 
need to start business enterprises quickly to service the thou-
sands of captive persons. Further, the decision to pay most cap-
tive workers the same basic wage and to distribute a portion 
of the surplus to them were common practices among self-help 
cooperatives. In the case of the RC cooperatives, a portion of 
any surpluses generated by the enterprises above the direct costs 
for materials and the cash advanced to evacuees would revert 
back to the WRA as partial repayment for the fair value of the 
food, shelter, medical care, and other services provided by the 
government. The balance of the surplus would be distributed to 
the evacuees in the form of additional cash advances. Accord-
ing to Myer [1971, p. 41], accounting data played a critical role 
in determining the surplus: 
The policy further provided that a full accounting would 
be kept of maintenance costs on the one hand and the 
income from the sale of products surplus to the cen-
ter needs on the other, and appraisals would be made of 
the increases in capital values of land and structures.
 As mentioned, the decision to structure the RC businesses 
as cooperative enterprises was made early by WRA administra-
tors.5 Cooperatives would utilize evacuee workers and manag-
ers to produce clothing goods and provide laundry, dry clean-
ing, shoe repair, and other needed services. In a May 25, 1942 
letter, Harvey M. Coverley, assistant regional director of the 
WRA, stated that, “a definite decision had been reached to the 
effect that all consumer services on relocation centers will be 
managed by cooperative associations.” Coverley also outlined 
the guiding principles for the cooperatives [Entry 16, box 421, 
folder 69.014]:
1. All cooperatives will be owned by their members.
2. Each member will have only one vote in membership 
meetings regardless of the number of shares owned.
5Myer [1971, p. 46] noted that three different plans were considered: “(1) 
WRA management of shops and services, (2) granting of concessions to private 
operators, or (3) management by the residents on a consumer cooperative ba-
sis.”
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3. All goods shall be sold for cash.
4. Lowest prevailing market prices shall be charged.
5. A certain percentage of profits shall be set up in re-
serves for cooperative education.
6. Any profits distributed to members as dividends shall 
be in proportion to the total number of shares out-
standing and number of shares owned by each mem-
ber.
7. All labor employed by cooperatives shall be treated 
fairly.
 The WRA’s long-term policy for operating the cooperatives 
emerged from a conference in late August 1942. In addition to 
specifying the standards of organization, dividend distribution, 
and merchandise pricing, the WRA also established uniform ac-
counting procedures and a set of accounts that “should be regu-
larly audited” [Myer, 1971, p. 46]. Clearly, these enterprises op-
erated at a far lower total cost than if they had been staffed 
by non-Japanese-American employees and operated as privately 
owned canteens. Using evacuee workers also allowed the WRA 
to reduce out-of-pocket expenditures, while any work done for 
private industry (i.e., contract labor) would be charged at pre-
vailing prices.
 The WRA’s fiscal 1943 appropriation request included $4 
million for establishing cooperatives, but, according to Myer, 
this entire expenditure was best viewed as a loan that “will 
be repaid to the Government in full” [Entry 16, box 37, folder 
12.100]. Of course, the evacuees were strongly opposed to re-
paying the government for these cash advances, arguing that 
persons who had been relocated against their wills should not 
be burdened with the cost of basic services.6
 Each business cooperative (e.g., Community Enterprises, 
Inc.) was registered in the state in which each RC was locat-
ed.7 They were run by Japanese-American managers who were 
selected by the WRA for their skill and expertise, since a num-
ber of evacuees were college educated and many had experi-
ence running small businesses prior to the evacuation order. 
6According to a February 19, 1943 memorandum from Taizo Inazu, presi-
dent of the Board of Directors of the Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises: “The 
evacuees have often been reminded that it was the duty and responsibility of the 
War Relocation Authority to provide evacuees with the three essentials of living: 
food, clothing and shelter” [Entry 48, box 228, folder 69.030].
7As of December 1943, eight of the ten enterprises had been set up as coop-
eratives; another (Gila River) was in the process of reapplying for state approv-
al; and another (Heart Mountain) continued to operate as a trust [Entry 16, box 
216, folder 24.040 #4].
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These managers fell under the supervision of one or two WRA 
staff advisors and were given a monopoly (in exchange for a 
monthly rental fee) for furnishing the goods and services not 
supplied by the government. According to a typical letter from 
the head of the WRA’s Community Management Division to a 
potential supplier, “[the corporations] must follow an account-
ing system prescribed by [the] Gov; must agree to accumulate 
adequate reserves before distributing profits; and must agree 
to using a mark-up system that will permit them to operate on 
a sound business basis” [Entry 16, box 416, folder 69.010 #1]. 
According to an August 25, 1942 WRA policy statement, con-
sumer cooperative enterprises were to be given exclusive rights 
to operate at all ten RCs. The enterprises were expected to fol-
low WRA procedures for pricing, merchandising, and distribut-
ing dividends. They were also required to obtain regular audits 
of their accounts and financial reports [Myer, 1971]. Patrons 
who purchased additional shares in the cooperatives were en-
titled to receive a portion of the cooperative’s profits as divi-
dends, but only after the monthly cash advances for clothing 
(between $2.00 and $3.75 per month) had been repaid to the 
government.
 One WRA internal report indicated that as of June 30, 1944, 
a total of $1,131,740.22 in patronage rebates had been declared 
and that $580,306.23 had been actually distributed to evacuees.8 
As of December 31, 1944, there were 36,696 members out of 
an aggregate population of 80,003 that still resided at the RCs. 
There were a total of 166 shops and services, employing 1,825 
evacuees. While the number of employees may seem small, it 
should be noted that the WRA directly employed evacuees in 
mess halls, camp maintenance, police, fire, and sanitation de-
partments, and other basic services. For 1943, total enterpris-
es sales were $7.52 million, with net profit of $913,000. Corre-
sponding numbers for 1944 were $7.13 million and $910,000 
[Entry 16, box 417, folder 69.010 #4].
 Community services such as dry cleaning, beauty shops, 
barber shops, and shoe repair were among those that were 
operated as cooperative enterprises. Operating costs included 
the material cost of purchased goods, staff wages, and facility 
rental charges of either $.235 cents per square foot per year 
8There was a significant difference among the various projects as to the per-
centage of dividends actually paid. Jerome paid all it had declared ($105,036.36), 
while Poston declared $215,044.81 but paid only $39,558.41[Entry 16, box 417, 
folder 69.010 #4]. According to Myer [1971, p. 47], a total of $2,298,820 was dis-
tributed in patronage dividends out of $21,890,167 in gross revenues.
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for unheated or $.28 per square foot for heated facilities 
[WRA Administrative Manual, Entry 29, box 3].9 According to 
WRA officials, the payment of rent entitled the cooperatives to 
operate as monopolies and precluded individual evacuees from 
charging for services provided to other evacuees [Entry 48, box 
230, folder 75.000]. As mentioned, the difference between an 
enterprise’s revenues and operating costs would be distributed 
to members of the association only after the government’s cash 
advances had been repaid.
 In October 1942, the National Society of Co-operative Ac-
countants (NSCA) proposed setting up a uniform accounting 
system for the War Relocation Co-operative Enterprises for a 
fee of $15,000 or $1.50-2.00 per hour plus travel and expenses. 
The proposal was rejected by Otto Rossman of the Communi-
ty Enterprise Section of the WRA who indicated that the WRA 
planned to use in-house staff to set up its accounting systems, 
although Rossman did indicate that the NSCA would be contact-
ed for follow-up audits [Entry 16, box 416, folder 69.010 #1].10 
The decision to use WRA and evacuee staff resulted in a range 
of accounting practices that lacked uniformity and clearly hin-
dered inter-project comparability. For example, the superintend-
ent of the Community Enterprises Section in Washington indi-
cated by letter to the acting superintendent of the Gila River 
Project [Entry 16, box 416, folder 69.010 #3]:
The control and system and auditing [at Gila River] is 
the best we have seen in cooperatives. If all the enter-
prises use the same system, we can then send out com-
parative reports. This is very difficult to do with differ-
ent types of reports, as you can well imagine. 
COOPERATIVE ACCOUNTING ON THE RCS
 Evidence reveals that the WRA used comparative financial 
information to help stimulate cost efficiency and instill a spir-
it of competitiveness among the RCs despite the lack of ac-
counting uniformity. For example, the WRA prepared semi-an-
nual reports that summarized the financial performance of the 
9Rent rates were revised downward in February 1943 to the above figures in 
response to complaint letters from evacuees at the Rohwer, Manzanar, and Tule 
Lake RCs [Entry 16, box 416, folder 69.010 #3].
10All RCs except for Granada were audited by the Northwest Cooperative Au-
diting and Service Association of Walla Walla WA. Granada was audited by the 
Consumers Cooperative Association of Kansas City [Entry 16, box 417, folder 
69.010 #6]. Box 418, folder D contains multiple copies of the accounting system 
set up by Northwest.
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centers’ business enterprises and focused on key performance 
indicators. Meeting key indicators, such as a three-to-one cur-
rent ratio, also triggered cash rebates to the evacuees and thus 
served as an inducement to meet the WRA’s financial targets. 
Detailed reports were prepared regularly to assess and compare 
the performance of each center. The semi-annual report ending 
December 31, 1943 included a section on business enterprises 
that contained the current ratios for all ten RCs, ranging from 
8.83 at Central Utah to 2.09 at Tule Lake. The report included 
the following comments about the financial performance of the 
business enterprises [“Semi-Annual Report, July 1 to December 
31, 1943,” Entry 3, box 6]:
During this period an effort was made to reach a ratio 
of current assets to current liabilities of 3 to 1. By the 
end of the year most of the Enterprises had hit this ra-
tio and the others were climbing steadily toward it. Sev-
eral of the Enterprises had established such good cash 
[positions] that they were able to pay a cash rebate just 
before the Christmas season. This, of course, is a fine 
morale builder at this particular time.
 Certain evacuee officers and managers of the project co-
operatives appeared similarly concerned with meeting financial 
targets despite not having the opportunity to benefit financial-
ly. For example, while noting that the Jerome cooperative was 
compelled to dissolve despite being rated as the best performer 
among the ten center co-ops, Katsujiro Iseri, president of the 
cooperative, discussed the following financial indicators in his 
year-end summary report [“History of the Jerome Co-Operative 
Enterprises, Inc.,” Entry 16, box 427, folder 69.020]11:
According to the report of the WRA Business Enter-
prises, the ratio of operating expenses to gross sales in 
the case of Jerome Co-Operative Enterprises, in com-
parison with the other center co-ops, is the third from 
the lowest. The ratio of net savings to gross sales is the 
second highest among center co-ops. The average ra-
tio of assets to liabilities of all center co-ops is 2.95 to 1, 
but ours is 5.01 to 1, which rates ours at the top.
 
11The archives also include a set of financial reports entitled “Combined Bal-
ance Sheet and Operating Statement of Business Enterprises Operating on Relo-
cation Centers.” Each of the ten projects is listed on the same page. The follow-
ing data are included: current ratio, total net savings, average monthly sales per 
employee, average sales per capita [Entry 16, box 429, folder 69.034].
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 Once the evacuees had been removed from the West Coast 
assembly centers (ACs) and relocated to permanent camps, dis-
persing evacuees to other regions of the country became one of 
the WRA’s policy goals. The archives reveal that certain WRA 
field officials tried very hard to relocate evacuee accountants 
who worked on the project cooperatives to other cooperatives 
further east. An exchange of letters between Don Elberson, chief 
of Consumer Enterprises at the Tule Lake Project, and Merlin 
G. Miller, director of the Education Department of the Consum-
ers Cooperative Association in Kansas City, reveals the difficul-
ty in accomplishing this goal given the prejudice against Japa-
nese Americans and the resistance to employ them.12
 Despite the difficulties mentioned above, and the relatively 
small number of resettlements, relocations of accounting per-
sonnel were sufficient to cause staff shortages to the degree that 
they impacted the quality of financial reporting. For example, 
the December 1943 semi-annual report noted that, “there is con-
stant turnover of personnel which is particularly serious in the 
accounting department where financial reports have to be sub-
mitted periodically” [“Semi-Annual Report, July 1 to December 
31, 1943,” Entry 3, box 6]. Similarly, a December 5, 1944 letter 
from Charles M. Beltt, business enterprise advisor to the head 
of the Business Enterprise Section in Washington DC, stated 
[Entry 16, box 417, folder 69.010 #5]: 
As we all know, there has been a very fast turnover in 
the personnel of the Business Enterprises and in some 
instances the cooperatives have lost nearly all of their 
12On February 10, 1943, Elberson recommended three evacuees for employ-
ment. He spoke most highly for Mr. Tanaka, who, although an alien, “is very 
thoroughly Americanized” and “in terms of knowledge of accounting theory and 
practice and business organization, he has no peer on this project.” Later, in his 
three-page, typed letter, Elberson discussed the role of cooperatives in overcom-
ing the racial stereotyping that confronted skilled workers like Mr. Tanaka: “It is 
rather inconceivable to me that the employment of one of these people in an or-
ganization the size of C.C.A. could be sufficient to split your organization open 
on a racial question … It is true that the cooperative movement professes that it 
puts into practice racial tolerance where other groups merely talk about it. We, 
who attempt to sell the cooperative movement to the Japanese as an instrument 
to be used for their general welfare, have much of this point, and I feel that it 
is quite obvious that the cooperative movement itself has as much to gain from 
this as the Japanese.” Unfortunately, Elberson was not fully persuasive as Mill-
er’s February response indicates: “I, myself, am convinced by your argument, but 
this is not the case for our entire staff, and we do, here, usually work as a unit. 
Frankly, our situation is complicated by the fact that part of our staff and our 
employees come from a long mental background of the old slave-holding states 
psychology of color prejudice” [Entry 48, box 281, folder 516].
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accountants and other key employees, and they have 
been unable to fill these vacancies with qualified people. 
Beltt noted that employee turnover caused the financial state-
ments to contain errors and to lack uniformity for comparative 
purposes. This theme was frequently reinforced in the WRA ar-
chive. Emil Sekerak of Topaz wrote to Rossman in 1943, claim-
ing that the lateness of its financial statements and the RC’s fail-
ure to use the uniform reporting form were occasioned by the 
recent turnover of chief accountants three times [Entry 16, box 
417, folder 69.010 #4].
 In 1944, auditing had become so desperate in Communi-
ty Enterprises that Mr. Provinse, the head of the Division, em-
ployed George Mori, an evacuee, to travel from camp to camp 
doing auditing work. In a July 22, 1944 letter, Provinse said a 
precedent had been set for such an unusual action by the YMCA 
and the Red Cross [Entry 16, box 417, folder 69.010 #4].
 With typical care and perspicacity, Myer drafted a 15-page 
guide for the liquidation of the cooperative enterprises as ear-
ly as January 1945 [Entry 16, box 417, folder 69.010 #6]. The 
final version was dispatched to the project directors in August. 
In a September 19 memo, Rossman informed Myer that the 
accounting side of the liquidation was impossible as the “staff 
had melted away to almost nothing” [Entry 16, box 417, folder 
69.010 #6]. Nevertheless, the WRA utilized its financial reports, 
flawed as they were, to evaluate and compare the performance 
of project enterprises.
 Accounting information and financial reports also served a 
variety of managerial purposes at the RCs, including compara-
tive costing.13 Costs were also monitored to defend against the 
many critics of WRA policies and activities. For example, each 
center had to submit its planned menus to Washington for ap-
proval “to make sure that the public was adequately informed 
of WRA feeding policies and procedures” [CWRIC, 1997, p. 
163]. A June 14, 1943 letter from J.W. Clear, WRA budget and 
finance officer, to the project director at the Granada RC clear-
ly illustrates the importance of the Handbook, the level of re-
13The authors of the Handbook described its purposes thusly: “It is intended 
that the accounting records prescribed in this Handbook provide a means of pre-
paring adequate financial operating statements to permit: A substantial basis for 
budgetary estimates; adequate budgetary control; comparative operating costs 
as a tool of good management; costs of production to assist in intelligent indus-
trial planning and marketing; an adequate means of accounting for all funds ad-
vanced to the War Relocation Authority; a source for supplying information with 
a) the evacuees, b) other government agencies, c) the public.
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porting detail, and the degree of administrative accountability 
within the WRA [Entry 16, box 494, folder 72.520]: 
There should be no conflict of thought as to the prep-
aration of any monthly reports as the procedures pre-
scribed in the Finance Manual will govern all cases. We 
have, therefore, made the necessary changes in your re-
port as to the Total Number of Meals Served, etc. We 
are unable to check your figures for the daily average 
number of persons served for the month or by sepa-
rate mess halls. Will you please advise how you com-
puted the averages as shown. In the future will you also 
please support any deductions from the ‘Stores to Ac-
count For,’ which are covered by Survey Reports, by at-
taching copies of those reports to the Monthly Subsis-
tence Report.
 Because evacuee cash advances (i.e., wages) were capped 
far below comparable civilian wages, there were few economic 
incentives to induce workers to perform above minimum perfor-
mance levels.14 WRA policies initially specified that a job would 
be provided to every evacuee who was willing and able to work. 
In addition, evacuees were given food, clothing, housing, edu-
cation, and medical attention whether they worked or not, al-
though the business enterprises were required to reimburse the 
government for the allowances given to their employees.15 This 
meant that jobs were often overstaffed, and there were few pen-
alties that could be imposed for absenteeism, tardiness, or poor 
job performance. 
 In our view, the WRA responded to its charge by combining 
administrative mechanisms that included traditional, account-
ing reporting procedures, as specified in the Handbook, with a 
variety of more creative, non-market social factors that includ-
ed aspects of a less than fully democratic society. In a June 10, 
1942 memorandum to Thomas Holland, chief, Employment Di-
vision, a senior employment officer described the challenges 
confronting the WRA [Entry 16, box 492, folder 72.100]: 
14As an example of the wage disparity between Caucasian and evacuee work-
ers, the CWRIC [1997, p. 167] noted that, “a WRA librarian received $167 a 
month, while her evacuee staff received $16 a month.”
15According to the U.S. Department of the Interior [1975, p. 81], the deci-
sion to provide jobs to everyone who was willing and able to work led to “a num-
ber of glaring abuses – a great deal of overstaffing on evacuee jobs at some of the 
centers, creation of a large number of ‘boondoggling’ positions, and encourage-
ment of inertia and slack working habits among a large percentage of the evacu-
ee population.”
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In the Relocation Centers, at present, the ordinary in-
centives to work are largely lacking. The wage is small 
and the worker sees little prospect of being able to im-
prove his future position through present work or sac-
rifice. The people enjoy security of a kind but without 
freedom or future … Closely related to the lack of work 
incentives is the weak position of the Administration as 
employer. The ordinary employer holds a strong sanc-
tion over his employees in that he can terminate the 
employment and endanger the livelihood of an employ-
ee whose performance is not satisfactory to him. Con-
versely he can offer greater pay as a reward for more or 
better work. The WRA can do neither. Unless it is pre-
pared to resort to physical duress, the Administration is 
compelled to treat idlers nearly as well as the workers.
 Thus, notwithstanding the frustrations of inducing worker 
efficiency in the RC environment, the WRA staff collected ex-
tensive data on each individual worker’s job performance and 
maintained a personnel file on every evacuee who resided in 
them. They established cooperative associations as the form of 
enterprise best able to minimize costs, overcome work resist-
ance, and facilitate skill development that would enable WRA 
officials to disperse evacuees to other parts of the country. The 
WRA collected cost data as a way to stimulate efficiency in the 
absence of normal market mechanisms (layoffs, discharges, 
plant closings, etc.).
COST ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL PROCEDURES
 While many top WRA officials had administrative experi-
ence with isolated populations at the Department of Agricul-
ture or the Bureau of Indian Affairs [U.S. Department of the 
Interior, 1975, p. 83], the mass relocation of over 100,000 ci-
vilians to isolated camps must have represented an extraordi-
nary set of challenges. As a first step, the WRA had to prepare 
budget estimates and develop detailed administrative policies. 
The largest single item within the WRA’s fiscal 1943 budget of 
$70 million was an expenditure of $20 million for evacuee food 
costs. Although $.50 per person per day was the daily food al-
lowance initially proposed for the ACs, the WRA Handbook [En-
try 29, box 1, 20.2.8/9] reduced the allotment to $.45 per per-
son per day, in part because the RCs could provide foodstuffs 
from their cooperative farms. The overall cost was calculated at 
$1.20 per day for evacuees except at Tule Lake. Figure 1 illus-
trates the costing procedures that were proposed by WRA staff 
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to determine per-person food cost at the RCs. Although compa-
rable examples are not reproduced, this same level of account-
ing detail was proposed for estimating the costs of operating 
housing and sanitary facilities, laundry facilities, and the hos-
pital/dispensary. 
FIGURE 116 
Proposed Outline for Food Costs
Explanation of Accounts
10. Provision of food for evacuees other than those in hospital. Includes costs 
of food and of operation of kitchen, commissary, dining halls, and refrig-
eration and food storage facilities.
11.0 Direct Costs
 11.1 Food issued to kitchens, but not including food inventory held in 
warehouse
 11.2 Evacuee labor used directly in operating kitchen, commissary, re-
frigerator plant, etc. … but not including central office force
 11.3 Caucasian labor employed in this activity
 11.4 Freight on food issued to kitchen, but not including freight on food 
inventory
 11.5 Fuel for cooking and heating buildings and water
 11.6 Miscellaneous
12.0 Allocated Costs
 12.1 Water. A charge for water, prorated from the Center water account 
as nearly as possible on the basis of quantity consumed.
 12.2 Electricity. A charge for electric power and light, prorated from to-
tal electric power cost as nearly as possible according to consump-
tion.
 12.3 Garbage disposal. Proration as equitably as may be of total cost of 
garbage disposal for whole project.
 12.4 Trash disposal.
 12.5 Cartage. Charges incurred by WRA for cartage of food from rail-
road station to project, within project, prorated from project total 
for cartage as nearly as possible according to load.
 12.6 Office and general supervision. A pro rata charge for general office 
service not carried as a specific project expense.
13.0 Buildings: Maintenance and Repair. Includes items of a more or less re-
current nature, including labor, material, and supplies, incident to main-
taining in operating condition the buildings used for kitchens, dining 
room, and food storage, refrigeration, and preparation.
14.0 Equipment: Maintenance and Repair. [Same as above]
15.0 Investment Items. These are items of major outlay, usually recurring only 
infrequently, if at all, the cost of which must be spread over a considerable 
period rather than charged currently.
 15.1 Land cost, building construction and replacement of buildings used 
for … Includes replacement of complete units or substantial parts 
thereof, as in case of serious damage by fire or wind.
 15.2 Equipment cost, installation and replacement for …
16Letter on August 13, 1942 from Stauber, to Mr. Leland Barrows, executive 
officer, WRA [Entry 16, box 494, folder 72.520]. Stauber proposed that a summa-
ry form, based on these procedures, be prepared monthly with data reduced to a 
“per evacuee-day” cost basis. Stauber recommended a similar costing approach 
for housing and sanitary facilities, laundry facilities, and the hospital/dispensary.
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 The Finance Handbook contained WRA Form 202 – Revised 
which was entitled “Monthly Report of Administrative Mess Op-
eration” [Entry 29, box 5, Finance Handbook, 1945, Section EG]. 
This standard form was prepared at each RC and described how 
the average cost per meal was to be computed. Another state-
ment entitled “Comparative Mess Hall Food Costs” was to be 
prepared by each mess hall at a RC and was to supplement the 
center’s monthly report [Entry 29, box 5, Finance Handbook, 
1943, Sections E-G]. This supplemental report was to include 
columnar headings for the total number of meals served, the 
daily average number of rations served, the cost of food con-
sumed, the average food cost per ration, and remarks. Another 
statement, entitled “Comparative Mess Hall Labor Costs,” was 
to include columnar headings for the daily average number of 
rations served, the labor costs, the average labor cost per ration 
per month, and remarks. Clearly, these two statements served 
managerial purposes of promoting greater cost efficiency for 
mess hall operations.
 In addition to providing essential information for budgeting 
and cost control, a carefully proscribed, cost accounting meth-
odology enabled WRA officials to respond definitively to in-
quiries from the media, other federal agencies, government offi-
cials, and political critics of WRA policies. For example, data 
emanating from a comprehensive cost accounting system could 
explain the following response to an inquiry from Secretary of 
Labor Frances Perkins [Entry 16, box 494, folder 72.520]:
The policy of the War Relocation Authority, an agency 
of the Federal Government, requires payment by evacu-
ees of $4.69 per week to cover cost of food and lodging 
when such evacuees are engaged in private employment 
and taking meals and lodging on the project.
 Since a number of evacuees were well-educated and many 
had experience running groceries and other small businesses be-
fore their internment, the WRA could employ them in account-
ing positions at the centers. For example, of the 3,845 people 
listed as working at the Rohwer Center on May 11, 1943, 26 
were described as engaged in accounting activities. The fact that 
only a $3 monthly wage differential existed between the con-
troller and the lowest level clerk clearly illustrates the challeng-
es the WRA faced in creating economic work incentives. The 
breakdown of these positions is presented in Figure 2 [Entry 
16, box 495, folder 72.510].
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FIGURE 2
Occupational Titles in Use at Rohwer Relocation Center
Title Total $16  $19 Job Title Description 
Accountant, Cost 4 2 2 Prepares financial statement, audits 
books – Maintenance, Public Works, Ag-
riculture, Trans. & Supply Division.
Controller 1  1 Supervises the financial affairs of Coop-
erative  Enterprise.
Bookkeeper II 1 1  Keeps record of the business transac-
tions – Community Service.
Bookkeeper III 3 3  Keeps record and works on one phase 
of records Administration Division
Accounting Clerk 5 5  Performs the more routine calculat-
ing, typing, and posting necessary in ac-
counting – Administrative, Community 
Service, Co-op Enterprise.
Audit Clerk 3 3  Checks and verifies the figures, calcula-
tions and postings pertaining to various 
transactions Administrative Division.
Cost Clerk II 9 9  Computes the cost of a working unit – 
Public Works, Maintenance, Trans. & 
Supply, Administrative Division.
 Cost accounting methods used at the projects were also sub-
ject to periodic audit by the WRA’s headquarters staff. For ex-
ample, the project director at Gila River sent a letter to Myer 
regarding a recent audit [Entry 16, box 37, folder 12.000]. The 
letter described a number of questions that WRA officials had 
raised, but that Mr. Dodd, the project director, had channeled 
to Myer. The first question and Dodd’s response, reproduced be-
low, illustrate the comprehensiveness of the cost accounting at 
the centers:
1. How are the farm produce costs arrived at from farm 
to mess? Our cost system includes the following 
charges:
(1) direct and indirect labor
(2) materials, such as seeds, fertilizer, sprays, dust, 
etc.
(3) cost of farm employment expenses and opera-
tion
(4) transportation to and from the farm, transporta-
tion of material, and transportation of produce
(5) land and water rentals
(6) miscellaneous expenses such as evacuee office 
wages, office material, etc.
(7) salaries of appointed personnel …
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 In summary, WRA officials recognized the importance of 
maintaining detailed records that monitored costs in order to 
justify appropriation requests, promote cost efficiency, and as-
suage critics who charged that evacuees were given favored 
treatment over native citizens in regard to wages, provisions, 
and accommodations during a period of wartime shortages. As 
mentioned, many career WRA officials had cost accounting ex-
perience from prior service at the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and 
the procedures they initiated at the RCs were fully described in 
the government’s Finance Handbook. Instilling a desire among 
captive workers to work in a cost efficient manner was an en-
tirely different matter and one that required a more creative so-
lution. 
 In summary, and from a theory perspective, the decision 
to establish cooperatives and their use of accounting and cost 
controls enabled the WRA to minimize resistance and control 
the labor process in a non-market setting amidst a captive la-
bor force that the WRA could not physically compel to work. 
The next two sections of the paper reviews certain key aspects 
of the interment episode and then highlight how accounting in-
formation was used to monitor and socialize the evacuees.
 
THE INTERNMENT EPISODE: A BRIEF RETROSPECTIVE
 While the internment appears unequivocally reprehensible 
in retrospect, it is noteworthy that the injustice done to citi-
zens of Japanese descent did not go unrecognized by WRA of-
ficials. For example, a WRA booklet of May 1943, entitled “The 
Characteristics of the Project Population, A Handbook of Gen-
eral Statistics,” contained the following introductory comments 
[Entry 16, box 498, folder 79.100 #1]: 
It was about an [sic] year ago that nearly a hundred 
thousand Japanese were suddenly divorced from the 
scheme of things in American society and corralled into 
far-flung desert waste lands while the nation girded it-
self for the supreme task of winning the war. The war 
has obliterated every vestige of individual achievement 
for the whole of the Japanese. Issei and Nisei alike now 
find themselves in the bottom stratum.17
 The Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of 
17Issei were native-born Japanese who had emigrated to the U.S. after 1907 
and could not become U.S. citizens by law. Nisei were American-born, Ameri-
can-educated, U.S. citizens of Japanese descent.
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Civilians (CWRIC) was established in the early 1980s to re-ex-
amine the internment episode in detail. The CWRIC [1997, p. 
12] held 20 days of hearings, received testimonies from 750 wit-
nesses, and described the losses that were not covered by the 
Japanese-American Evacuation Claims Act of 1948 to include, 
“… the stigma placed on people who fell under the exclusion 
and relocation orders; the deprivation of liberty suffered dur-
ing detention; the psychological impact of exclusion and relo-
cation; the breakdown of family structure; the loss of earnings 
or profits; physical injury or illness during detention.”18 The 
CWRIC [1997, p. 18] also concluded that, “the broad historical 
causes which shaped these decisions were race prejudice, war 
hysteria and a failure of political leadership.” It clearly intimat-
ed that racial prejudice was a major driving force, citing Gen-
eral DeWitt’s February 1942 recommendation for forcible exclu-
sion [CWRIC, 1997, p. 6]: 
In the war in which we are now engaged racial affinities 
are not served by migration. The Japanese race is an en-
emy race and while many second and third generation 
Japanese born on United States soil, possessed of Unit-
ed States citizenship, have become ‘Americanized,’ the 
racial strains are undiluted.19 
 In terms of the actual relocation, the Wartime Civil Con-
trol Administration (WCCA) preceded the WRA and was charged 
with assembling Japanese-American civilians in 64 civil control 
stations and relocating them to15 regional centers.20 
 Several of these ACs were hastily constructed at near-
by racetracks or fairgrounds where living conditions were de-
plorable. Evacuees were fed and housed there for one to four 
18Russell Robinson, WRA chief of the Evacuee Property Division, estimated 
that the evacuees left behind $200 million worth of real, personal, and commer-
cial property when forced to leave their homes [U.S. Department of the Interior, 
1946e, Entry 1, box 1, p. 108].
19Further to this point were comments by General DeWitt that were quoted 
by the Associated Press on April 13, 1943, during a hearing of the House Naval 
Affairs Subcommittee [Entry 16, box 417, folder 69.010 #5]: “It makes no differ-
ence whether the Japanese is theoretically a citizen. He is still a Japanese. Giving 
him a scrap of paper won’t change him. I don’t care what they do with the Japs 
so long as they don’t send them back here. A Jap is a Jap.” Weglyn [1996, p. 28] 
noted that 73% of those interned were American citizens who “were imprisoned 
for no reason other than their race.” Dillon Myer, long-time director of the WRA, 
noted in a speech to the American Legion that 72% of the evacuees had never 
seen Japan [Entry 16, box 471].
20Voluntary relocation outside the WDC ceased as an option at the end of 
March 1942.
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months until permanent camps could be built. The WCCA’s pol-
icies did call for a space allowance of 200 square feet per cou-
ple, food rations not to exceed $.50 per person per day, and a 
yearly clothing allowance that ranged from $25 to $42 depend-
ing on an evacuee’s age and sex. In point of fact, the ACs spent 
on average only $.39 per person per day [CWRIC, 1997, p. 142]. 
Drinnon [1987] observed that by the end of March 1942, over 
90,000 persons were living at ACs where they stayed an aver-
age of 100 days.
 During their residence at these centers, evacuees were as-
signed a family identification number and were required to 
wear regulatory ID tags to identify each family member, their 
personal property, and every transaction involving the exchange 
of goods or services.21 An evacuee’s individuality was routine-
ly compromised by requiring everyone to eat in common mess 
halls and to use common showers, latrines, and laundry facil-
ities. 
 The internment camps were intended to be as self-sustain-
ing as possible given the constraints of a wartime economy and 
the existing prejudice against any policy that appeared to favor 
Japanese evacuees over “native” American citizens. For exam-
ple, evacuee wage rates were capped at $19 per month so that 
they fell below the $21 that was initially paid to American mil-
itary personnel. Milton Eisenhower noted that, “a storm of pro-
tests developed throughout the country about the possibility of 
the evacuees being paid any amount of money greater than the 
amount paid to American soldiers, namely, $21 a month” [En-
try 16, box 53, file 12.202]. 
 By August, 1942, the WRA’s charge also included the dis-
persal and permanent resettlement of evacuees in non-designat-
ed areas of the U.S.22 As of January 1, 1945, just under 32,000 
21Icihasi described the use of identification numbers at his AC: “The Camp 
has a population of 18,400, each of which is numbered for identification; for in-
stance I am No. 5561A, which is required for every transaction in the Camp.” 
Transactions included the purchase of clothing, medical attention, and patron-
age at camp stores and enterprises [Chang, 1997, p. 110].
22In a letter to Eleanor Roosevelt in August 1942, Myer explained the soften-
ing of the original policy [Entry 16, box 429, folder 71.100]: “We strongly believe 
that loyal American citizens among the evacuees should be allowed every oppor-
tunity and encouragement to reenter private employment or enterprise…With 
this in mind I issued about two weeks ago an instruction to our field offices cov-
ering procedures through which individual loyal American citizens of Japanese 
ancestry may be permitted to leave relocation centers to accept private employ-
ment in the middle-western States.”
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evacuees had been settled outside the RCs.23 Of these, 14,000 
had gone to the East North Central region which included Chi-
cago and 8,500 to the Mountain states. Interestingly, nearly 
1,500 had been allowed to return to the Western Defense Com-
mand, mostly to Oregon and Washington. The resettlements in-
creased significantly during 1945 when it appeared the war was 
winding down. Only 194 persons had been permitted to go to 
California precedent to 1945; subsequently, 43,181 returned to 
the state that had been the center of Japanese ethnic culture 
before the evacuation outrage [U.S. Department of the Interi-
or, 1946b, Entry 1, box 1, pp. 42-45].
 Table VI of the WPA’s semi-annual report for July 1-Decem-
ber 31, 1944 [Entry 3, box 4] provided interesting place-of-ori-
gin and occupation data for evacuees who had been granted in-
definite departure from the RCs. Of 111,170 original evacuees, 
29.4% had left the RCs. Of the 38,520 foreign-born detainees, 
only 14.23% had departed; the corresponding number for the 
72,650 native-born was 37.55%. With respect to the mobility of 
various occupational groups, it seems that those with middling 
skills were most in demand (e.g., sales/clerical 52.63%, semi-
skilled 42.51%, trained but without specific expertise 41.98%). 
Those with greater expertise followed (e.g., professional and 
managerial 37.56% and skilled 35.02%), while those without 
skills lagged behind in terms of their occupational mobility (e.g., 
unskilled 28.53%, no occupational classification, 22.10%, agri-
culture and fishing 25.19%).24 
 Although the WRA’s staff performed yeoman service in at-
tempting to place evacuees with private industrial and service-
sector firms outside the containment area, bureaucratic delays 
in determining an evacuee’s loyalty and a reluctance to hire 
workers of Japanese ancestry meant that “only a small percent-
age of the internees were able to leave the camps” and be reset-
tled [Robinson, 2001, p. 5]. Typical was a letter G. Richardson, 
head of the Community Enterprises Section, wrote to J.W. Han-
non on October 15, 1942, in which he characterized these ef-
forts in patriotic terms [Entry 16, box 416, folder 69.010 #1]:
23The WRA maintained monthly records on the relocation rate for evacuees 
per 1,000 population. Over the course of 1943, the monthly rates ranged from 
3.9 to 23.6%. These rates ranged from 7.4 to 30.4% and 12.7 to 39.1% for 1944 
and 1945 respectively [U.S. Department of the Interior, 1975, p. 211].
24These percentages are derived by dividing those on indefinite departure on 
December 31, 1944 by the original job classification identified for each evacuee 
in 1942.
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It has been determined that this problem shall be han-
dled in a thoroughly democratic, American way. The 
WRA is cooperating with both military and civilian 
agencies to enable this mass migration to proceed in a 
planned, orderly, and decent manner.
 WRA officials often described relocation and resettlement 
efforts similarly; however, their sentiments are belied by a com-
ment Richardson made trying to place Japanese Americans 
with eastern cooperative groups. He assured Mr. Lincoln, for 
instance, in a December 10, 1942 letter that “… each candidate 
would be thoroughly investigated by the FBI” [Entry 16, box 
416, folder 69.010 #1]. These “democratic” principles are also 
contradicted by the fact that evacuees who failed to answer 
the now infamous Question 28 in the prescribed manner were 
disqualified from relocation.25 However, the WRA’s community 
activities advisors may be cast in a more sympathetic light if 
one considers their efforts to “Americanize” the evacuees for a 
smoother transition to resettlement. For example they secured 
movies for educating evacuees about sections of the country to 
which they might be relocated [Entry 16, box 417, folder 69.010 
#4].
 The WRA Handbook [Entry 29, box 1, 30.5.5, 30.5.9] speci-
fied that the prime objective of the WRA’s Community Activities 
Section was to facilitate the relocation process by sponsoring in-
teraction between the evacuees and “groups typically American 
in concept.” RC residents were allowed to participate in “Japa-
nese style games, sports, and cultural activities,” but only if they 
were not specifically nationalistic. Baseball was in; Sumo wres-
tling was out. Likewise, the Community Analysis Section was 
charged with the responsibility to engineer sociological inves-
tigations and to provide programming that was geared toward 
the “assimilation of evacuees into American life” [WRA Hand-
book, Entry 29, box 1, 30.8.1B]. 
 Regardless of their personal motives towards evacuees, 
WRA officials followed the procedures and completed the stand-
ard forms that were specified in the WRA’s Finance Handbook. 
The purpose of the Finance Handbook was “to cover all phas-
es of accounting involved in the activities of the War Reloca-
tion Authority” [Entry 29, box 5, p. A-1]. Thus, the account-
ing and record keeping for both WRA-operated activities (mess 
halls, hospitals, fire and police departments, and agricultural 
25Question 28 was an oath of allegiance to the U.S. It will be discussed in de-
tail in the succeeding section.
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units, among others) and evacuee-managed cooperative enter-
prises (general clothing stores, food and drug stores, shoe re-
pair shops, watch and radio repair shops, etc.) were indicated 
in the Handbook.  
BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING
 Four decades prior to Orwell’s dating of his futuristic vi-
sion, the U.S. government had collected an astounding amount 
of data on the evacuees. Even before the WRA’s statistical divi-
sion was established, the WCCA was gathering information re-
lated to the AC phase of the relocation operation. A letter from 
M.M. Tozier to Myer reviewed the categories of information the 
WCCA was being asked to provide [Entry 16, box 498, file 79.100 
#1]. These included documentary materials taken from evacuees 
at the ACs (e.g., diaries, minutes of evacuee meetings), all AC 
newspapers, vital statistics of all evacuees, reports on AC op-
erations, daily recapitulation reports on the whereabouts of all 
detainees, etc. Subsequently, when the WRA assumed responsi-
bility, a letter sent from Myer to John McCloy, the Assistant Sec-
retary of War [December 5, 1942, Entry 16, box 498, file 79.100 
#1], requested additional information from either the WCCA or 
the War Department. The specifics of the WRA’s informational 
needs are summarized in Appendix A.
 By the end of 1942, the WRA had ceased to depend upon 
the WCCA for its statistical data. B. Ralph Stauber served single-
handedly as the relocation planning officer until he was given 
a small division (Relocation Planning) of his own in 1943, the 
result of a nine-page, single-spaced memo to Myer on Novem-
ber 7, 1942, in which he proposed a statistical division for the 
WRA. His grand design for 1943 was a “locator file” in which 
would appear a Hollerith alphabetic punch card for each evacu-
ee. These cards were to include standard demographic infor-
mation about age, gender, education, occupation, family size, 
medical history, criminal record, and RC location. However, ad-
ditional data categories about links to Japan were also main-
tained, such as years of residence in Japan and the extent of 
education received there. 
 Perhaps the most intrusive statistics were those associated 
with Japanese Americans identified as “repatriates,” either by 
virtue of an evacuee’s application to be sent to Japan and/or by 
a request emanating from the Japanese government [Entry 16, 
box 498, folder 79.100 #1]. The punch card project was so ex-
tensive and immediate that the WRA subcontracted the func-
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tion to IBM. A March 24, 1943 memo from Leland Barrow in-
formed Clear and Stauber that 30,000 locator cards had been 
completed on an initial contract of 40,000 with a final total of 
80,000 expected [Entry 16, box 498, folder 79.100 #2]. By April 
9, Stauber complained to the WRA director that the file proj-
ect had been slowed by variations in the data gathering at the 
RCs [Entry 16, box 498, folder 79.100 #2].
 Stauber’s 1942 proposal to Myer, envisioning a statistical 
division of the WRA to gather in-depth information on all RC 
operations, was approved in early 1943. These data would in-
clude the physical facilities of each, with particular attention to 
the number of available apartments for evacuee living. At the 
Rohwer Center, for example, the 1,050 single persons all lived 
in six-person units [Entry 16, box 498, folder 79.100 #1]. Agri-
cultural and industrial statistics were kept on operations and 
individuals, as were records of those evacuees who worked off 
the RCs and the payments made to them. The cost of subsis-
tence payments and clothing allowances was maintained, lead-
ing to “profit and loss” statements for each project (Entry 16, 
box 498, folder 79.100 #1).
 Additional information on evacuees included lists of visi-
tors to the RCs and those who were visited [Entry 16, box 498, 
folder 79.100 #1]; data on short and long-term leave hearings 
for educational, occupational, and relocation purposes [Entry 
16, box 498, folder 79.100 #3]; and background details on the 
characteristics of those evacuees confined to the centers’ stock-
ades [Entry 16, box 498, folder 79.100 #4]. “Gallup Poll” inquir-
ies were regularly solicited to gauge evacuee opinion on an as-
sortment of issues [Entry 16, box 498, folder 79.100 #1]. The 
WRA wanted to differentiate the attitudes of the Kibei, Japa-
nese Americans who had been educated in Japan, from the Ni-
sei and Issei. What were the characteristics of the repatriates, 
both those who wanted to emigrate to Japan and those whom 
the Japanese government had specified for return? Did evacuee 
reactions change as their internment lengthened? Were there at-
titudinal variations among the occupants of various RCs? How 
did those who sought employment relocation differ from those 
who did not [Stauber to Myer, November 7, 1942, Entry 16, box 
498, folder 79.100 #1]? Based upon these and other questions, 
an “Analysis Unit” was formed as a component of the Reloca-
tion Planning Division of the WRA. The analytical and estima-
tion activities of this unit are summarized in a letter from its 
head, Evelyn Rose, to Stauber in October 1943 [Entry 316, box 
498, folder 79.100 #3].
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 On March 7, 1944, a new handbook of statistical proce-
dures was sent by Stauber to all project directors. This resulted 
in a new reporting system which was operationalized on April 
1 [Entry 16, box 498, folder 79.100 #4]. In a letter from Stau-
ber to R.R. Best at the Tule Lake Center on April 23, 1944, the 
head of the Relocation Planning Division prioritized the infor-
mation required by the Washington office [Entry 16, box 498, 
folder 79.100 #4]. It will be seen below that Tule Lake housed 
those evacuees considered the most dangerous by the govern-
ment. See Appendix B for details of this prioritization with ac-
companying references to the new manual.
 While much of this wealth of information was amassed to 
improve the internment process irrespective of its inherent im-
morality, the outcomes did not always reflect benevolence. Myer 
wrote to Senator Holman on June 21, 1943, disclosing the num-
ber of native-born Japanese Americans 17 years and older who 
had “declined to subscribe to an oath of allegiance”; namely, 
“Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of 
America and foreswear any form of allegiance to the Japanese 
emperor, or any other foreign government, power or organiza-
tion?” The WRA had sufficient information to report that 79% 
had so sworn and 21% had refused [Entry 16, box 498, folder 
79.100 #2]. Subsequently, the wording of this infamous “Ques-
tion 28” was “rephrased to read whether they would abide by 
the nation’s laws and refrain from interfering with the war ef-
fort” [Myer speech to the American Legion, November 16, 1943, 
Entry 16, box 471]. A later statistic, reported by the U.S. De-
partment of the Interior [1946c] after the war, had only 11% of 
the evacuees declining to swear the oath.26
 The oath of allegiance, combined with information regard-
ing those Japanese Americans requesting repatriation, formed 
the basis for a heinous process known as “segregation” that ad-
umbrated the advent of McCarthyism a decade later with an ad-
ditional leavening of racism and xenophobia. Segregated at the 
Tule Lake Center were those evacuees, along with one or two 
immediate family members, who failed to respond affirmative-
ly to Question 28 and/or those viewed as potentially interfering 
26The WRA Handbook [Entry 29, box 1, 60.4.3B] was very specific as to 
which evacuees would be eligible for permanent relocation out of the camps. 
First and foremost was the need for an “unqualified affirmative” to Question 28. 
Additionally, Japanese-American male citizens were eligible only if they had not 
lived in Japan for ten years of more after age six, had not received all or most of 
their education in Japan, and had received no formal education in Japan after 
the age 15. 
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with the war effort [Myer speech to the American Legion, No-
vember 16, 1943, Entry 16, box 471].27 
 The discussion of the WRA’s data gathering efforts hereto-
fore has suggested several reasons for this time-consuming and 
expensive undertaking. In the first instance, the WRA was the 
servant of government and, as such, was required to provide 
sufficient data to demonstrate that the captive population was 
maintained efficiently and cost effectively. In some instances, 
comparative statistics from the ten RCs were required for gaug-
ing the relative competency of their individual managements. 
As an agent of government also, the WRA had to pay particu-
lar attention to those Japanese Americans whom the state per-
ceived to be the most dangerous – the Kibei, the repatriates, 
those who had declined the oath of allegiance, and those who 
were segregated.
 In other instances, the statistical collection had the poten-
tial for improving life on the RCs specifically as attitudinal data 
were gathered and analyzed. Information about the evacuees 
was provided to academics, such as Leonard Blum of UCLA and 
D.S. Thomas of UC Berkeley, for psychological, sociological, and 
statistical study. The distinguished American author and Japa-
nese-Hawaiian advocate, Edgar Rice Burroughs, requested and 
received information about evacuee mobility from the RCs to 
employment opportunities further east [Entry 16, box 498, fold-
er 79.100 #3]. Ultimately, however, it was the economic data the 
WRA collected on the cooperative enterprises operating on the 
RCs that benefited the evacuees most directly.
 The State Department had a distinct interest in the WRA’s 
statistical operations. In November 1943, the State Department 
wrote Myer to the effect that it might need detailed informa-
tion about the costs of Japanese-American detention if post-war 
negotiations took a particular direction. Stauber informed the 
WRA leadership that the Relocation Planning Division was al-
ready compiling those costs. Myer wrote to Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull on December 8, 1943: “The system of statistical 
records and cost accounts provided in the regular operating 
procedures in the War Relocation Authority appear to be ade-
quate to furnish the information requested …” [Entry 16, box 
498, folder 79.100 #3].
 A related and interesting observation was made by Myer 
27Evidence in Entry 16, box 498, folder 79.100 #3 suggests that correlations 
between Question 28 declinations and repatriation requests were made routine-
ly, even when segregation was not at issue.
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in his November 1943 speech to the American Legion when he 
averred that it was his feeling that the WRA had to do all it 
could to make life bearable on the RCs lest the Japanese mili-
tarists take retaliatory actions against American prisoners of 
war [Entry 16, box 471].
 The archive also reveals an exchange of information be-
tween the WRA and several foreign governments. A letter from 
Stauber to Hector Allard, the secretary of the Canadian lega-
tion in Washington, proposed a reciprocal exchange of informa-
tion and visitation to Canadian operations that paralleled the 
RCs [October 13, 1942, Entry 16, box 498, folder 79.100 #1]. In 
particular, Stauber was interested in hearing about conditions 
the Canadian government imposed upon employers of evacu-
ee labor. Additionally, there is evidence of the Spanish govern-
ment’s interest in the operation of the RCs and the utilization 
of a captive labor force. The repressive Franco regime is re-
puted to have employed convict labor in the aftermath of the 
Spanish Civil War. A letter from Stauber to John Provinse, the 
chief of the Community Management Division, requested data 
in preparation for a 1944 visit to the RCs by the Spanish Em-
bassy under the auspices of the State Department [Entry 16, 
box 417, folder 69.010 #5].
 We should also point out that the WRA maintained dai-
ly time reports for all evacuee workers, some 2,500 to 3,000 
at each center. A post-war conclusion with respect to their ef- 
ficiency was discouraging. Although the average working day 
was seven to eight hours of on-the-job presence, the WRA felt 
it was getting only two to three hours of performance [U.S. De-
partment of the Interior, 1946c, Entry 1, box 1, pp. 32-34]. If 
this analysis is correct, it could suggest that the cooperatives 
may have provided sufficient incentives to make them a superior 
labor control structure than the direct hiring of labor at low 
wages, which was the only recourse for the WRA. However, it 
is conceded that no evidence exists in the archives of the work 
performance of cooperative employees; thus, any comparison to 
the WRA’s direct hires in terms of their relative efficiency must 
be pure conjecture.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
 In our view, the need to house, care for, and sustain thou-
sands of captive workers in semi-permanent centers convinced 
top WRA officials that cooperative enterprises would be the or-
ganizational form that would best overcome worker resistance, 
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provide positive incentives, and promote cost efficiency in the 
non-market environment of RCs. A letter on October 9, 1942 
from E.R. Fryer, acting project director (Gila River) to Philip 
M. Glick, the WRA’s solicitor, reveals the thinking behind coop-
eratives. It is most helpful in illuminating the WRA’s underly-
ing rationales implementing this structure [Entry 16, box 495, 
folder 72.510]:
We are obligated not only by virtue of our commit-
ments but even more so by our position as guardians to 
take every possible action to maintain and, in fact, pro- 
mote economic respectability. Otherwise, not only will 
we fail in our efforts during war time to preserve hu-
man values but in the difficult post-war period we shall 
have on our hands a great American minority that shall 
have lost some of its most admirable qualities. On the 
purely practical side, industrial and agricultural enter-
prises will fail if we do not by some means make our 
people a living, vital part of them. Otherwise, each 
evacuee will generate inevitably into a $16 or $19 work-
er. Here at Gila we are about within two weeks – to 
launch a net enterprise. We certainly don’t want a rep-
etition of Manzanar – strikes, sit-downs, bitterness, 
charges and counter-charges. It is clearly within our 
power to dignify the ‘net’ enterprise. We can easily give 
it all the vitality needed. We need to make it a Commu-
nity Enterprise with the proceeds deposited into a com-
munity trust fund for the benefit of all members of the 
work corps shared in proportion to their man-days of 
work. 
 It is especially noteworthy to observe that top WRA admin-
istrators discussed the use of non-economic (i.e., social) incen-
tives as a way to stimulate evacuee work performance and bring 
vitality to the cooperative enterprises. On September 1, 1942, 
Director Myer issued Administrative Instruction No. 27 on the 
subject of Employment and Compensation [Entry 16, box 495, 
folder 72.510].28 This Instruction contained the most detailed 
policy statement to date and included such items as basic pol-
ices, compensation and work rules, employment in consumer 
enterprises and the private sector, and unemployment compen-
sation. It reaffirmed that all employment would be voluntary, 
but went on to describe the social inducements that would be 
28The CWRIC [1997, p. 167] noted: “The new policy adopted in August 
[1942] remained substantially unchanged throughout the WRA program.”
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used to promote work effort and desired behaviors. Section II, 
“The Work Relocation Works Corps and The Order of Merit,” 
and Section III, “Merit Rating Board,” are reproduced in Fig-
ure 3:
FIGURE 3
Administrative Instruction No. 27
II The War Relocation Works Corps [WRWC] and The Order of Merit
A. The Work Corps was designed to place in the hands of the evacuees an 
instrument of organization understood by the American people, and an 
organization which can focus attention on work for the public good and 
will give recognition to evacuees.
B. Each evacuee, upon first being assigned to a job, shall become there-
by enlisted in the WRWC…Upon completion of three months’ employ-
ment, if his conduct and quality and quantity of his work for that period 
are certified to the Project Director as outstanding by the Merit Rating 
Board, an evacuee may be cited by the Project Director for special rec-
ognition and be made a member of the Order of Merit which is herby es-
tablished as a unit within the WRWC. The Merit Rating Board may rec-
ommend that such merit recognition shall be withdrawn, for cause, and 
the Project Director may, upon such recommendation, terminate the 
membership of an evacuee in the Order of Merit.
C. Preferential consideration shall be given to members of the Order of 
merit in connection with leaves for private employment, assignment to 
preferred types of employment within the relocation center, promotion 
to supervisory positions, and in such other matters as the Project Direc-
tor may consider appropriate, in recognition of the superior initiative, 
efficiency, leadership and loyalty of evacuees who achieve in the Order 
of Merit.
III Merit Rating Board
A. There shall be on each relocation center a Merit Rating Board of sev-
en members, appointed by the Community Council. Members of the Ad-
ministrative Staff may serve on the Board if requested to do so by the 
Community Council. This Board may be assigned a full-time evacuee 
secretary.
B. The Merit Rating Board shall develop and install a simple work report 
to be made periodically by each supervisor for members of the Work 
Corps working under his direction. This work report shall cover quality 
of work, quantity of work, and conduct. (Attitude, punctuality, loyalty to 
the United States, etc. shall be considered as part of conduct.)
C. The Merit Rating Board shall constantly seek all proper work incentives 
by planning awards and recognition and may make appropriate recom-
mendations, from time to time, to the Project Director.
 The most interesting aspect of Instruction No. 27 is its 
 reliance on non-market factors to spur work effort and recog-
nize achievement. For example, a Merit Rating Board, com-
prised of evacuees, would evaluate the conduct, quantity, and 
quality of an evacuee’s work. Superior performance would re-
sult in membership in a select “Order of Merit,” which included 
benefits such as job promotion and leaves for private employ-
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ment outside of the center. In essence, therefore, cooperative as-
sociations provided a structure for labor control through peer 
monitoring and evaluation.
 Another point of interest in Instruction No. 27 is the call 
for evacuees to demonstrate loyalty and patriotism to the U.S. 
In retrospect, the idea that captive workers would be expected 
to express loyalty to their captors seems almost ludicrous, but 
Japanese Americans were widely mistrusted in the early 1940s 
and were subjected to frequent and overt acts of racial preju-
dice, especially in the months immediately following Pearl Har-
bor. WRA officials believed that displaying acts of loyalty to the 
war effort, such as putting forth a full-day’s work effort and lat-
er volunteering for military service, would help the evacuees ob-
tain employment and join the mainstream of American life.
 In essence, evacuees had far fewer options than native 
workers in utilizing their labor power despite severe wartime la-
bor shortages. Evacuee wages were capped; evacuees were forc-
ibly relocated and detained at remote locations. They were un-
able to pursue other opportunities to leverage their bargaining 
position in regard to wages and work conditions. On the other 
hand, evacuees were not slaves or convicts, and they could not 
be physically compelled to work, in part because of the gov-
ernment’s intent to abide by the terms of the Geneva Conven-
tion.29 Evacuees were provided with basic necessities whether 
they worked or not, so the economic motives for work effort 
(e.g., resources necessary for food, clothing, and shelter) were 
essentially nonexistent.30 Given these unique circumstances, the 
29Glick discussed the reasons against work compulsion: “It is probably im-
possible to compel Japanese to work against their will. While their detention can 
be shown to relate to the National safety as a war measure, the product of their 
work would be in no different category from the standpoint of war need than the 
product of the work of any other American citizen. Furthermore, it would be un-
wise to attempt to compel them to work in view of present negotiations between 
the State Department and the Japanese Government, under which the Geneva 
Convention of 1929 regarding treatment of prisoners of war would be extended 
to civilian internees and under which the compulsory labor of civilian internees 
would be prohibited. It is not expected that the lack of authority to compel labor 
will be a practical obstacle in view of the administrative devices of preferential 
treatment that can be used” [Entry 16, box 225, folder 31.000].
30A February 19, 1943 memorandum from Taizo Inazu, president of the 
Board of Directors of the Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises, to Dr. William. J. 
Bruce, superintendent of the Consumer Enterprises Division, listed ten points 
 indicating why the WRA should lessen the financial burden on cooperatives. 
Point number 6 reveals the incentive problems the WRA constantly faced: “It is 
felt by the residents that the Cooperative is a division of the WRA set-up to serve 
the interests of the residents” [Entry 48, box 228, folder 69.030].
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WRA felt that cooperatives would be the most effective and cost 
efficient way to control the labor process. Philip M. Glick, so-
licitor of the WRA, described why cooperative enterprises were 
selected [Entry 16, box 225, folder 31.000]:
The lack of power to compel Japanese to work without 
their consent may not, however, be a serious obstacle to 
carrying out the Authority’s plans for work programs. 
Most of them will likely prefer work to idleness, par-
ticularly where an increase in income is assured. The 
Authority can provide other inducements. Coopera-
tion in the work program as a sign of patriotism and 
loyalty can be stressed. It can be rewarded through 
various types of awards, insignia, or preferential treat-
ment. Lack of cooperation can be discouraged through 
various administrative devices, including, if necessary, 
withdrawal of privileges and denial of more than bare 
subsistence.
 Ultimately, a full understanding of the success of the WRA 
cooperative associations transcends both labor process and ac-
counting, lying instead with both the culture of the Japanese-
American community and the demands of a wartime economy. 
Rather than sustaining resistance that would have caused any 
managerial system to fail, Japanese-American evacuees general-
ly portrayed a voluntarism that reflected itself in a commitment 
to hard work and a patriotism in light of the severest adversi-
ty best exemplified by the 442nd, the most decorated battalion 
of American soldiers in World War II, whose bravery belied the 
atrocities committed by the American government against civil-
ians who shared their ethnicity.31 
 We are unable to conclude that the WRA’s policies, includ-
ing the decision to establish cooperative enterprises, were inor-
dinately successful. However, the evacuees’ spirit of voluntarism 
and active support of cooperative associations enabled WRA 
 officials to act relatively humanely towards the detained Japa-
nese civilians, although these officials were not immune from 
obtaining benefits from the wage ceiling which was imposed 
on evacuees.32 The few documented cases of civil disobedience 
31Myer, in his speech to the American Legion, mentioned the exemplary ser-
vice record of the 442nd [Entry 16, box 471].
32For example, a letter on April 13, 1943 from Paul A. Taylor, project director 
(Jerome), to D.S. Myer (subject: rates for personal services of evacuees working 
for the appointed personnel) is most revealing [Entry 16, box 495, folder 72.500]: 
“The appointed personnel at the Jerome Project have expressed a need for the 
services of a few evacuees to work in their homes as housekeepers, cooks and 
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and the evacuees’ willingness to staff key managerial positions 
despite receiving wages far below market suggest that coopera-
tive associations enabled the WRA to use non-economic in- 
centives and to avoid physical punishments that typified earli-
er captive worker environments. That said, it is impossible to 
parcel out the impact of the cooperative business structure on 
the response of the Japanese-American evacuee population to 
their forced confinement.
 We can conclude, however, that the accounting informa-
tion and control procedures played a critical role in the intern-
ment episode. The WRA had to justify its policies continually 
and publicly and to minimize expenditures during a period of 
severe wartime shortages. The Finance Handbook contained the 
set of templates for recording transactions and creating reports 
that enabled top officials to compare the centers’ performance 
and monitor their operations. Compiling average daily meal cost 
figures and creating an elaborate system of repayment for gov-
ernment advances are two examples of the procedures which 
promoted cost efficiency. Thus, in conjunction with the social 
mechanisms associated with cooperative business enterprises, 
accounting played a key role in the management and adminis-
tration of the RCs.
 We would not be relating the full story of the Japanese-
American evacuation unless we provide the WRA the opportu-
nity to deliver its final verdict on the relocation program that it 
directed [U.S. Department of the Interior, 1946d, Entry 1, box 
1, p. 99]:
While some of the evacuees will never recover from 
the bitter experiences of the evacuation, the Authori-
ty is convinced that because of the industry and integri-
ty of the Japanese American, they will quickly build for 
themselves a better social and economic pattern than 
they had before the war.
nurse maids. I would like authorization for an acceptable full and part-time rate 
that the appointed personnel should pay for this service. I would suggest that a 
rate be established on the following basis:
 (192 Hour Basis)
 Per Hour Per Month
 $.0833 (A) 16.00 – wage paid to evacuee worker 
    by appointed personnel
  .1510 (B) 19.00 – subsistence ) Paid by
   3.50 – clothing allowance ) appointed
  (B) 6.50 – quarters ) personnel
   –––– ) to WRA
 $.2343  $45.00 – Total paid by appointed personnel”
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 It is our conviction that with these words the WRA was put-
ting a much too favorable spin upon the whole relocation ep-
isode, which remains one of the most shameful events in race 
relations in the recent history of the United States. The best 
that can be said for the WRA’s participation is that the record 
seems to indicate that the agency generally did the best it could 
to make the process as palatable as possible for the oppressed 
ethnic minority. Yet, it cannot be forgotten that the WRA was 
an arm of the government and the military establishment that 
had orchestrated this abomination.
 In conclusion, we believe that there are innumerable oppor-
tunities to extend this line of research and examine the role of 
accounting for repressed or captive workers in other non-mar-
ket settings. One of the most intriguing areas for study is the 
accounting for convict labor which was common in Australia 
in the mid-1800s and throughout the U.S. South after the Civil 
War and well into the early 1900s. Many interesting questions 
arise regarding leases of human capital. For example, how were 
these leases structured? What role did accounting play in jus-
tifying punishments for failing to meet predetermined task lev-
els? What kinds of accounting information were used by outside 
contractors who supervised production and marketed convict-
made goods? Answering these and related questions will illu-
minate accounting’s role in controlling the labor process of re-
pressed and/or captive workers.
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APPENDIX A
Information Requested by D.C. Myer from the War Department  
(January 1943)
A) Records or Documents Concerning the WCCA Program
1) AC populations (age, sex, occupation, family size, place of original resi-
dence, place of origin, RC to which sent
2) daily recapitulation reports (nos. 1-12, 44-46, 52-54, 113, 127, 133-34, 
any issued after 142
3) addresses of individual evacuees at different stages of the program
4) property records of the WCCA covering assistance to evacuees in con-
junction with property management and disposal in cooperation with 
the Farm Security Administration and the Federal Reserve Bank of San 
Francisco
 5) social data registration schedule (WCCA Form S-3)
6) copies of records, correspondence, applications, or declinations related 
to repatriation
7) vital statistics during the assembly center stage
8) information on sick, insane, deaf, dumb, blind, crippled evacuees
9) case records of evacuees hospitalized or other medical treatment at the 
ACs
B) Reports or Information Concerning Individual Evacuees
1) visitor-visitee file kept by WCCA
2) individuals sent to RCs from ACs ahead of schedule and reasons
3) individuals released from ACs and reasons
4) information about transfers to reunite families
5) records of those with a “shady past” or those who obstructed administra-
tion, or those with “bad performance at ACs
6) names of students given leave and institutions attending
7) evacuees from Alaska and reasons for evacuation
C) Reports or Information on Special Situations or Conditions
1) report on Santa Anita riot – causes, names, actions taken
2) other specific difficulties in ACs or RCs
D) Information Concerning Physical Facilities and Plant Operation
1) reports of engineers on facilities at RCs (sewers, electricity, water) – ade-
quacy 
2) information on equipment and supplies
3) relief grants and clothing allowances pending at time of transfer from AC 
to RC
E) Observations or Comments on Various General Phases of AC Operations
1) reports of the WCCA on the entirety of assembly centers operations
2) evacuee governance at assembly centers – recent shift from self-govern-
ance (discontinued) to advisory councils, why the change, conditions 
that led to the change
3) most cooperative and uncooperative groups or organizations of evacuees 
at the ACs  
4) offenses committed and how they were dealt with 
Source: letter from Myer to John McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War [January 5, 
1943, Entry 16, box 498, folder 79.100 #1]
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APPENDIX B
Principal Items or Classes of Information Needed  
by the Relocation Planning Division
1a. Material called for in the manual regarding the Census of March 31 (manual 
50.8.6)
1b. Population distribution by age, sex, citizenship at 3 months intervals back to 
the beginning of the project
2. Current population reports daily, weekly, and monthly (manual 50.8.2-5)
3. Special information incident to clarifying and correcting records, and clari-
fying of particular evacuee cases, etc.
3a. Queries from the Central Utah Laboratory to facilitate completion of our 
Central records
3b. Listing of unauthorized residents of Tule Lake for purpose of clarifying sta-
tus through interview, hearings, etc.
3c. Cleaning up the residual of incomplete repatriation applications
3d. Supplying corrected lists of seasonal leaves transferred or pending to other 
projects
4. Completing lists of aliens in residence, particularly those transferred to Tule 
Lake in the segregation movements.
5. Maintaining a current integrated set of records including a locator file, an 
evacuee case file, and special records (manual 50.8.1 B(4))
6. Consultative services to Project offices, including review of monthly reports 
for accuracy, completeness, and comparability of statistical data (manual 
50.8.8)
7. Analysis services, analysis and interpretation of statistical data pertaining to 
evacuees (manual 50.8.7).
7a. Analysis of repatriation applications, giving classification by such factors as 
age, sex, citizenship, year and method of entry into the U.S., residence and 
schooling in Japan, etc.
7b. Information concerning stockade residents (many information categories 
specified)
7c. Kibei: the number of the so-called “1940 Kibei,” that is, Kibei who are un-
married, whose families are not in the U.S. since 1935, by age, sex, years in 
Japan, number requesting repatriation, etc.
7d. Inductees
7e. Project employment – distribution of employment – number of families hav-
ing one or more wage earners – relation of employment status to welfare 
load – nature and origin of welfare relief cases (drawn predominately from 
what groups)
8. Auxiliary reports
8a. Check list of segregee movements to Tule Lake, giving dates of each move-
ment and number transferred, by age (under and over17), sex, citizenship, 
reason for segregation
8b. Check list of non-segregee movements out of Tule giving date, and number 
of  evacuees, by age (under and over 17), sex, and citizenship
8c. Prompt return of receipted train lists
Highest priority items are identified as 7c, 7b, 7d, and 7a in that order. 7e will 
take time with immediacy depending upon project considerations. 1a, 1b, 2, 5, 6, 
and 8c are to be handled routinely. 3 is to be handled as circumstances require. 4 
must be kept completely current to meet commitments. 8a and 8b are small jobs. 
8c must be dealt with promptly.
Source: Stauber to Best, April 28, 1944 [Entry 16, box 498, folder 79.100 #4]
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Abstract: This comment on a recent contribution by Fleischman and 
Radcliffe [2005], entitled “The Roaring Nineties: Accounting History 
Comes of Age,” specifically deals with their cautionary comments 
on the general condition of accounting history research in the U.S. 
around the close of that decade. The author contends that public in-
terest in accounting’s past is currently strong, especially following the 
recent corporate scandals and audit failures in the U.S., and points 
out that accounting history research projects which are of relevance 
to policy makers and regulators are likely to be both funded and, ac-
cordingly, recognized. 
 Dick Fleischman and Vaughan Radcliffe have rendered a 
timely, interesting, and well-written account of an action-packed 
decade in accounting history research and publication which 
has been captured by the colorful title “The Roaring Nineties: 
Accounting History Comes of Age” [Fleischman and Radcliffe, 
2005]. Readers of this contribution gain a strong sense that ac-
counting history, as a field of scholarly endeavor, is more pop-
ular than ever before. Indeed, the authors stated, “it was only 
in the last decade of the 20th century that a substantial expan-
sion and maturation of its research agenda occurred” [Fleis-
chman and Radcliffe, 2005, p. 61; see also, Walker, 2005]. The 
underlying level of enthusiasm in the field, as is manifest within 
the article itself, is equally evident in recognizing the fact that 
this contribution appeared in the Accounting Historians Journal 
within five years after the end of “the roaring nineties” (1991 
to 2000). 
 Notwithstanding the generally positive tone described 
above, the final section of the article, entitled “concluding re-
marks and a cautionary word,” refers to an ominous cloud on 
the horizon of accounting history research and publication in 
the U.S. [Fleischman and Radcliffe, 2005, pp. 82-86]. Indeed, 
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the authors argued that “the field’s prospects in the U.S. seem 
to be diverging from the promising conditions seen in much of 
the rest of the world” [p. 83]. According to Fleischman and Rad-
cliffe [2005, p. 84], “conditions in the U.S. are significant for re-
searchers worldwide, not only because history is threatened in 
one jurisdiction but because that jurisdiction has proved to be 
an influential model in both the practice and study of account-
ing.” 
 Without desiring to re-examine the difficulties being faced 
in the U.S. by accounting history, as discussed by Fleischman 
and Radcliffe, it is useful to summarize the recent adverse in-
dications. These include the apparent exclusion of accounting 
history from major U.S. journals; the failure to renew the pro-
fessoriate in this field; the disinclination of accounting depart-
ments to provide doctoral training in the field; and the declin-
ing U.S. membership of the U.S.-based Academy of Accounting 
Historians.1 In their final sentence, Fleischman and Radcliffe 
[2005, p. 86] almost worryingly stated a hope that the roaring 
nineties “will not also be regarded as ending with the quiet but 
discernable death of accounting history in the U.S.” (emphasis 
added). In sharing this hope and also in supporting the authors’ 
portrayal of accounting history in a broader international con-
text, the following brief comments are made in the interest of 
furthering discussion and debate on the trends identified.
 Is interest in accounting history at or near death in the 
U.S.? Looking in from the outside, and acknowledging the dis-
advantages this external insight may provide, the present an-
swer is almost certainly a negative one. Why is this so? It is 
because never before in the U.S. has there been such a strong 
public focus on accounting and audit from the early 2000s when 
“a raft of corporate scandals highlighted how auditors failed to 
blow the whistle on financial reporting frauds, such as Enron, 
WorldCom and HealthSouth” [Parker, 2005b, p. 12], and which 
brought the dramatic demise of Arthur Andersen. Should any 
readers wish to find out more about such happenings, venture 
to a cinema complex near you and watch the movie Enron: The 
Smartest Guys in the Room or read one or more of the almost 
endless array of books on such major corporate collapses and 
the related accounting and audit debacles. These spectacular 
happenings and the associated reforms made to the regulation 
1At the time of writing, the author was a trustee of the Academy of 
Accounting Historians. All views expressed in this paper are the personal views 
of the author and may or may not be supported by the Academy. 
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of accounting and audit in the U.S., along with activities within 
the accounting profession generally, have stimulated an industry 
of accounting watchers, commentators, and authors. Many au-
thors of this genre have taken an historical perspective in pre-
paring their works, including those who have focused attention 
on accounting practices, accounting firms, and, more generally, 
the accounting profession.
 The writer, for instance, has recently reviewed in an ac-
counting journal two books which take an historical perspec-
tive in examining the recent U.S. events. The first of these two 
books is entitled Unaccountable: How the Accounting Profession 
Forfeited a Public Trust by Brewster [2003] [Carnegie, 2005b]; 
the other is Inside Arthur Andersen: Shifting Values, Unexpected 
Consequences by Squires et al. [2003] [Carnegie, 2005a]. There 
are many other books of this ilk or similar [see, for example, 
Jeter, 2003; McLean and Elkind, 2003; Toffler and Reingold, 
2003; Wood, 2004; Eichenwald, 2005; Skeel, 2005].
 It is true, of course, that such authors are almost always 
not accounting academics in leading universities with long lists 
to their names of refereed articles on the historical development 
of accounting. Yet, authors of this genre are typically experi-
enced writers who seem to rely heavily on the official histories 
of firms, such as Arthur Andersen, and/or classic accounting 
history texts, such as A History of Accountancy in the United 
States: The Cultural Significance of Accounting by Previts and 
Merino [1998] and The History of Accounting: An International 
Encyclopaedia, edited by Chatfield and Vangermeersch [1996], 
as well as, in a number of cases, oral history interviews and 
recollections of their experiences by leading accounting profes-
sionals. Classic texts on accounting’s past at least summarize, 
in a convenient form, the relevant accounting history research 
which underpins their preparation. 
 Books released for the mass market of the kind described 
by non-accounting historians are typically interesting and easy 
to read. They would surely not have been published unless there 
was sufficient commercial interest in their preparation. And so, 
there presently exists commercial interest in historical perspec-
tives on accounting and audit in the U.S. There is also greater 
oversight of accounting and audit in the U.S. than ever before 
as a result of the disasters which have sparked this unprece-
dented popular interest in accounting’s past.
 What are the research topics that are occupying the minds 
of U.S.-based members of the Academy of Accounting Histori-
ans? It is very difficult to submit any authoritative response to 
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this question. One way of gleaning some fragmentary evidence, 
however, is to examine the program of the 2005 Research Con-
ference of the Academy which was held in Columbus, Ohio dur-
ing October 6-8, 2005.2 Among the concurrent research papers 
presented, only one research paper was identified which direct-
ly addressed the issues which are effectively selling books, such 
as those written by Brewster [2003] and Squires et al. [2003]. 
The single paper is entitled “Neo Liberalism, Deregulation and 
Financial Reporting Abuses during the Last Two Decades in the 
United States” by Merino et al. [2005]. At the time of writing, 
no articles of this genre have appeared in the Academy’s jour-
nal, the Accounting Historians Journal.
 It would appear that the calamity which has besieged the 
accounting profession in the U.S., with implications for the ac-
counting profession worldwide, and which has occupied many 
non-accounting historian authors has yet to exercise a discern-
able impact on the research agendas of many, if not most, U.S. 
accounting historians. And yet, accounting and other policy 
makers and regulators in the U.S. are likely to be at least in-
terested in being acquainted with rigorous and robust research 
findings which assist them in their analyses of issues and in 
formulating policies and/or rules and even in identifying past 
accounting solutions that may be relevant to current problems. 
Are prominent and even exciting research opportunities being 
identified and realized by Academy members in the U.S.? If not, 
perhaps U.S. accounting academe is failing, at least in part, to 
fulfill a vital role in the U.S. economy and society and, there-
fore, to realize its potential for the nation and beyond.
 It is to be hoped that research within institutions of higher 
education, including accounting research, is responsive to what 
goes on in the world. Many scholars at least hope that their 
research will assist in shaping public opinion and even lead to 
changes in behavior in society. The popular commercial interest 
in the history of accounting will hopefully translate into great-
er receptivity towards history by the U.S. accounting research 
community. Fear of failure to sharpen up to society’s expecta-
tions and needs may even persuade the editors of capital-mar-
kets journals and their followers, in particular, to become more 
interested in, or at least tolerant of, the important insights that 
can be provided by rigorous historical investigation and analy-
sis in accounting. If not, claims that such research groups live 
2A copy of the conference program is found at the following site: http://fish-
er.osu.edu/acctmis/hall/conference/ (site visited on October 18, 2005).
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in their own world as self-perpetuating institutions may become 
increasingly valid in the aftermath of the recent major account-
ing shocks in the U.S. [see, for example, Lee, 1995, 1997; Wil-
liams and Rodgers, 1995]. 
 Of course, it may be argued that any emerging focus by ac-
counting historians in the U.S. on corporate failure is not sus-
tainable as the accounting profession is now beginning to regain 
public trust in that country [see, for example, Parker, 2005a, 
b]. However, the outgoing chairman of the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), William McDonough, is 
cited as stating that “‘investors’ faith in the accuracy of audit-
ed published statements has not been fully restored” [Parker, 
2005b, p. 12]. According to McDonough, the alleged securities 
fraud at Refco indicates “there is much work still to be done” 
[Parker, 2005b, p. 12]. Indeed, the work of the PCAOB has 
shown that there are still, in the reported words of McDonough, 
“significant difficulties” in the dependability of certain auditing 
work being undertaken in the U.S. by major international ac-
counting firms [Parker, 2005b, p. 12; see also, Norris, 2006]. 
Unlike previous rounds of corporate failure in the U.S., where 
the accounting profession has experienced scrutiny which then 
subsided, this round of intense scrutiny has never been strong-
er and will not be completely shaken off if ever, until leading 
companies are no longer regularly required to restate their ac-
counts through the work of the PCAOB.
 Increasingly, research in higher education institutions is be-
ing measured in convenient and supposedly reliable ways. One 
key way of quantifying research productivity is by means of 
measuring the amounts of direct funding which academics re-
ceive, if any, for their proposed research projects from public 
and other funding bodies [Carnegie and Napier, 2002, p. 711]. 
Around the globe, accounting historians in at least some coun-
tries are becoming increasingly conscious of the need to seek 
external funding for their research activities, and there is evi-
dence to suggest that certain scholars are becoming well versed 
at obtaining competitive research funds to assist in financing 
their accounting history research on a variety of topics, includ-
ing corporate collapse and audit failure. This should be rec-
ognized as a positive trend for accounting history research in 
an international context rather than a perceived threat to the 
field.
 The growing need to seek and attract such research funds 
by means of competitive grants, especially in terms of establish-
ing or maintaining the visibility of research groupings or com-
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munities, appears to be no less urgent in the field of account-
ing history than in the U.S at this time. Accordingly, U.S.-based 
Academy members should aim, where possible, to make their 
research more visible, and perhaps by necessity of more rele-
vance to economy and society, by seeking available financial 
support from public and other funding agencies in the coun-
try. There is an old adage: “What gets measured gets done.” In 
the modern era of academe, “what gets measured gets recog-
nized.” Through increased recognition, the field will prosper in-
ternationally.
 Presumably, recognition is what accounting history re-
search and publication in the U.S. currently needs most of all. 
If that recognition comes in line with the current enhanced 
levels of public interest in the field as outlined above, at least 
some other problems, as elucidated by Fleischman and Rad-
cliffe [2005, p. 85], will tend to be addressed, if not tempered in 
due course. The so-called problematic organization of the field 
in the U.S. may be perceived as less of a concern should ac-
counting history research and publication gain enhanced recog-
nition and even contribute to the shaping of public opinion on 
a scale not yet experienced. Such things, of course, are much 
easier said than done! Predicting the future is not the aim of 
this exercise. Notwithstanding, the perceived threat to account-
ing history in the U.S. can equally be perceived in more posi-
tive terms, if not as an opportunity, in the current climate.
 This contribution will hopefully generate further discussion 
and debate on the subject. If so, such contributions may assist 
in demonstrating that accounting history research is essential 
in augmenting our understanding of accounting’s past and pres-
ent both in and beyond the U.S. Irrespective of where histori-
cal accounting research is undertaken, “explanations adopting 
a historical perspective will help us to understand the nature 
of accounting change and its impacts on organizational and 
social functioning, as well as enabling us to appreciate better, 
and thereby effectively critique, the accounting of today” [Napi-
er and Carnegie, 1996, p. 6; see also Carnegie and Napier, 1996; 
Previts et al., 1990, pp. 3-8].
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Vaughan S. Radcliffe
UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO
“IT’S OYSTERS, DEAR!” PROFESSOR 
CARNEGIE’S PRESCRIPTION AND 
THE SEEMING FATE OF ACCOUNTING 
HISTORY IN THE UNITED STATES
 It is always a thrill to find someone who is familiar with 
one’s work. I well recall the time that someone first came up to 
me at a conference and advised that she/he had read my work 
during Ph.D. studies, had thought it marvelous, and so on. I 
will not embarrass the colleague in question by naming names; 
suffice it to say that he/she is now a well-known academic at an 
institution not far removed from my own. The question, I sup-
pose, is, who should be more embarrassed in reviewing such 
a navigation of the tropes of conference life, the then student 
bent on making a good impression or the lonesome academic 
who so very much wanted to believe what was being said?
 It was with a frisson of excitement therefore that I found 
that our good colleague Garry Carnegie had penned a response 
to the recent review paper written by Dick Fleischman and my-
self. I have not had a comment on a paper come quite so soon 
before, and so there were loud echoes of that first conference 
encounter and exchange of familiarity in work when I first 
heard of this note. Unfortunately, the frisson of excitement is 
gone, and the familiarity with the work in question seems dis-
tant. Whether more or less distant than that of my earlier in-
terrogator is for the reader to decide.
 Carnegie starts well enough with a strong précis of argu-
ments made in the piece regarding the seeming decline of ac-
counting history in the U.S. He notes a series of factors includ-
ing the apparent exclusion of accounting history from major 
U.S. journals, a failure to renew the accounting history profes-
soriate in the U.S., the lack of available doctoral training in the 
U.S., and the declining U.S. membership of the Academy of Ac-
counting Historians. Carnegie lists these factors without appar-
ent disagreement and then wishes to share in the hope that the 
authors, Dick and I, came to in wanting not to believe that the 
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nineties might become known as ending with the “quiet but dis-
cernable death of accounting history in the U.S.” Carnegie men-
tions that he added the emphasis here, but in a way he need 
not have; the original manuscript used the term “death rattles” 
but as with any co-authorship, a more measured colleague (in 
this case Dick) called on a less measured colleague (in this case 
me, I admit) to cool it. So death rattles might have been too 
strong, but a sense that the end of the 1990s marked a tipping 
point in the trajectory of U.S. accounting history seems to hold 
true.
 In a way, I wish I had not cooled it for the sounds of the 
death rattles are, quite honestly, clearly there in each of the 
gatherings of friends that constitute the Academy of Account-
ing Historians’ annual research conferences and in the lovely 
ice cream socials held at the annual meetings of the American 
Accounting Association.1 I say this despite the promising in-
clusion of accounting history in the body of the AAA’s annual 
meeting program even though this comes under the delightful 
title of “History, Integrative and Other.”2 So next on to Carne-
gie and to the other.
 What is Professor Carnegie’s prescription to cure that which 
ails the accounting history academy in the U.S? It is to write 
popular works of the type he lauds in his text (e.g., Parker, 2005; 
Brewster, 2003; or Squires et al., 2003). In other words, a blast 
of populism should show the public interest benefits of a keen 
understanding of accounting history and should allow us all to 
join friend Carnegie in his belief that answer of whether ac-
counting history in the U.S. faces death should be overwhelm-
ingly “negative.”
 Where to begin? An immediate observation would be that 
a similar prescription of populist appeal is hardly of attraction 
or interest to capital market researchers, agency theorists, or 
others who toil in their allotments within the AAA’s intellect- 
1A disclaimer is due here; I have served as a trustee of the Academy, but 
do not speak for this fine body in any formal capacity. These views are strict-
ly my own; furthermore, I have good reason to believe that these views are dif-
ferent from those of my co-author on the “Roaring Nineties,” Dick Fleischman. 
As always, Dick’s sense of propriety is strong, and so he insisted he not be an au-
thor on any reply. This means Dick is never found suspect of self-dealing given 
his service to the Academy as editor of the Accounting Historians Journal. It also 
means that his younger and more naïve or doleful co-author has free rein to ex-
press just why Professor Carnegie’s prescription seems so unlikely to cheat fate 
for the Academy and its friends.
2Either the AAA’s staff has been reading sophisticated social theory or dis-
cussion of the other happened by some curious chance at the keyboard.
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ual array. So in that sense, we are different people with a differ-
ent lot.3 A further observation, and as a trained field research-
er who combined this with historical work that did not quite 
meet the 30-year rule alluded to by Carnegie (and so had a 
closer link to practice, or a “history of the present,” something 
Carnegie seems to like) I would simply say, there is no substi-
tute for lived experience.
 Not even the academic tourism of the conference circuit can 
fill in for the lived experience of trying to plough one’s furrow 
as an accounting historian in the unforgiving ground of contem-
porary North American business schools. Remember that North 
American Ph.D. graduates are now very rare with some 90 per 
year seeming to be the prevalent count. Precious few of these 
have the interest or training to engage in accounting history, 
and, candidly, this observation alone, together with the demo-
graphic profile of active Academy members, assures that pow-
erful demographic forces are bearing down to shape the future 
of academic accounting history in the U.S.
 But beyond this, Professor Carnegie’s prescription contains 
a sense of the willed disbelief of that initial encounter and ex-
pression of familiarity with work, which now seems so long 
ago. Surely, we want a field to succeed if we have worked long 
and hard with its problems. We look for that success or at least 
continuation with the fervor of a drowning man grasping for 
aid. And yet wanting this does not mean that it is true. At the 
simplest level, a renewed public interest in accounting does not 
necessarily equate to a popular interest in accounting history. As 
Carnegie notes, this is all easier said than done. Even the most 
talented accounting historian seems unlikely to crack the best 
seller lists. Indeed, it is telling that, as Carnegie himself notes, 
the public works he admires work at a distance, several times 
removed, from the accounting history he claims are their basic 
source. Furthermore the authors of such work are “almost al-
ways not accounting academics.” In this sense, the Carnegie pre-
scription seems to recognize its fallacy even within itself and in 
its own terms. Wishing for a new and more publicly embraced 
3Populism is not needed to ensure their continued sense of purpose given 
that it is adherents of such work that overwhelmingly handle the levers of con-
trol within American accounting academe. These colleagues seem unmoved by 
the shriller aspects of positive accounting theory, and certainly seem not to fol-
low the idea of one really big market for ideas. As historians have noted from a 
distance, such a view fails to account for the seemingly very large investments 
made by accountancy’s positivists in social networks and social dexterity of a 
type long exhibited by the more successful characters within AAA central.
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form of accounting history is not the same as, indeed is quite 
distinct from, the scholarship whose demise he claims not to 
see. In a sense this is reminiscent of Alice in the Looking Glass 
and her conversation with her cat:
By the way, Kitty, if only you’d been really with me in 
my dream, there was one thing you would have enjoyed 
– I had such a quantity of poetry said to me, all about 
fishes! Tomorrow morning you shall have a real treat. 
All the time you’re eating your breakfast, I’ll repeat ‘The 
Walrus and the Carpenter’ to you; and then you can 
make believe it’s oysters, dear!
 It is with regret that I find that Professor Carnegie’s pre-
scription is to the seeming fate of accounting history as Alice’s 
poetry of fishes is to her cat. Belief in the Carnegie prescrip-
tion is as making believe “it’s oysters dear” for you and for me. 
Just because we wish it were so, does not make it so in prac-
tice. We can still make believe, however, if it makes what may 
lie ahead any easier. I would rather see a call of this nature lead 
to fervent effort to train a new generation of accounting histo-
rians to take the place of those who will retire. Failing that, we 
might try to make believe its oysters for us all, a willed state 
that surely beats embrace of the signs of the alternative. Death 
rattles anyone?
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